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1 Introduction and General Overview 
 
In times of globalization and the information and knowledge society (van Weert, 
2006; Webster, 2006), being informed about the knowledge or expertise of spatially 
distributed persons is highly relevant for many areas of research and practical life, 
for example, educational, social and organizational research and practice, 
including knowledge management in computer-supported cooperative work 
(CSCW), and computer-supported collaborative learning (CSCL). As humans are 
social beings, learning is driven mostly by social processes, for example, by 
comparing one’s own knowledge or expertise to that of other people (Festinger, 
1954).  
Further, the task solutions that learners create in an elaborate way (i.e., not 
by mere guessing) can be regarded as externalizations of their knowledge 
(“sediments of cognitive activity”; Rindermann, 2013, p. 190). Thus, different 
solutions regarding the same task indicate different knowledge. In such a situation, 
we would like to know whether we have solved the task correctly or whether the 
other producer of a divergent solution has solved it correctly (Mugny, Butera, 
Sanchez-Mazas, & Pérez, 1995). This special learning situation is called a 
cognitive conflict (Lee et al., 2003): becoming aware that what we know differs from 
the information provided by the outside world (Piaget, 1950). If the outside world 
consists of another learner, for example, this situation is called a socio-cognitive 
conflict (Mugny & Doise, 1978). Since human beings have a rich repertoire of 
communicational strategies, such socio-cognitive conflicts can take on very 
different forms, as the following two short examples of a fictitious conversation of a 
1   Introduction and General Overview 
13 
learning dyad, taken from Darnon, Doll, and Butera (2007, p. 228), illustrate (Table 
1): 
 
Table 1 
Two Examples of a Fictitious Conversation of a Learning Dyad, Taken From 
Darnon and Colleagues (2007, p. 228) 
Example 1  
(Focus on Task Solution) 
Example 2  
(Focus on Social Comparison of Ability) 
“M:   What was your answer for question 
2? 
K:     I answered “X” 
M:    Hum. I thought the answer was “Y”. 
K:     I don’t think so because… 
M:    I see. Then how come…? 
K:     Probably because…”. 
“M:   What was your answer for question 
2? 
K:     “X” of course, the answer is obvious. 
M:    Hum. I thought the answer was “Y”. 
K:    How can you think the answer is “Y”? 
You should know that… 
M:    I see. Then how come…? 
K:    If you had listened to what the 
teacher said, you would know 
that…” 
 
The question of how learners react if they are confronted with a task solution 
of either a source that is of equally low or higher competence than they are and 
that deviates from their own solution is the focus of the present dissertation.  
 
 
 
1.1 Core Concepts 
As this dissertation unifies concepts from different subdisciplines of psychology and 
related research areas, it is unavoidable that different expressions for the same 
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underlying concept are taken up, in this case, knowledge, expertise, competence 
(Klieme, 2004), ability (Rindermann, Ceci, & Williams, 2013), and aptitude 
(Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001). The concept of ability is more often used in 
psychology, whereas the concept of competence is more common in educational 
science (Rindermann et al., 2013). Research on conflict elaboration theory (e.g., 
Mugny et al., 1995), which is one focus of this dissertation, often uses the 
psychologically broad concepts of competence and aptitude. In psychological 
research on expertise and expert performance (Ericsson, Charness, Feltovich, & 
Hoffman, 2006), the concepts of knowledge and expertise are more focused on 
cognitive aspects, and the level of specialization a person has reached (e.g., Chi, 
2006; Feltovich, Prietula, & Ericsson, 2006).  
Further, studies on conflict elaboration theory differentiate between the 
starting point of a cognitive conflict, called source (e.g., a learner who has 
produced a task solution which deviates from one’s own solution), and the target 
person whose reaction to this cognitive conflict is under investigation (e.g., Buchs, 
Butera, Mugny, & Darnon, 2004b; Butera, Caverni, & Rossi, 2005; Darnon et al., 
2007; Quiamzade, Mugny, & Darnon, 2009). 
 
 
 
1.2 Core Research Areas 
Psychological theories and models explain why it is useful to be informed about 
others’ knowledge or expertise (e.g. Clark & Murphy, 1982; Nickerson, Butler, & 
Carlin, 2009; Stewart & Stasser, 1995; Wegner, 1995) and why people still 
sometimes are not willing to share their knowledge and information with others 
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(e.g. Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002; Cress & Kimmerle, 2013). For example, computer-
mediated communication (e.g. Nückles & Stürz, 2006) and computer-supported 
collaborative learning (e.g. Dehler-Zufferey, Bodemer, Buder, & Hesse, 2011) 
become more effective and efficient if we have an accurate idea of our 
counterpart’s knowledge or expertise and can adapt our explanations accordingly 
(Clark & Murphy, 1982). In addition, group members manage their knowledge and 
information more effectively and efficiently if they are informed about who is expert 
in a certain area and, thus, responsible for storing and retrieving information in this 
area (e.g. Schreiber & Engelmann, 2010; Stewart & Stasser, 1995; Wegner, 1995). 
However, sharing one’s knowledge and expertise often is associated with 
“psychological costs”, such as loss of time, privacy, and “knowledge superiority” 
(e.g. Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002; Cress & Kimmerle, 2013; Reichling & Wulf, 2009). 
Therefore, a lot of different computer-supported applications have been developed 
for supporting distributed knowledge exchange in CSCL and CSCW respecting 
users’ privacy (e.g. Hsi & Hoadley, 1997; Maybury, D’Amore, & House, 2002). 
Being aware of others’ knowledge or expertise can change a learner’s 
behavior in many ways. As positive examples, previous studies have shown that it 
both supports collaborative learning and problem solving (Engelmann, Dehler, 
Bodemer, & Buder, 2009; Engelmann & Hesse, 2010) by improving peer 
explanations (e.g., Dehler-Zufferey et al., 2011), for example. As a negative 
example, however, comparing one’s own knowledge to that of other people can 
result in unfavorable social influence dynamics such as reduced information 
sharing with a peer due to seeking self-enhancement (Ray, Neugebauer, 
Sassenberg, Buder, & Hesse, 2013). Further, learning from a high competent 
partner can threaten a learner’s self-esteem which often results in quickly and 
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uncritically imitating the partner’s solution without understanding it deeply 
(competence threat; Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001). 
In the present dissertation, two research areas are integrated and extended: 
(1) research on knowledge awareness (Engelmann et al., 2009), a strand of 
research on group awareness (Gross, Stary, & Totter, 2005; Gutwin & Greenberg, 
1995) aiming to provide computer-supported external representations of learners’ 
knowledge or expertise which enhance collaborative learning and problem solving 
(Engelmann et al., 2009); (2) research on the conflict elaboration theory which 
deals with social influence dynamics in the context of knowledge exchange (Mugny 
et al., 1995). In the following sections, these two research areas will be introduced 
in brief.  
 
 
1.2.1 Group Awareness Research as the Origins of Research on 
Knowledge and Expertise Awareness 
Research on group awareness aims at investigating and supporting 
“consciousness and information of various aspects of the group and its members” 
(Gross et al., 2005, p. 327). Gutwin and Greenberg (1995, p. 1) define group 
awareness as “the up-to-the-minute knowledge of other people’s activities that is 
required for an individual to coordinate and complete their part of a group task”. 
This means that group members know, for example, what the others are doing 
(Carroll, Neale, Isenhour, Rosson, & McCrickard, 2003). Group awareness has to 
be established in virtual teams for CSCL and CSCW by means of groupware 
because group members who are spatially separated do not receive the social 
cues casually transmitted face-to-face which facilitate knowledge exchange and 
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coordination of task completion (e.g., seeing a group member nodding his or her 
head; Gutwin & Greenberg, 1995).  
Bodemer and Buder (2006; see also Janssen & Bodemer, 2013) argue that 
technologies for supporting group awareness have an even higher potential 
beyond re-establishing in virtual systems the environmental cues naturally 
occurring face-to-face, based on the group members’ observable activities: 
Cognitive group awareness tools (Janssen & Bodemer, 2013) inform about past or 
present cognitive aspects (e.g. knowledge, opinion, preference) of individuals or 
groups which often are not directly observable because they first need to be 
externalized; this cognitive awareness information supports groups in their self-
regulation of social interaction and knowledge exchange (cf. Bodemer & Buder, 
2006; Buder, Bodemer, Dehler, & Engelmann, 
Knowledge awareness (Engelmann et al., 2009) is a type of cognitive group 
awareness (Janssen & Bodemer, 2013) defined as “an individual’s state of being 
informed and having perceived information about others’ knowledge”, that is, 
especially others’ externalized task-relevant knowledge (Engelmann et al., 2009, p. 
950). Similarly, expertise awareness can be defined as being informed about 
various aspects of others’ expertise, for example, their “type and level of expertise” 
(Maybury et al., 2002, p. 204), their activities in their area of expertise, and 
changes to their area of expertise (Dörner, Pipek & Won, 2007; Reichling & Wulf, 
2009; Vivacqua, 1999).  
2009; Janssen & Bodemer, 2013).  
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In this dissertation, CSCL studies in which the distributed participants 
interacted with and learned from partners who had an equal level of expertise1
Two basic processes result in the formation of knowledge or expertise 
awareness: (1) people explicitly provide information about their knowledge or 
expertise, and (2) people extract from their environment information about other’s 
knowledge (cf. Engelmann et al., 2009) or expertise (cf. Maybury et al., 2002). For 
example, labels of the level of expertise (i.e., the continuum of “layperson – novice 
– intermediate – expert”, Bromme, Jucks, & Rambow, 2004; Bromme, Rambow, & 
Nückles, 2001; or the categories of “student vs. professor”; cf. Mugny, Tafani, 
Butera, & Pigière, 1998) can be awarded either by other people or institutions, they 
can be statistically generated by means of data mining (e.g. Afzal et al., 2009; 
Mattox, Maybury, & Morey, 1999; Yimam & Kobsa, 2000; Yimam-Seid & Kobsa, 
2003), or people can self-label their level of expertise and understanding of a topic 
(cf. 
 
regarding the subject matter domain of the task conducted in the studies are 
categorized as researching knowledge awareness (e.g. Bodemer, 2011), including 
this dissertation’s both experimental studies. In contrast, CSCW studies which 
involved distributed professional cooperation with or help seeking between 
interaction partners who showed a larger asymmetry of the level of expertise 
regarding the subject-matter domain of the task conducted in the studies are 
categorized as researching expertise awareness (e.g. Nückles & Stürz, 2006; 
Reichling & Wulf, 2009).  
Dehler, Bodemer, Buder, & Hesse, 2009; Dehler-Zufferey et al., 
                                            
1 In one experimental condition of this dissertation’s Study 1, the learning partner was indicated as a 
supposed “textbook of the subject-matter domain”; however, the presented task solution in fact had 
been created by a former participant of a pilot study who had an equally low level of expertise in the 
task domain like the authentic participants. Therefore, the term “knowledge awareness” is used in 
the context of Study 1, and not “expertise awareness”. 
2011).  
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Computer-based external representations can enable people to compare 
their own knowledge or expertise with other persons’ knowledge or expertise (cf. 
Engelmann et al., 2009). Several studies have consistently shown that approaches 
for fostering knowledge or expertise awareness by means of external 
representations improve computer-supported learning and distributed collaboration 
(e.g., Engelmann et al., 2009; Nückles & Stürz, 2006; Sangin, Molinari, Nüssli, & 
Dillenbourg, 2011).  
Until now, the following classifications of knowledge awareness exist in 
CSCL: Engelmann and colleagues (2009) introduced a dimension of knowledge 
awareness with the three subcategories context-based, hybrid, and content-based 
knowledge awareness. Further, Sangin and colleagues (2011) suggested 
distinguishing between activity-based (cf. Ogata, Matsuura, & Yano, 2000; Ogata & 
Yano, 1998, 2000), subjective, and objective knowledge awareness. In addition, in 
CSCW research and development, the related concept of expertise awareness is 
often used (e.g. Chen, Tao, Yan, Anerousis, & Shao, 2010; Dörner et al., 2007; 
Maybury et al., 2002), and several features of the awareness information (i.e. 
explicit vs. implicit, static vs. dynamic information) are considered to be especially 
relevant (Maybury et al., 2002). The present dissertation aims at contributing to 
research on knowledge and expertise awareness in a conceptual way, and, 
regarding knowledge awareness, also in an empirical way: 
(1) Conceptual contribution: Since knowledge awareness and expertise 
awareness are related concepts (cf. Janssen & Bodemer, 2013) which have 
commonalities and differences, a possible distinction is presented. Further, a 
combined classification of knowledge and expertise awareness for CSCL and 
CSCW is introduced in order to highlight their commonalities, describe the possible 
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types of knowledge or expertise awareness, and their psychological functions for 
CSCL and CSCW comprehensively. Based on the awareness features presented 
by Maybury and colleagues (2002), this dissertation suggests (1) to determine both 
for knowledge and expertise awareness whether the awareness information 
comprises an explicit versus an implicit level of expertise, and (2) to take dynamic 
changes of the external representation for supporting knowledge or expertise 
awareness into account by differentiating between static versus dynamic 
knowledge or expertise awareness information (cf. Engelmann et al., 2009; 
Maybury et al., 2002). In addition, based on a literature review, this dissertation 
provides an overview of 30 computer-mediated applications developed for 
supporting knowledge management by knowledge or expertise awareness 
information, and an overview of 22 studies conducted in the past 16 years applying 
different configurations of knowledge or expertise awareness, the latter being 
categorized according to the suggested combined classification.  
(2) Empirical contribution: In two experimental studies, a computer-based 
external representation for supporting knowledge awareness is used in order to 
make task-relevant diversity between learning partners visually salient (cf. 
Bodemer, 2011; Engelmann et al., 2009) which should increase the probability of 
experiencing a socio-cognitive conflict (Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001). This 
dissertation argues that the comparison processes activated by knowledge 
awareness information, that is, comparison of task solutions (Bodemer, 2011) and 
social comparison of the level of expertise (Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001), are highly 
relevant in a cognitive conflict paradigm, for example. Therefore, in two 
experimental studies, assumptions of the currently most comprehensive theory on 
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socio-cognitive conflict, the conflict elaboration theory (Mugny et al., 1995), will be 
tested and extended. In the next section, this theory is briefly outlined.  
 
 
1.2.2 Conflict Elaboration Theory 
Conflict Elaboration Theory (Pérez & Mugny, 1992; Mugny et al., 1995) integrates 
both cognitive developmental approaches to peer learning (cf. Mugny & Doise, 
1978) as well as social psychological theories and findings (e.g. evidence on 
majority vs. minority influence; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Moscovici & Personnaz, 
1986) for predicting learners’ behavior (e.g., in inductive reasoning tasks; Legrenzi, 
Butera, Mugny, & Pérez, 1991). In the following, this theory will be introduced 
briefly, presenting assumptions, an example of an empirical study, and limitations. 
 
1.2.2.1 Origins of Conflict Elaboration Theory 
Conflict elaboration theory integrates several areas of research, namely research 
on cognitive development (Piaget, 1950), especially by means of socio-cognitive 
conflicts (e.g., Mugny & Doise, 1978), and research on social influence, especially 
majority vs. minority influence and source credibility on learners’ behavior (e.g., 
Asch, 1956; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1986; Mugny, 1984; 
Nemeth, 1986). This theory aims at predicting under which conditions social 
influence can support or hinder learning processes. 
Piaget (1950) argued that cognitive conflicts trigger human cognitive 
development (cf. Marchand, 2012). “Cognitive conflict is a perceptual state in which 
one notices the discrepancy between one’s cognitive structure and the 
environment (external information) …” (Lee et al., 2003, p. 585). Inspired by his 
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early scientific experiences as a biologist, Piaget (1950) postulated a motive to 
achieve cognitive balance through adaptation to new information: Intellectual 
development occurs through conflict resolution, namely, if new information is either 
integrated in existing schemata (assimilation) or if new schemata are acquired 
(accommodation).  
Some neo-Piagetian approaches focus on socio-cognitive conflicts, that is, 
on situations in which the new information is introduced by another person. 
According to Tudge and Rogoff (1989), peer learning, that is, learning from a 
person who is equally competent than oneself is, should be more fruitful than 
learning from more or less competent partners because peers would “(…) attribute 
the same meanings to the same terms.” (O’Donnell & O’Kelly, 1994, p. 337). 
Further, conflict elaboration theory is concerned with social influence 
dynamics in the context of different cognitive tasks, for example, hypothesis 
testing, inductive reasoning, anagram tasks etc. (e.g. Butera et al., 2005; 
Quiamzade et al., 2009).  
 
1.2.2.2 Assumptions of Conflict Elaboration Theory 
One motivation to develop conflict elaboration theory was that Mugny and 
colleagues (1995) noted controversies among theories of social influence (e.g., 
majority-minority controversy; Deutsch & Gerrard, 1955; Moscovici, 1980): These 
theories made different predictions because they focused on different tasks and 
sources of social influence. Therefore, conflict elaboration theory aimed at 
explaining “the multiple types of tasks, sources, levels of influence and processes 
through which social influence operates” by means of the postulated unifying and 
underlying concept of conflict elaboration (Mugny et al., 1995, p. 161). 
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The starting point is a situation in which a person solves a task or gives his 
or her opinion and, after this, is confronted with a task solution or opinion of 
another source (e.g., a person or a group) which deviates from the person’s 
solution or opinion. With regard to this basic situation, three core assumptions are 
(Mugny et al., 1995, p. 162): 
1) Different sources of deviating solutions or opinions will result in 
different conflict elaborations, even if the degree of divergence 
between these different sources is similar. 
2) Different tasks will result in different kinds of conflict elaborations, 
even if the source of the deviating solution or opinion and the degree 
of deviation are held constant. 
3) Different ways of conflict elaboration result in different patterns of 
manifest or latent social influence. 
Relevance for this dissertation: In Study 1, the first assumption of conflict 
elaboration theory will be tested directly by varying the level of expertise of the 
source (i.e. high competent or equally low competent) of a solution which deviates 
from the learner’s solution, while keeping the presented deviating solution 
constant. 
Further, by means of this dissertation’s Study 1, the second assumption of 
this theory will be investigated indirectly by applying a more knowledge-rich 
inductive reasoning task (i.e. identifying structural similarities between law cases; 
Nievelstein, van Gog, Boshuizen, & Prins, 2010) than the tasks used in previous 
studies on conflict elaboration theory (e.g. hypothesis testing; Butera et al., 2005), 
while the source of the deviating solution or strategy as the experimental factor is 
similar in Study 1 of this dissertation and in Study 1 by Butera and colleagues 
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(2005). In this way, it can be at least indirectly concluded whether equally low 
competent sources of cognitive conflict support learning of well-defined tasks more 
(result of Study 1 by Butera et al., 2005) than they support learning of knowledge-
rich tasks (Study 1 of present dissertation). 
The different ways of conflict elaboration and patterns of social influence 
(assumption 3) will be examined by assessing various cognitive, personality-
related, and both individual and collaborative performance-related aspects of the 
learners, for example, perceived cognitive conflict (Studies 1 & 2), rating of own 
versus partner’s task-relevant competence (Study 2), need for socially comparing 
one’s abilities (Study 1), correctness of task solutions and adaptation to the 
presented deviating solution (Studies 1 & 2), and quality of peer talk (Study 2). 
 
In addition, conflict elaboration theory distinguishes tasks according to two 
dimensions: (1) relevance of error and (2) social relevance (cf. Mugny et al., 1995). 
Relevance of error is given if the task has only one correct solution which is 
objectively measureable. Social relevance is given if the task defines membership 
to a social category or group, or a person’s rank position within a category. Both 
dimensions can be crossed, resulting in four types of tasks which are described in 
detail by Mugny and colleagues (1995, e.g. Figure 2, p. 162). Only the following 
type of task is relevant for the present dissertation: high relevance of error, socially 
anchoring task (TAP, Tasks: Aptitudes; Mugny et al., 1995). Such tasks are used 
as aptitude tests for evaluating abilities and ranking people. The foci of conflict 
elaboration are (1.) to increase judgments’ correctness, and (2.) to give the best 
self-image (cf. social comparison theory; Festinger, 1954). Examples of these 
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aptitude tasks are problem solving tasks which require higher order thinking skills 
(e.g., inductive reasoning; Butera et al., 2005). 
Relevance for this dissertation: In both experimental studies of this 
dissertation, the same aptitude task will be applied, an inductive reasoning task 
(i.e. identifying structural similarities between law cases; Nievelstein et al., 2010) 
which is more knowledge-rich than, for example, the inductive reasoning task used 
in the studies by Butera and colleagues (2005). Thus, both a high relevance of 
error and a socially anchoring task will be realized which should increase the 
probability of experiencing a cognitive conflict when the learner is confronted with a 
solution which deviates from his or her solution. 
 
1.2.2.3 A Study Example 
Butera and colleagues (2005) examined the impact of a high- versus low-
competence source of a cognitive conflict in the context of an inductive reasoning 
task (i.e., testing hypotheses in Wason’s 2-4-6 problem; Wason, 1960). 
Competence of the learning partner, who in fact was a confederate of the 
experimenter, was varied by either presenting the partner as a novice in this task or 
as an expert. In Study 1, problem solvers were more likely to acquire a new and 
rare strategy (i.e., disconfirmation strategy) when they perceived a low-competence 
partner using this strategy compared to a high-competence partner using this 
strategy. One interpretation of this result was that since the credibility of the low-
competence partner was low, the learners tested more alternatives in order to find 
a good strategy (Chaiken, 1980). Thus, a low-competence partner would not 
threaten their self-esteem, thus, enabling an epistemic conflict resolution. In 
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contrast, the high-competence partner activated a relational conflict, that is, a 
social comparison of ability which distracted learners’ attention from the core task. 
 
1.2.2.4 A Critical Appraisal of Conflict Elaboration Theory 
Studies conducted in the context of conflict elaboration theory have focused mainly 
on conditions under which peer learning is advantageous (e.g., Buchs & Butera, 
2009; Quiamzade et al., 2009). The first experimental study of the present 
dissertation shows that in the context of a knowledge-rich task, learners improve 
their task solutions more if confronted with a more competent source than with an 
equally low competent source.  
Further, assumptions of the theory have not been completely empirically 
validated because in most studies, it was not assessed whether learners actually 
had experienced a cognitive conflict (e.g., Quiamzade, 2007). Therefore, in the 
present dissertation, perceived cognitive conflict will be measured by means of 
subjective rating scales (e.g., Darnon et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2003).  
Moreover, in the first study of this dissertation, it is argued that there is a 
personality trait, the need for socially comparing one’s abilities (Festinger, 1954; 
Gibbons & Buunk, 1999), which is an important moderator for explaining social 
influence on learners’ behavior while solving a cognitive conflict task. This 
personality trait has not been included in previous studies on conflict elaboration 
theory before. 
In addition, most studies on this theory excluded authentic interaction 
between the target person and the source of the deviating solution (e.g., 
Quiamzade, 2007). Consequently, previous studies did not clarify the impact of 
peer talk on conflict elaboration (Mercer, 1995, 1996). For this reason, the second 
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experimental study of the present dissertation aimed at examining whether 
computer-supported peer talk increases or helps to resolve cognitive conflict 
compared to no peer talk (Harmon, 1998). 
 
 
 
1.3 General Overview of This Dissertation‘s Aims and Research 
Program 
In Chapter 2, a combined classification of knowledge awareness in CSCL and 
expertise awareness in CSCW will be introduced in detail. Subsequently, this 
dissertation’s two experimental studies will be presented in Chapters 3 and 4. 
These studies aimed at answering the following questions: 
Study 1 (cf. Chapter 3): 
− What impact does a more highly competent producer of a deviating task 
solution have compared to an equally low competent producer on 
experiencing a cognitive conflict and on completing a knowledge-rich 
cognitive conflict task? 
− Is perceived cognitive conflict a mediator of learners’ adaptation of task 
solutions to the presented deviating solution? 
− Is learners’ need for socially comparing their abilities a moderator of their 
adaptation of task solutions to the presented deviating solution? 
One core assumption of Study 1 is that for knowledge-rich tasks in which no 
interaction between the source of a cognitive conflict and the target person takes 
place (e.g. identifying structural similarities between law cases; Nievelstein et al., 
2010), an equally low competent producer of a deviating task solution will have a 
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much weaker social influence on conflict elaboration than usually postulated by 
studies on conflict elaboration theory applying less knowledge-rich tasks (e.g. 
anagram tasks; Quiamzade et al., 2009). Therefore, in comparison to Study 1, the 
aim of Study 2 is to strengthen the influence of the equally low competent source of 
the cognitive conflict by enabling computer-mediated peer talk in dyads of learners 
who initially generated largely deviating task solutions. It is assumed that peer talk 
helps to understand the peer’s deviating solution better and, thus, to reduce doubts 
about its correctness (Harmon, 1998). This could result in more frequently adopting 
aspects of the peer’s task solution compared to the condition of Study 2 without 
peer talk and compared to the similar condition of Study 1 without peer talk. 
However, only high quality peer talk (Mercer, 1995, 1996, 2000) should support a 
superior correctness of task solutions compared to no peer talk (Teasley, 1995, 
1997; Webb, Troper, & Fall, 1995). 
In addition, static knowledge awareness information will be provided in 
Study 1, whereas dynamic knowledge awareness information will be presented in 
Study 2 in order to descriptively compare across both studies whether these two 
subcategories of knowledge awareness may have different psychological effects 
(cf. technology affordances & representational guidance; Suthers, 2006), according 
to the combined classification proposed in Chapter 2. Therefore, the research 
questions of Study 2 are: 
 
Study 2 (cf. Chapter 4): 
− Does peer talk help to reduce cognitive conflict and to improve the 
correctness of task solutions compared to no peer talk? 
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− What role does the quality and content of peer talk play for improving 
task solutions? 
− Does dynamic knowledge awareness (Study 2) result in different 
psychological effects on learners who do not communicate compared to 
static knowledge awareness (Study 1)? 
Table 2 provides an overview of the experimental factors, the subcategories 
of knowledge awareness implemented, and further factors investigated in the 
context of the two studies of this dissertation. According to previous CSCL 
classifications of knowledge awareness, both studies applied hybrid knowledge 
awareness information (Engelmann et al., 2009) because the external 
representation provided a combination of both context-based (e.g., information on 
whether a learner did or did not complete the task) and content-based (i.e., 
concrete task solution) knowledge awareness information. Further, subjective 
knowledge awareness information (Sangin et al., 2011) was applied because the 
learners’ self-created task solution was displayed. According to the combined 
classification of knowledge awareness presented in Chapter 2, in both studies, an 
explicit level of expertise was realized because the presented task solution which 
always had been generated by an equally low competent peer learner was either 
labeled as the solution of “a peer layperson” (Study 1 & 2) or as the solution of “a 
textbook of the subject-matter domain” (Study 1). Further, according to the 
combined classification, in Study 1, static knowledge awareness information was 
provided because the learners were informed once about a task solution that 
deviated from their own task solution. In contrast, in Study 2, the learners received 
dynamic knowledge awareness information because the computer-based external 
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representation displayed in real-time which changes their learning partner made to 
his or her task solution. 
 
Table 2 
Overview of Both Experimental Studies: Subcategories of Knowledge Awareness 
and Further Factors Investigated 
Study 1 
(N = 59 Participants) 
Study 2 
(N = 58 Participants) 
Hybrid Knowledge Awareness 
Subjective Knowledge Awareness 
Static Knowledge Awareness Dynamic Knowledge Awareness 
Explicit Level of Expertise: 
Varied  
= Experimental Factor: 
Constant: 
Experimental 
Condition 1 (nt = 20): 
“Textbook of Subject-
Matter Domain”  
= High Competent 
Experimental 
Condition 2(np = 20): 
“Peer Layperson”  
= Equally Low 
Competent 
Both Experimental Conditions: 
“Peer Layperson” 
= Equally Low Competent 
Baseline Condition  
(nb = 19): 
Without Knowledge Awareness 
 
Further Factors: 
Individual Differences Regarding  
Need for Socially Comparing Abilities  
= Moderator 
Peer Talk  
= Experimental Factor 
With Peer Talk 
(npt = 26) 
Without Peer Talk 
(nnpt = 32) 
 
In Chapter 5, the results and methods of both experimental studies will be 
discussed, and their implications for future studies will be presented.  
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1.4 Prepared and Submitted Manuscripts for Publication 
The reader should note that the conceptual Chapter 2 and the two experimental 
studies (Chapters 3 & 4) were designed as consecutive steps of the current 
dissertation project. However, Chapters 2 to 4 were written in a way that they can 
be published independently of each other. Thus, the empirical Chapters 3 and 4 
each include a theoretical introduction, a method and a results part as well as a 
discussion section. As the studies are partly based on similar assumptions, some 
overlap was unavoidable. In the following, the publication manuscripts and 
conference contributions are listed on which this dissertation is based. The order 
reflects the chronology of the chapters within this dissertation.  
 
Baumeister, A. E. E., Engelmann, T., Cress, U., & Hesse, F. W. (in prep.). 
Knowledge and expertise awareness in CSCL and CSCW: Theories, 
applications, and their psychological implications. Manuscript in preparation. 
Baumeister, A. E. E., Engelmann, T., & Hesse, F. W. (subm. a). One task, 
divergent solutions: Source labels and social comparison guide adaptation 
in a cognitive conflict task. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Baumeister, A. E. E., Engelmann, T., & Hesse, F. W. (subm. b). Impact of peer talk 
in a computer-supported cognitive conflict task. Manuscript submitted for 
publication. 
 
 
 
1.5 Conference Contributions 
Baumeister, A., Engelmann, T., & Hesse, F. W. (2013, July). Peer talk in a 
cognitive conflict task. [Talk]. The 13th European Congress of Psychology 
(ECP). Stockholm, Sweden. 
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Baumeister, A., Engelmann, T., & Hesse, F. W. (2009, September). Der Einfluss 
von "Knowledge Awareness" auf die individuelle ähnlichkeitsbasierte 
Fallzuordnung [Poster; Abstract]. Universität des Saarlandes, Fr 5.1 
Erziehungswissenschaft (Hrsg.), 12. Fachtagung Pädagogische Psychologie 
der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Psychologie (S. 114). Saarbrücken: 
Digitaldruck Pirrot. 
Baumeister, A., Engelmann, T., & Hesse, F. W. (2008, July). Can knowledge 
awareness enhance computer-supported dyadic analogical problem 
solving? [Talk]. 11th Conference of Junior Researchers of EARLI. Leuven, 
Belgium. 
Baumeister, A., Engelmann, T., & Hesse, F. W. (2008, July). Impact of computer-
supported collaboration and knowledge awareness on analogical problem 
solving [Poster; Abstract]. In C. Dalbert (Hrsg.), Abstracts of the XXIX 
International Congress of Psychology (S. 666). Essex, UK: Psychology 
Press. 
Baumeister, A., Engelmann, T., & Hesse, F. W. (2008, June). Can knowledge 
awareness enhance computer-supported dyadic analogical problem 
solving? [Talk]. Doctoral Consortium Workshop of the Eighth International 
Conference of the Learning Sciences. Utrecht, the Netherlands. 
Baumeister, A., Engelmann, T., & Hesse, F. W. (2008, June). The potential of 
computer-supported collaboration and knowledge awareness for supporting 
analogical problem solving [Poster]. Eighth International Conference of the 
Learning Sciences. Utrecht, the Netherlands. 
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2 Knowledge and Expertise Awareness in CSCL and 
CSCW: Theories, Applications, and Their 
Psychological Implications 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Baumeister, A. E. E., Engelmann, T., Cress, U., & Hesse, F. W. (in prep.). 
Knowledge and expertise awareness in CSCL and CSCW: Theories, 
applications, and their psychological implications. Manuscript in preparation. 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The question of how people can be informed about others’ knowledge or expertise 
is highly relevant both for organizational but also for educational research and 
practice, for example, computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW) and 
computer-supported collaborative learning (CSCL). Being aware of others’ 
knowledge or expertise can change a person’s behavior in many ways. This 
chapter introduces theories relevant for explaining the psychological impact of 
knowledge and expertise awareness in CSCL and CSCW, examples of 
applications for supporting knowledge and expertise awareness, and psychological 
implications of knowledge and expertise awareness as identified by several studies 
in the past years. The chapter is structured as follows: 
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− WHAT is knowledge awareness or expertise awareness? – These 
concepts are introduced. 
− WHY is knowledge awareness or expertise awareness important? –
Theories and models are outlined which describe and explain different 
psychological aspects of knowledge exchange and the role of knowledge 
or expertise awareness. 
− WHICH APPLICATIONS for supporting knowledge awareness or 
expertise awareness do exist? – An overview of example applications in 
CSCL and CSCW is provided based on a literature review.  
− HOW does knowledge awareness or expertise awareness work? – A 
classification is introduced for describing the core features of 
representations for supporting knowledge and expertise awareness. In 
addition, a literature review is presented on studies which contributed to 
understanding the psychological effects of knowledge awareness or 
expertise awareness and which were conducted in the past 16 years. 
Further, psychological functions of the different subcategory of 
knowledge or expertise awareness for CSCL and CSCW are described. 
 
 
 
2.2 WHAT is Knowledge Awareness or Expertise Awareness? 
The term ‘knowledge awareness’ was first used in the context of CSCL 
environments that provided “information about the activities of the learners within 
the shared knowledge space” (Ogata & Yano, 1998, p. 219). That is, knowledge 
awareness was conceptualized in the sense of behavioral action awareness 
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(Carroll, Neale, Isenhour, Rosson, & McCrickard, 2003; Engelmann, Dehler, 
Bodemer, & Buder, 2009). According to a more recent definition, knowledge 
awareness is “an individual’s state of being informed and having perceived 
information about others’ knowledge”, that is, especially others’ externalized task-
relevant knowledge (Engelmann et al., 2009, p. 950).  
Knowledge awareness is a strand of research on group awareness (Gross, 
Stary, & Totter, 2005; Gutwin & Greenberg, 1995). The aim of group awareness 
research is to support virtual teams in CSCL and CSCW by providing them with 
task-relevant information about the group members (Gross et al., 2005) because 
spatially separated group members do not receive the social cues casually 
transmitted face-to-face which facilitate knowledge exchange (e.g., seeing a group 
member nodding his or her head) and coordination of task completion (Gutwin & 
Greenberg, 1995). Research on knowledge awareness aims at providing 
computer-supported external representations of the users’ knowledge that enhance 
learning and distributed collaboration (Engelmann et al., 2009; Janssen & 
Bodemer, 2013). More specifically, knowledge awareness is a type of cognitive 
group awareness (Janssen & Bodemer, 2013). In contrast to classical group 
awareness (e.g., action awareness; Carroll et al., 2003), cognitive group 
awareness aims at capturing cognitive variables that are usually not directly 
observable in face-to-face or computer-mediated situations (Janssen & Bodemer, 
2013).  
Expertise awareness means that people are informed about various aspects 
of others’ expertise, for example, their “type and level of expertise” (Maybury, 
D’Amore, & House, 2002, p. 204), their activities in their area of expertise, and 
changes to their area of expertise (Dörner, Pipek & Won, 2007; Reichling & Wulf, 
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2009; Vivacqua, 1999). Expertise awareness is an important goal of distributed 
knowledge management in order “to enable innovation, integration and 
collaboration” both within and across organizations (Maybury et al., 2002, p. 201).  
Knowledge and expertise are related concepts, however, some distinctions 
can be made: “Knowledge is information which has been cognitively processed” 
(Tergan & Keller, 2005, p. 3). Expertise means that a person has gained both 
highly specialized knowledge regarding a subject-matter domain (Bromme, Jucks, 
& Rambow, 2004; Bromme, Rambow, & Nückles, 2001) and general problem 
solving competence (Sassenberg, Boos, & Klapproth, 2001) by means of 
prolonged and intensive deliberate practice (Ericsson, 2006). Due to pattern 
learning and automaticity, experts own informal and tacit knowledge (Scardamalia 
& Bereiter, 1994) which is difficult to elicit (Hoffman & Lintern, 2006). In addition, 
expertise (similarly like the concept of ‘competence’) also involves motivational and 
volitional aspects (Klieme, 2004).  
In CSCL and CSCW, no strict distinction between the concepts of 
knowledge or expertise awareness is made (e.g. Janssen & Bodemer, 2013). 
However, the term knowledge awareness is more common in CSCL settings which 
involve distributed persons with an equal level of expertise in the subject-matter 
domain of a task (cf. Engelmann et al., 2009), whereas expertise awareness is 
more common in CSCW settings which involve a stronger asymmetry regarding the 
level of domain-specific expertise, in case of distributed professional cooperation or 
help seeking from an expert, for example (cf. Maybury et al., 2002).  
One commonality of knowledge awareness and expertise awareness is that 
each concept can exist on the level of individual persons without having to be 
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shared on a group level (cf. Engelmann et al., 2009), in contrast to related group 
level concepts such as common ground (Clark & Brennan, 1991).  
 
 
 
2.3 WHY is Knowledge Awareness or Expertise Awareness 
Important? 
In the following, theories and models from different areas of research are outlined 
in brief which explain the potential of and the barriers to knowledge exchange as 
well as the role of knowledge or expertise awareness.  
Knowledge projection. As long as people do not have an accurate idea of 
others’ knowledge, they tend to use stereotypes and their own knowledge as a 
basis for judging what others might know (cf. Nickerson, 1999; Nickerson, 
Baddeley, & Freeman, 1987; Nickerson, Butler, & Carlin, 2009). However, this 
heuristic can result, for example, in the “illusion of simplicity” (Krauss & Fussell, 
1991; Nickerson, 1999), that is, overestimating the comprehensibility of one’s own 
explanations for others (Nickerson, 1999).  
Role of knowledge or expertise awareness. Computer-mediated 
communication becomes more effective and efficient if collaboration partners have 
an accurate idea of each other’s knowledge because they can adapt their verbal 
explanations to their partners’ current level of understanding (audience design; 
Clark & Murphy, 1982) which is an important process in computer-supported 
collaborative learning (e.g., Dehler-Zufferey, Bodemer, Buder, & Hesse, 2011; 
Fussell & Krauss, 1989a,b). 
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Collective information sampling model. In most situations of group 
decision making, groups first have to share the members’ diverse knowledge in 
order to reach good decisions which are potentially superior to individual decisions 
(Wittenbaum, Hollingshead, & Botero 2004). However, a special challenge is an 
information distribution called hidden profile (e.g. Stasser & Stewart, 1992): The 
majority of group members shares information supporting a less optimal decision 
whereas only a minority has information needed in order to reach the optimal 
decision. Information which is known to most members right from the start will be 
mentioned more probably and will exert a stronger influence on members’ 
preferences (Gigone & Hastie, 1993, 1997) than information which is known to only 
one member (Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987; Stasser, 1992).  
Role of knowledge or expertise awareness. Studies have shown that if 
members know their expertise distribution, unshared information is discussed more 
often and, thus, the hidden profile can be solved correctly (e.g. Stasser, Stewart, & 
Wittenbaum, 1995; Stasser, Vaughan, & Stewart, 2000; Stewart & Stasser, 1995) 
and more efficiently (Schreiber & Engelmann, 2010). Further, members in the role 
of experts do not only take the responsibility for bringing in their own information 
but they also remember previously unshared information which was mentioned by 
other members more often than if all members have the role of non-experts 
(Stewart & Stasser, 1995). However, perceived status differences can compromise 
information sharing of low status members (Hollingshead, 1996; Wittenbaum, 
1998, 2000). In addition, Sassenberg and colleagues (2001) have shown that 
expertise awareness resulted in improved information sharing by virtual groups 
only if expertise was interpreted as unique knowledge and not as general problem 
solving competence. 
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Transactive memory system. Wegner (1986, 1995) developed a model of 
how “individual human memory systems are linked into group memory systems” 
using a computer network metaphor (Wegner, 1995; p. 319). This model explains 
how information is assigned to an expert within the group who is responsible for 
storing this information and how information retrieval is coordinated. Further, it 
explains why teams who are informed about their distribution of expertise work 
more efficiently than teams who are not informed about this. 
Role of knowledge or expertise awareness. Recent studies on TMS have 
extended this concept by (1) arguing that both individual-level and collective 
awareness of the knowledge or expertise distribution exist independently of each 
other (Engelmann et al., 2009; Schreiber & Engelmann, 2010; Yuan, Monge, & 
Fulk, 2005), (2) by showing that being aware of others’ concrete knowledge 
elements and information resources results in a superior team performance than 
only being aware of others’ areas of expertise without more concrete information 
(Engelmann & Hesse, 2011) and by (3) showing that not only expertise awareness 
but also social and technological accessibility of experts contribute to expertise 
retrieval in large teams (Yuan, Carboni, & Ehrlich, 2010).  
 
Social dilemma. Contributing to a shared database which was supposed to 
be used for knowledge management actually represents a social dilemma situation 
(Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002; Cress, Kimmerle, & Hesse, 2006; Cress & Kimmerle, 
2013; Thorn & Connolly, 1987): The more one contributes to the database, the 
higher the individual costs are (e.g. loss of time & of “knowledge superiority” in 
relation to those who receive one’s knowledge), whereas the more the other group 
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members contribute, the higher the individual benefit is of having all the information 
available in the database (Cress, 2005). Therefore, the least costs would be 
associated with contributing nothing and exploiting others’ information in the 
database. However, if all group members showed this kind of social loafing and 
free riding (Karau & Williams, 1993), the database would remain empty and 
useless for all (Dawes, 2000). This dilemma can be overcome by a combination of 
psychological and structural interventions (see Cress & Kimmerle, 2013, for an 
overview), for example, by informing the group members which of their potential 
contribution is important for others and by changing the payoff function (e.g. use-
related bonus system; Cress et al., 2006).  
Role of knowledge or expertise awareness. People who have relatively less 
knowledge pursue a proportionality norm, that is, they expect from more 
knowledgable ones that they share their knowledge and contribute more (cf. Cress 
& Kimmerle, 2008, 2013; Rapoport & Suleiman, 1993), whereas people who think 
that they have more knowledge than others do not feel more obliged to share it 
(Cress & Kimmerle, 2008). Although the proportionality norm is reduced for 
privileged people, they still contribute more in comparison to those who think that 
they have less knowledge (Cress & Kimmerle, 2008). Thus, knowledge or expertise 
awareness activates social norms relevant for contributing to a public good such as 
a shared database (Connolly & Thorn, 1990; Fulk, Flanagan, Kalman, Monge, & 
Ryan, 1996). 
 
Conflict elaboration theory. Exchanging one’s knowledge with others often 
sparks socio-cognitive conflicts if learners experience discrepancies between their 
own versus others’ knowledge and understanding (Doise & Mugny, 1984; Lee et 
2   Knowledge and Expertise Awareness in CSCL and CSCW:  
Theories, Applications, and Their Psychological Implications 
41 
al., 2003). Conflict Elaboration Theory (Pérez & Mugny, 1992; Mugny, Butera, 
Sanchez-Mazas, & Pérez, 1995) integrates both cognitive developmental 
approaches to peer learning (e.g. Doise & Mugny, 1984) and evidence on social 
influence (e.g. Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1986) for 
predicting learners’ behavior in socio-cognitive conflict situations (Buchs, Butera, 
Mugny, & Darnon, 2004b). The starting point is a situation in which a person solves 
a task, and is confronted with a task solution of another source (e.g., a person or a 
group) which deviates from the person’s solution. This theory aims at predicting 
under which conditions social influence can support or hinder knowledge 
acquisition and exchange.  
Role of knowledge or expertise awareness. According to this theory, 
learning from a high competent partner is more likely to cause a competence threat 
than learning from an equally low competent partner (e.g. Butera, Caverni, & Rossi, 
2005). A competence threat can result in uncritically imitating the partner’s solution 
without elaborating it further (Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001).  
 
Communities of practice. Core features of work practice are narration, that 
is, story-telling as accumulated knowledge of past similar cases in order to solve 
current problems, collaboration and social construction (Brown & Duguid, 1991). 
Becoming an insider and practitioner of a community can be described as a 
process of legitimate peripheral participation (Lave & Wenger, 1991). That is, by 
means of modeling, scaffolding, coaching, and fading (Collins, Brown, & Newman, 
1989), newcomers receive an increasing level of legitimate access to the ongoing 
community practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991).  
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Role of knowledge or expertise awareness. The meaning of the concepts of 
knowledge or expertise is not fixed but it has to be negotiated socially depending 
on the current situation (Lave, 1991). It is neither enough for knowledge acquisition 
to know who the experts are in an organization, nor to receive only abstract 
instructions from experts, nor to be only allowed to observe an expert model, but 
novices should also be actively engaged in the implicit practices in situ (Brown & 
Duguid, 1991; Lave, 1991). Communities of practice in large companies usually 
engage in various activities aimed at supporting knowledge or expertise 
awareness, for example, maintaining discussion forums, or employing content 
managers who provide meta-data about the authors of documents in a shared 
database (Lesser & Storck, 2001). 
 
Knowledge building communities. This concept emerged from the notion 
of “intentional learning” (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1989), that is, learners pursue 
both their individual learning agenda and collaborative learning goals (Scardamalia 
& Bereiter, 2006). One aim was to restructure classroom activities towards a “peer 
review system” by means of a computer-supported intentional learning 
environment (CSILE; Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1994). Later, the concept of 
knowledge-building communities was used as a model for developing “knowledge-
networking tools” for educational technology users, researchers, and 
businesspeople (CILT Knowledge Network; Hoadley & Pea, 2002; Knowledge 
Forum®; Scardamalia, 2004). A decentralized open knowledge environment 
serves as a communal multimedia database for collective understanding 
(Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1994).  
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Role of knowledge or expertise awareness. Although knowledge building 
communities are a learner-centered and constructivist approach to education, the 
importance of authoritative information is clearly acknowledged (Scardamalia & 
Bereiter, 2006). Students should judge the quality of expert information by using 
arguments instead of absorbing them uncritically or passively (Scardamalia & 
Bereiter, 1994, 2006). Knowledge building communities use networking tools 
including functionalities some of which support knowledge or expertise awareness 
(see Table 3).  
 
Organizational knowledge creation. According to Nonaka (1994), new 
organizational knowledge evolves as a result of four modes of a dynamic 
interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge: Tacit knowledge is created either 
by sharing experience in the course of socialization or by learning in general 
(internalization), whereas explicit knowledge results from either externalizing tacit 
knowledge or from combining (i.e., adding, recategorizing) several aspects of 
already existing explicit knowledge. Nonaka (1994) describes organizational 
knowledge creation as “an upward spiral process” (p. 20) in which the interactions 
between tacit and explicit knowledge extend to involve an increasing number of 
actors and become faster. In order to support organizational knowledge creation, 
he recommends that self-organizing teams cooperate flexibly horizontally and 
vertically in the context of a “hypertext organization”. Whether the knowledge spiral 
increases or decreases depends on the incentive system for motivating individuals 
to share their knowledge, the corporate culture (e.g. trust, commitment), and further 
factors (Nonaka, Toyama, & Nagata, 2000).  
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Role of knowledge or expertise awareness. Awareness of other people’s 
knowledge and expertise is crucial for several processes of organizational 
knowledge management (Maybury et al., 2002). One aim of applications in CSCW 
is to create an organizational memory (Walsh & Unger, 1991). Since it is 
problematic for experts to constantly externalize their tacit knowledge, automatic 
approaches have been developed (Marwick, 2001): Technologies are used to infer 
the authors’ expertise from documents or from the questions answered in 
discussion forums (e.g. Ackerman & McDonald, 1996; Autonomy Corporation, 
2002; Yimam & Kobsa, 2000; Yimam-Seid & Kobsa, 2003). 
 
 
 
2.4 WHICH APPLICATIONS for Supporting Knowledge 
Awareness or Expertise Awareness do exist? 
In order to provide an overview of applications for supporting knowledge and 
expertise awareness in CSCL and CSCW, a literature search was conducted for 
the terms “knowledge awareness”, “expertise awareness”, “awareness of 
competence”, “knowledge sharing”, “knowledge building (community)”, “knowledge 
representation”, “visualization of expertise”, “expertise map”, “knowledge map”, 
“expert finding”, “expert locating”, “expert(ise) recommender”, and “knowledge 
management (system)” in online databases (PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, SciVerse 
SCOPUS), and in the Internet search engine Goggle. Further, the cross-references 
of publications on these search terms were also searched. Table 3 provides this 
overview of 30 applications which is not exhaustive because examples were not 
incIuded if no sufficient information was found on the Internet (e.g. Abuzz “Ask 
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Anything”, cf. Maybury et al., 2002). These applications were developed for 
different areas (e.g. research networks, K-12 education, public sector agencies), 
and are based on data and profiles which were either generated by the users 
themselves (e.g. MII Expert Finder; Mattox, Maybury, & Morey, 1999; Mattox, 
Smith, & Seligman, 1998), generated automatically (e.g. MIT ExpertFinder; 
Vivacqua, 1999) or semi-automatically (e.g. ExpertFinding System; Reichling & 
Wulf, 2009). The methods used for knowledge management and identification of 
expertise include, for example, publishing (Autonomy Corporation, 2002), self-
nomination (Walther, 1997), database search (Mattox et al., 1999), tagging 
(Walther, 1997), ontology (Ackerman & McDonald, 1996) vs. user-generated 
hypotheses about expertise (e.g. Expertise Awareness Client; Dörner et al., 2007), 
recommender systems (McDonald & Ackerman, 2000; Reichling & Wulf, 2009; 
Vivacqua, 1999), statistical ranking and clustering techniques such as social 
network analysis (cf. Maybury et al., 2002), and visualization techniques (e.g. Afzal 
et al., 2009; Mockus & Herbsleb, 2002; Walter, 1997) for knowledge and 
information (cf. Tergan & Keller, 2005).  
 
In order to understand how knowledge or expertise awareness works from a 
psychological perspective, it is important to consider the whole process of 
generating, perceiving, and reacting to knowledge or expertise information which 
will be done in the following sections. 
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Table 3  
Examples of Applications for Supporting Knowledge Management by Knowledge and Expertise Awareness Information 
Assessment of Expertise Awareness in Resolution Networks (Chen, Tao, Yan, Anerousis, & Shao, 2010) 
− application area: IT service industry, resolution social networks: routing of users’ problem tickets to the right expert groups; tickets are 
transferred from one expert group to the next if the previous expert group cannot solve the problem 
− resolution social network (cf. Chen et al., 2010): nodes represent expert groups, edges represent ticket transfer relationships between 
groups; measures: number of resolved and transferred tickets of a group; expertise awareness between two groups = transfer 
effectiveness 
− provides ticket routing recommendations based on majority of past decisions (transition probability; Chen et al., 2010); further aim: 
training program for improving the awareness of other groups’ expertise 
Autonomy Technology (http://www.autonomy.com/, Autonomy, 2013; Autonomy Corporation, 2002) 
− application area: Hewlett Packard company for the automation of business operations, e.g., knowledge management, content publishing, 
e-commerce, electronic customer relationship management, Internet portals, etc. 
− extracts areas of expertise from users’ search & publication histories; helps to find users with similar interests & experts in a field 
(http://www.autonomy.com/, Autonomy, 2013; Autonomy Corporation, 2002) 
− privacy: not all items in a results list can be viewed by all users, & not all documents in a results list can be opened by all users 
(http://www.autonomy.com/, Autonomy, 2013; Autonomy Corporation, 2002) 
CILTKN (The Center for Innovative Learning Technologies Knowledge Network; e.g. Hoadley & Pea, 2002) 
− application area: research networks; tools for “know-who”: recommender engines, & visualizations of social information (see ReferralWeb; 
Kautz, Selman, & Shah, 1997); the center was closed in 2004 
− community software: collaborative workspace, bulletin board, daily news publishing system (Hoadley & Pea, 2002) 
− information about: people (contact, interests), projects (research & implementation), places (Universities, organizations, labs, K-12 
schools), papers (bibliographic information about important papers in the field of learning technology), syllabi (courses, learning 
technology), collaboration notices (jobs, conferences, etc.; Hoadley & Pea, 2002) 
CONNEX (“connection to experts”, Hewlett-Packard; cf. Bouthillier & Shearer, 2002) 
− application area: Intranet of Hewlett-Packard 
− directory of expert profiles (Bouthillier & Shearer, 2002) & Web browser interface for searching profiles (Becerra-Fernandez, 2000) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Examples of Applications for Supporting Knowledge Management by Knowledge and Expertise Awareness Information 
ContactFinder (Krulwich & Burkey, 1996) 
− application area: learning from bulletin boards, e.g. large-scale technology-related bulletin board 
− agent monitors discussion boards & identifies authors; responds to questions with a referral to an expert (i.e. contact information); 
operates conservatively (i.e. more often fails to extract contacts than to erroneously indicate experts; Krulwich & Burkey, 1996) 
CSILE (e.g. Scardamalia, 2004; Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1991, 1994) 
see: Knowledge Forum® 
Dataware Knowledge Management Systems (Walter, 1997) 
− application area: software solution for organizational knowledge management 
− Dataware II Knowledge Directory (Walter, 1997): based on keyword tagging; expertise discovery by directory search; self-nomination of 
experts or nomination by administrators; user receives expert’s contact information; various search options (e.g. navigating the categories 
of a “knowledge map” visualization, thesaurus, etc.) 
DEMOIR Approach (Dynamic Expertise Modeling from Organizational Information Resources; Yimam & Kobsa, 2000) 
− application area: organizational knowledge management 
− “expertise information space”: centralized expertise model (based on domain models / ontologies); “expert-related source gatherers”: 
agents for memorizing names of experts & gathering documents; “source type identifiers”: agents for analyzing documents; “source 
wrappers”: agents specialized on domain knowledge driven extraction of expertise indicators (e.g. concepts) from documents; “expertise 
information space manager”: integrates expertise indicators received from source wrappers; methods: matrix fusion (clustering on several 
tiers) & visualization (Yimam & Kobsa, 2000; Yimam-Seid & Kobsa, 2003) 
Expertise Browser (ExB; Mockus & Herbsleb, 2002) 
− application area: collaborative software engineering for change management systems 
− displays relationship between software parts & domain experts; quantifies expertise based on change activity: levels & breadth of 
expertise based on changes which the person / organization made to the software; measures of expertise: e.g. area, technology used, 
purpose / type of change, productivity, external ratings of other developers, etc.; expertise profiles of individuals or organizations 
− attributes of experts (individuals / organizations) are visualized, e.g. by a tree structure (SWING JTree; Zukowski, 2005); user browses 
through experts & can compare degree & breadth of expertise 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Examples of Applications for Supporting Knowledge Management by Knowledge and Expertise Awareness Information 
Expertise Discovery and Visualization in a Scientific Community (Afzal et al., 2009) 
− application area: finding reviewers for a journal; finding potential collaboration partners 
− applies citation mining technique; expertise measures: number of publications, number of citations received, extent & proportion of 
citations within particular area, expert profile records & experience; 2 categories of experts: (1) reviewers (manually assigned) & (2) high-
profile authors (automatically flagged); calculates expertise’ weights; hyperbolic tree visualization (hyperbolic browser; Lamping & Rao, 
1996) of experts 
ExpertFinding System (Reichling & Veith, 2005; Reichling, Veith, & Wulf, 2007; Reichling & Wulf, 2009) 
− application area: organizational knowledge management; e.g. European industrial association; finding experts to handle incoming 
requests from member companies 
− expert recommender system; combines self-reported information & keyword mining from users’ personal files with their permission: users 
select documents from their own file system; system generates semi-automatic large scale keyword list from the selected documents; 
dynamic changes to users’ expertise are captured by automatically extracting additional new keywords from the selected changed 
documents (Reichling et al., 2007; Reichling & Wulf, 2009) 
− search results: expertise profiles, 2 components: (1) keyword profile, & (2) yellow pages (YP) profile: users enter contact information & 
information about their educational background, job description, qualifications etc. (Reichling et al., 2007; Reichling & Wulf, 2009) 
− for study results (Reichling & Wulf, 2009), see Table 5 in this chapter 
Expertise Map (Huang et al., 2006) 
− application areas: research expertise of business school professors in Taiwan; different types of low-level domain-independent visual 
tasks according to cognitive fit theory (Vessey, 1991); especially suited for associate, compare, distinguish, & cluster tasks (Huang et al., 
2006) 
− applies dimensionality reduction visualization technique for expertise information space: self-organizing map (SOM) & multidimensional 
scaling (MDS); 2 types of maps generated: (1) expert map (grouping of experts according to overlapping research interests), & (2) 
expertise field map (grouping of expertise according to similarities of research fields); distance on map captures similarity (Huang et al., 
2006) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Examples of Applications for Supporting Knowledge Management by Knowledge and Expertise Awareness Information 
Expertise Recommender (ER; McDonald & Ackerman, 2000) 
− application area: organizational knowledge management 
− applies recommender system; generates user profiles based on work products; users are clustered into groups having similar dis-/likes; 
expertise search based on topic areas & optional filters (e.g. social network selected by user); if recommended person also is logged into 
ER server, “contact” button establishes synchronous chat (McDonald & Ackerman, 2000) 
HelpNet (Maron, Curry, & Thompson, 1986) 
− application area: experimental system at first; implemented on IBM Personal Computer later 
− provides access to a repository of expertise information; document retrieval system 
− inductive search system: finds the best fit between information seeker & source of knowledge & information from a large class of objects 
or people; probability ranking: both information seeker & source of knowledge & information estimate probability of the source to satisfy 
seeker’s query (Maron et al., 1986) 
IHMC CmapTools (Institute for Human and Machine Cognition, 2013; http://ftp.ihmc.us/) 
− application area: knowledge modeling software toolkit for individual & collaborative knowledge management (Novak & Cañas, 2006) 
− knowledge modeling by means of digital concept maps (i.e. hierarchically ordered nodes & links between them); stored on “CmapServers” 
(Cañas, Hill, & Lott, 2003); users can link resources (e.g. image or text files, videos) to the concepts within the concept maps; several 
concept maps can be linked together (Cañas et al., 2003) 
− collaboration functions (Cañas et al., 2004): concept maps can be shared; text chat function; multiple distributed users can edit a shared 
map synchronously: upon request, first author of a concept map can open up an “edit lock” to further users; color-coding of multiple users: 
anonymous or non-anonymous name labels are displayed together with a color code at the user’s cursor position 
− for study results (e.g. Engelmann, Tergan, & Hesse, 2010b), see Table 4 in this chapter 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Examples of Applications for Supporting Knowledge Management by Knowledge and Expertise Awareness Information 
Knowledge Forum® (www.knowledgeforum.com; Knowledge Building Concepts Inc., 2013) 
− application area: group workspace for knowledge-building communities of various ages & contexts, e.g. K-12 schools, hospitals, research 
teams, other organizations 
− formerly named Computer Supported Intentional Learning Environments (CSILE; e.g. Scardamalia, 2004; Scardamalia & Bereiter, 
1991, 1994; current developers: The Institute for Knowledge Innovation and Technology, Toronto, Canada) 
− knowledge base for sharing & searching information (e.g. posting text, graphics or videos, commenting on others’ notes); offers flexible 
visual information displays (www.knowledgeforum.com; Knowledge Building Concepts Inc., 2013) 
− features: text & graphical notes can only be edited by author; peer commentary & automatic notification of authors about comments; 
several communication modes: (a)synchronous, audio, video, etc.; default option: public-access material, but private material also 
possible (Scardamalia, 2004; Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1991, 1994) 
LinkedIn (www.linkedin.com; LinkedIn Corporation, 2013) 
− application area: professional social networking; open access 
− users create own profile based on professional affiliation (Papacharissi, 2009); “gated-access approach” aims at supporting trust among 
members (Papacharissi, 2009): new connections are built (1) via pre-existing relationships or (2) by intervention of a mutual contact 
person 
Mahara ePortfolio System (Kineo Pacific & Catalyst IT, 2013; Hand, Bell, & Kent, 2012; https://mahara.org/) 
− application area: individual & collaborative knowledge management; example user: PH Heidelberg (https://eportfolio.ph-heidelberg.de) 
− funders: New Zealand's Tertiary Education Commission's e-learning Collaborative Development Fund (eCDF), Massey University, 
Auckland University of Technology, The Open Polytechnic of New Zealand, & Victoria University of Wellington (Hand et al., 2012) 
− personal learning environment: users create & share electronic portfolios (i.e. web pages showing their personal educational or work 
achievements), write (or comment on others’) learning protocols (blogs), plan projects, upload files, embed social media resources, 
collaborate using shared files & forums, e.g. for peer assessment (Stevenson, 2006); personal profile can be exported (Hand et al., 2012) 
− user decides which content is private vs. open for specific target groups (e.g. “my contacts”, “my learning groups”, etc.); users can decide 
for each blog post whether commenting is possible; user can invite new users (Hand et al., 2012) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Examples of Applications for Supporting Knowledge Management by Knowledge and Expertise Awareness Information 
MIT ExpertFinder (Vivacqua, 1999) 
− application area: networked community of experts in the domain of Java programming; educational (e.g. students’ help seeking) or 
corporate settings; project aims at being domain independent 
− agent creates personal profile of users’ areas & level of expertise; made available to other expert finder agents upon request; profiles are 
recalculated periodically; level of expertise is classified by analyzing frequency of using specific methods, operations & libraries, & by 
comparison with the norms of general usage (Vivacqua, 1999) 
− agent preferably recommends people who have a slightly higher level of expertise than the questioner (cf. Vygotsky, 1978) 
− incentive for users: interface shows how many questions & answers users have contributed to the community (Vivacqua, 1999) 
− system can only be used if users are willing to share their profiles; however, users can choose their public areas of expertise & self-
correct own profile (Vivacqua, 1999) 
Multimedia Forum Kiosk (MFK; Hsi & Hoadley, 1997) 
− application area: electronic collaborative discussion tool for science classrooms; asynchronous text-based communication 
− system provides multimedia information (e.g. videos, sound tracks etc.) about everyday scientific phenomena 
− 3 formats of discussion (Hsi & Hoadley, 1997): (1) anonymous contribution, (2) contribution attributed to author, (3) contribution attributed 
to author plus authority participation (e.g. class teacher); 2 graphical representations of discourse: (1) “opinion area”: students’ initial 
statements plus contributor’s photo (non-anonymous) or cartoon face (anonymous), & (2) “discussion area”: argument map visualizing 
disagreements, questions, & lines of reasoning plus photo or cartoon face 
− students ask questions, generate explanations for scientific phenomena, & revise others’ ideas – also across different class periods 
− for study results (Hsi & Hoadley, 1997), see Table 4 in this chapter 
NewsMate (Fagrell, Forsberg, Johannesson, & Ljungberg, 2000; Forsberg, 2001) 
− application area: PDA based application for knowledge sharing & expertise location; developed for mobile & distributed journalists 
− features: personal to-do list; list of colleagues from the same radio station working on the same topic & who is online; SMS warning: 
“There is a risk of cross-reporting” (Forsberg, 2001, p. 51) 
− FieldWise (Fagrell, 2000; Forsberg, 2001): generalized architecture based on NewsMate (Fagrell et al., 2000) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Examples of Applications for Supporting Knowledge Management by Knowledge and Expertise Awareness Information 
ReferralWeb (AT & T Laboratories; Kautz, Selman, & Shah, 1997) 
− application area: reconstructing, visualizing, & searching social networks of experts on the World Wide Web 
− search engine retrieves Web documents mentioning the user; names of other individuals are extracted from the documents; individuals 
are matched to topic areas; results are merged into global network model; uncovers existing social networks based on bibliographic 
information, i.e., it visualizes connections between researchers based on coauthorship of papers (Kautz et al., 1997) 
− provides referrals via chains of named individuals, i.e., transparency instead of anonymity; recommendations are generated by matching 
profiles (Kautz et al., 1997) 
ResearchScorecard (www.researchscorecard.com, ResearchScorecard Inc., 2013; Committee on the Impact of Academic Research on 
Industrial Performance, 2003) 
− application area: database & data mining tools for finding & evaluating biomedical scientists & technological experts 
− established according to the recommendation of the "Committee on the Impact of Academic Research on Industrial Performance" of the 
US National Academy of Engineering in 2003 
− offers researchers’ & departmental profiles including their funding history; provides statistical reports of research productivity (e.g. patent 
& publication count), funding levels, research trends & product usage (www.researchscorecard.com, ResearchScorecard Inc., 2013) 
SIGMA (Dörner, Pipek, & Won, 2007) 
− application area: freelancer network of trainers & consultants 
− Expertise Awareness Client (eXacT; Dörner et al., 2007): based on users’ activities & hypotheses regarding indicators of expertise (i.e. 
decentralized expertise classification); expertise validation: visualization of trust into other users’ shared hypothesis generator; notification 
service: semi-automated observation of activities indicating (gain of) expertise; privacy filter; organizational filter (i.e. expertise indicators 
according to organizational policy); interest filter (individualization); Expertise Awareness Manager (EAMa) for changing indicators; 
Expertise Awareness Monitor (EAMo) displays current changes in available expertise (Dörner et al., 2007) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Examples of Applications for Supporting Knowledge Management by Knowledge and Expertise Awareness Information 
SPUD project (“Skills Planning und/and Development”, Microsoft; cf. Davenport & Prusak, 1997) 
− application area: organizational knowledge management, helping newcomers in the domain of system development finding experts in a 
geographically distributed company (Davenport & Prusak, 1997; Penuel & Cohen, 2003) 
− “knowledge map”: graphical representation (database) of distribution of knowledge in a company (Penuel & Cohen, 2003); supports 
matching persons to jobs & work teams 
− community of practice approach (Lave & Wenger, 1991): newcomers engage in “practice on the periphery” (Lave & Wenger, 1991) by 
interacting with experts via simulations & modeling tools (Penuel & Cohen, 2003); online assistance provided by the experts 
The Answer Garden (Ackerman & McDonald, 1996; Ackerman & Malone, 1990) 
− application area: tool for supporting growth of organizational memory by means of databases containing commonly-asked questions 
(Ackerman & Malone, 1990); targeted at organizations with a help line for customers (Penuel & Cohen, 2003), e.g. domain of software 
engineering 
− users are referred to experts who categorize users’ questions into ontology (tree-branching strategy; Penuel & Cohen, 2003) which can 
be browsed by users to find questions & answers similar to their own question; if user doesn’t find a good answer, s/he can send an 
anonymous email question to expert; new questions & answers are immediately integrated in the tree-branching structure; advantage: 
experts do not have to answer recurrent questions (Penuel & Cohen, 2003) 
− expertise validation by tracking experts performance, user ratings & experts’ response times 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Examples of Applications for Supporting Knowledge Management by Knowledge and Expertise Awareness Information 
The MITRE Corporation (cf. Maybury, D’Amore, & House, 2002) 
− application area: public sector agencies 
− Collaborative Virtual Workspace (CVW; Spellman, Mosier, Deus, & Carlson, 1997): ”virtual building” metaphor; several groupware 
systems (e.g. workspace & social awareness); various interaction devices (e.g. chat, whiteboard, audio/video conferencing); contributions 
are attributable to individuals (e.g. cursors & annotations are identifiable) 
− MII Expert Finder (Mattox, Maybury, & Morey, 1999; Mattox, Smith, & Seligman, 1998): employee sends query to search engine; 
expertise identification by data mining (e.g. newsletters, project descriptions, publications, home pages): system ranks employees’ 
expertise by number of mentions of a concept, methods: (1) tagging, & (2) proximity of name and keywords; self-definitions (e.g. 
employee’s resume) receive additional weight; search results: expert’s contact information, hyperlinks to relevant documents 
− MII XperNet (Maybury et al., 2002): works without user queries; expertise classification: (1) statistical clustering techniques, & (2) social 
network analysis (i.e., networks extracted from several activities & public share folders, e.g., projects, publications); assessment of level of 
expertise; uses domain-independent models of expertise (i.e., assessment based on document authorship, network centrality, personal 
Web pages, project membership); network expansion by dynamic merging of lower level clusters into larger core clusters; network 
visualization: map with nodes (people) and links between nodes (associations, strength of association); pilot system for extracting 
communities of practice (e.g. Lave & Wenger, 1991) & generating a “community card” (i.e. community name, central members, 
organizational unit, key projects, members working on overlapping projects) 
Technorati (www.technorati.com; Technorati Media, 2013) 
− application area: first Internet search engine for blogs; services for blogs & social media sites (e.g. BlogCritics.org: journalism publishing 
platform; Twittorati.com: shows tweets of top bloggers) 
− indexes blogs & tagged social media written in English; provides a current index of the most popular people & topics in the Blogosphere 
(www.technorati.com; Technorati Media, 2013) 
− open source software; tracks bloggers’ tags; if a blog is not included in list of blogs, bloggers can “claim” their blog; users can personalize 
their search by means of “watchlists” (i.e. RSS feeds; Pikas, 2005) 
− search areas: e.g. news, politics, business, technology, sports, entertainment, lifestyle etc. (www.technorati.com; Technorati Media, 2013) 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Examples of Applications for Supporting Knowledge Management by Knowledge and Expertise Awareness Information 
Whoknows (formerly named: Xperscore; Whoknows, 2013; whoknows.com/app/index) 
− application area: organizational knowledge management; automatic expertise discovery & collaboration platform 
− system silently monitors employees non-confidential Internet & Intranet browsing; learns how employees use & distribute internal 
information, e.g. to external experts via web based forums, social networks etc.; creates a knowledge base of information & experts 
(www.xperscore.com; Xperscore, 2013) 
Xpertfinder (Fraunhofer IPA; Sihn & Heeren, 2001) 
− application area: organizational knowledge management & cooperation management 
− aims at identifying experts in cooperating companies (Sihn & Heeren, 2001); creates expert profiles by analyzing e-mail communication or 
news group contributions of registered users (Sihn & Heeren, 2001) 
− within a company: knowledge models of subject areas (“thematic field trees”) constantly developed & saved on a server; across 
companies: cooperation network server 
− protection of personal data: experts are not named to the users directly; users send a query via e-mail; first query result is a graph of all 
company-wide anonymous experts; users can choose between companies and anonymous experts; system decodes selected experts & 
forwards message; experts can either reply to or ignore the question (Sihn & Heeren, 2001) 
Xperscore (Xperscore Inc., 2013; www.xperscore.com) 
see: Whoknows 
Yenta (Foner, 1997) 
− application area: developed for individual knowledge management; however, not yet been made available for widespread use on the 
Internet (Foner, 1997) 
− expertise identification from e-mail message traffic & ubiquitous personal data (e.g. newsgroup articles read or written by the user, not 
explicitly asking about expertise only; Foner, 1997); matchmaker: identifies users interested in similar topics across the Internet (Foner, 
1997) & enables one-to-one or group conversations; system compares agents’ information & transmits referrals from one agent to another 
(Foner, 1997); aim: finding relevant peers or experts 
− system protects private user data by means of cryptography, decentralization & a peer-to-peer architecture (Foner, 1997) 
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2.5 HOW does Knowledge Awareness or Expertise Awareness 
work? 
Engelmann and colleagues (2009) have introduced a cyclic model which includes 
the four steps of (1) person A adding knowledge or expertise information to an 
interaction space, (2) person B extracting these information, (3) person B adding 
adaptive information, and (4) person A extracting adaptive information from the 
interaction space (Engelmann et al., 2009, Fig. 1, p. 953). The following process 
steps will be described which are similar to those by Engelmann and colleagues 
(2009): (1) sharing – (2) representing – (3) perceiving – (4) psychological effects of 
knowledge or expertise information. 
 
 
2.5.1 Sharing Knowledge or Expertise Information 
Vivacqua (1999) argues that three major motives for sharing one’s knowledge and 
expertise exist: (1) expecting reciprocity in giving and receiving help, (2) being 
prosocial by answering others’ requests, and (3) showing off by presenting an 
excellent expertise profile (Reichling & Wulf, 2009). Showing off, that is, pretending 
to be more expert than one actually is, is discussed controversially in the literature: 
some researchers and developers see this as a problem (e.g. Reichling & Wulf, 
2009), others not (Vivacqua, 1999) because pretenders would receive questions 
they could not answer which subsequently would discourage them from continuing 
to show off (Vivacqua, 1999, p. 3). 
Further problems of user-generated data are that they are quickly out-dated 
(Maybury et al., 2002), and that the users lack motivation for contributing for 
several reasons, for example, loss of time (Cress & Kimmerle, 2013), visibility of 
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incompetence (Dörner et al., 2007), and privacy concerns (Reichling & Wulf, 2009). 
Therefore, some knowledge management systems have built in incentives for 
knowledge sharing also recommended by empirical studies (see Cress & 
Kimmerle, 2013, for an overview). For example, electronic commerce systems 
could give those users „credits“ who answer others’ questions. With these credits, 
users could “buy answers” to their own questions (Vivacqua, 19992
 
). Nevertheless, 
user-generated data are essential because one problem of automatically 
generated data is, for example, an erroneous classification of a person as an 
expert if the person has published content (e.g. as a web administrator) without 
being the author of this content (Maybury et al., 2002). 
 
2.5.2 Representing Knowledge or Expertise Information 
Several classifications for describing the way knowledge or expertise is 
externalized and represented have been introduced in the past which will be 
outlined in brief. First, classifications of knowledge awareness derived from CSCL 
research will be presented (i.e. Engelmann et al., 2009; Ogata & Yano, 1998, 
2003; Sangin, Molinari, Nüssli, & Dillenbourg, 2011). After this, a description of 
general features of awareness derived from CSCW research will be introduced (i.e. 
Maybury et al., 2002) because these awareness features should be included in a 
combined classification of knowledge or expertise awareness for CSCL and CSCW 
in order to describe more comprehensively which subcategories of 
 
                                            
2 The examples by Vivacqua (1999, p.3) are not available on the Internet any more (e.g. Abuzz “Ask 
Anything”). 
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knowledge or expertise awareness exist and which effects they have on the users’ 
behavior.  
Engelmann and colleagues (2009) introduced a classification of knowledge 
awareness in CSCL having three categories: 
Content-based knowledge awareness. Information for supporting knowledge 
awareness is provided by directly visualizing the content of a person’s knowledge 
concerning a subject-matter domain, for example, by means of digital concept 
mapping (e.g., Engelmann et al., 2010b; Engelmann & Hesse, 2011). The amount 
of content-based information about others’ knowledge can vary from meta-
knowledge about the domain of expertise only (Engelmann & Hesse, 2011) to 
more concrete knowledge elements and information resources (Engelmann et al., 
2010b; Schreiber & Engelmann, 2010).  
Context-based knowledge awareness. Information for supporting knowledge 
awareness is added as enrichment to the interaction space, in the context of a task 
that does not mirror the person’s concrete knowledge content per se. For example, 
learners self-assess their understanding of text units of learning material by tagging 
small boxes next to each text unit that they referred to (partner knowledge 
awareness tool; Dehler, Bodemer, Buder, & Hesse, 2009; Dehler-Zufferey et al., 
2011).  
Hybrid knowledge awareness. In this case, an external representation 
provides a combination of both context-based and content-based knowledge 
awareness. For example, the individual task solutions of learners are visualized 
displaying both content elements of the learners’ knowledge and contextual 
information regarding, for example, (un)shared knowledge gaps and conflicting 
knowledge (e.g. Bodemer, 2011). 
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In addition, Sangin and colleagues (2011) suggest distinguishing between 
activity-based, subjective and objective knowledge awareness. In the studies by 
Ogata and colleagues (e.g., Ogata, Matsuura, & Yano, 2000; Ogata & Yano, 1998, 
2000), activity-based knowledge awareness was implemented by providing 
learners with a “knowledge awareness map” visualizing, for example, how often a 
learner had visited a web page or how often he or she had given correct answers 
on conceptual questions. In this way, the knowledge awareness map 
recommended learning partners based on a learner’s current questions. Self-
reports of understanding or expertise provide information for supporting subjective 
knowledge awareness (Sangin et al., 2011). These information can also 
encompass self-created task solutions because if learners create them in an 
elaborate way (i.e., not by mere guessing), these solutions represent the learners’ 
knowledge (cf. Engelmann et al., 2009). Objective knowledge awareness can be 
supported, for example, by displaying objective performance scores, obtained in a 
prior knowledge test (Sangin et al., 2011). 
 
In this chapter, it is argued that these classifications can also be used for 
describing expertise awareness information in CSCW contexts. Moreover, it is 
proposed that the following CSCW classification of awareness should be combined 
with these previous CSCL classifications of knowledge awareness: In describing 
general features of awareness, Maybury and colleagues (2002) distinguished 
between explicit versus implicit information and static versus dynamic information 
(pp. 199-200). In the following, these awareness features will be used in order to 
provide a combined classification of knowledge awareness in CSCL and expertise 
awareness in CSCW and in order to draw conclusions about the different 
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psychological effects and functions of each subcategory of knowledge or expertise 
awareness. 
Based on the description of awareness features provided by Maybury and 
colleagues (2002), it is suggested (1) to additionally differentiate between an 
explicit versus implicit level of expertise and (2) to take dynamic changes of the 
external representation for supporting knowledge or expertise awareness into 
account by distinguishing between static versus dynamic knowledge or expertise 
awareness (cf. Engelmann et al., 2009).  
Explicit information about the level of expertise is provided if, for example, 
persons are labeled as “layperson”, “novice”, or “expert” (Bromme et al., 2001; 
Mugny et al., 
For a comprehensive classification of knowledge or expertise awareness, it 
is important to distinguish between explicit or implicit information about others’ 
knowledge or expertise because being aware of others’ level of expertise and, 
thus, social status can activate strong social influence dynamics (e.g. Butera et al., 
2005; Quiamzade, Mugny, & Darnon, 2009), for example, social comparison of 
one’s own status to that of the others (Festinger, 1954). In addition, providing 
1995; Mugny, Tafani, Butera, & Pigière, 1998). This can be done by 
displaying these labels instead of or next to the names of the users of a shared 
interaction space (Baumeister, Engelmann, & Hesse, subm. a, b) or by labeling 
digital artifacts, for example, the individual concept maps of the collaborators as 
map of “expert a / b / c” (Engelmann et al., 2010b; Engelmann & Hesse, 2011). 
Further, the computer-supported environment can display the users’ self-ratings of 
their degree of understanding of a topic (Dehler-Zufferey et al., 2011; Nückles & 
Stürz, 2006; Ray, Neugebauer, Sassenberg, Buder, & Hesse, 2013) or their level 
of prior knowledge obtained by a test (Sangin et al., 2011). 
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accurate information about users’ level and areas of expertise is a core topic of 
knowledge management research and development (e.g. Dörner et al., 2007; 
Maybury et al., 2002; Reichling & Wulf, 2009; Vivacqua, 1999). 
In contrast, sometimes the collaboration space only implicitly provides 
information about others’ status of expertise, for example, by displaying the number 
of tasks worked on, the concrete task solutions (e.g., Bodemer, 2011), and by 
enabling communication.  
However, the dimension of explicit versus implicit level of expertise should 
not be confused with disclosing the names of the users versus keeping them 
anonymous. Explicit means that the information is indicated on the computer 
screen, whereas implicit means that the users are left to infer the information 
regarding others’ level of expertise.  
In addition, differentiating between an explicit or implicit level of expertise is 
more precise than the term ‘expertise awareness’ (Maybury et al., 2002) because 
expertise awareness per se does not tell whether the level of expertise is provided 
explicitly within the collaboration space or whether this information exists only 
implicitly which should have different psychological effects on the users of this 
awareness information. Sometimes users of knowledge management systems are 
erroneously identified as experts (Maybury et al., 2002; Reichling & Wulf, 2009). In 
such cases, additionally providing explicit information about their level of expertise 
could help to reduce over- or underestimation of their expertise (Reichling & Wulf, 
2009). Some knowledge management systems provide explicit rankings of 
expertise by means of data mining (e.g. Afzal et al., 2009), or the users themselves 
determine criteria of expertise (e.g. Dörner et al., 2006). However, in some 
collaboration platforms, an implicit level of expertise is implemented (e.g. Hoadley 
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& Pea, 2002), although the system has automatically ranked the users’ level of 
expertise (e.g. MII Expert Finder; Mattox et al., 1998, 1999). 
Moreover, external representations for supporting knowledge or expertise 
awareness should be categorized as static versus dynamic according to whether 
the users are informed about changes to the representation of knowledge or 
expertise of others in real-time (dynamic) or not (static). In the context of this 
dissertation, it is assumed that static knowledge or expertise awareness will have 
certain psychological effects other than dynamic knowledge or expertise 
awareness. For example, if we use a virtual learning environment and receive the 
information there that someone has recently read a short text about a complex 
subject-matter for the first time, we will assume that we can ask the person about 
the content of the text, but we will not assume that the person can answer all 
questions concerning this topic. Thus, we will consider this as an instance of static 
knowledge awareness, referring to a specific situation in a specific point in time 
(“has recently read this text”). However, if we observe in the virtual learning 
environment that this person has been learning about the topic for several months, 
becoming increasingly more knowledgeable, we will adapt our initial assumptions 
regarding this learner’s level of expertise, and we will consider this as an instance 
of dynamic knowledge awareness.  
The technical idea is not new that group awareness can support 
collaboration by storing and mirroring the users’ activities (Gutwin & Greenberg, 
2002), for example, by showing a timeline (‘history awareness’; Kreijns & 
Kirschner, 2002). Further, in the research literature on CSCW and CSCL, there is a 
strong emphasis on “the dynamic nature of expertise information” (Huang et al., 
2006, p. 1541; see also Engelmann et al., 2009, p. 951: “the dynamic nature of the 
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awareness concept”). However, as the overview of empirical studies presented in 
the next sections (Tables 4 & 5) will show, these studies in fact implemented either 
static or dynamic knowledge or expertise awareness. Thus, it seems possible that 
there might be a gap between the practices of using knowledge or expertise 
awareness information in the field (cf. Table 3) and empirical research on these 
concepts. Therefore, the distinction between static vs. dynamic knowledge or 
expertise awareness is a newly introduced dimension in CSCL and CSCW 
research. It is important to investigate whether these two subcategories (static vs. 
dynamic) of the dimension of presentation time are suitable for different purposes 
of CSCL and CSCW.  
 
 
2.5.3 Psychological Studies on Knowledge or Expertise Awareness 
In order to provide an overview of studies investigating the perception and 
psychological effects of knowledge or expertise awareness in CSCL and CSCW, a 
literature search was conducted using the same terms as for searching 
applications, that is, “knowledge awareness”, “expertise awareness”, “awareness of 
competence”, “knowledge sharing”, “knowledge building (community)”, “knowledge 
representation”, “visualization of expertise”, “expertise map”, “knowledge map”, 
“expert finding”, “expert locating”, “expert(ise) recommender”, “knowledge 
management (system)”, and the additional term “expert-layperson communication” 
in online databases (PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, SciVerse SCOPUS), and in the 
Internet search engine Goggle. Further, the cross-references of publications on 
these search terms were also searched. The overview of studies can be seen in 
Tables 4 and 5. Since the search focus was on psychological studies, research 
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results from other domains which also investigate representations of knowledge, 
for example, knowledge engineering and human-computer interaction, were not 
included. A special challenge was to identify suitable studies because not all 
studies reported in the following explicitly used the terms “knowledge or expertise 
awareness” for describing the concept under investigation (e.g., “the assessment 
tool”; Nückles & Stürz, 2006). However, these studies all have in common that they 
informed people about others’ knowledge or expertise. Also, all studies included in 
this review applied and tested a computer-based environment or tool for providing 
information about others’ knowledge or expertise, and they all assessed the effects 
of this knowledge or expertise information or of context factors combined with this 
information (e.g. anonymous vs. attributable comments; Hsi & Hoadley, 1997) on 
various psychological aspects (e.g. perception of knowledge or expertise 
awareness, knowledge acquisition & collaboration). The overview of study 
examples consists of 20 published studies of the past 16 years (i.e., publication 
year 1997-2013), and the two studies of the present dissertation which have been 
submitted for publication (Baumeister et al., subm. a,b). However, we cannot rule 
out that further studies may exist which also contribute to understanding the 
psychological effects of knowledge or expertise awareness. CSCL studies in which 
the participants interacted with and learned from distributed partners who had an 
equal level of expertise regarding the subject-matter domain of the task conducted 
in the studies were categorized as researching knowledge awareness (e.g. 
Dillenbourg & Traum, 2006, see Table 4), whereas CSCW studies which involved 
distributed professional cooperation or help seeking between interaction partners 
who showed a larger asymmetry of the level of expertise regarding the subject-
matter domain of the task conducted in the studies were categorized as 
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researching expertise awareness (e.g. Nückles & Stürz, 2006; Reichling & Wulf, 
2009, see Table 5).  
The following conventions are used for describing each type of knowledge 
or expertise awareness according to the combined classification (see Tables 4 & 
5): Double-lines indicate the boundaries between the dimensions of knowledge or 
expertise awareness; dotted lines divide the subcategories within the dimensions 
of knowledge or expertise awareness; that is, a computer-supported environment 
can feature a configuration of several dimensions of knowledge or expertise 
awareness simultaneously, for example, hybrid, subjective, and static knowledge or 
expertise awareness providing an explicit level of expertise (e.g., Baumeister et al., 
subm. b). In addition, due to the dynamic nature of the information about others’ 
knowledge or expertise, changes within each dimension are possible (e.g. from an 
implicitly to an explicitly provided level of expertise), and the subcategories are not 
mutually exclusive.  
 
2.5.3.1 Perceiving Knowledge or Expertise Awareness Information 
Some studies tested the effectiveness of an environment for supporting knowledge 
awareness and included a manipulation check of whether knowledge awareness 
indeed was acquired (e.g. Engelmann et al., 2010b; Engelmann & Hesse, 2010). 
These studies have consistently shown that the participants perceived the 
awareness information regarding their group members’ task-relevant knowledge 
accurately (e.g. Engelmann & Hesse, 2010). Further, in a study by Sangin and 
colleagues (2011), dyads provided with a knowledge awareness tool displaying 
explicit information about the partner’s level of expertise were able to model their 
partner’s knowledge after the collaboration phase more accurately than dyads 
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collaborating without the tool. It can be concluded that if the awareness information 
about the knowledge or expertise of other persons is helpful for the current task (cf. 
representational guidance; Suthers, 2006), it is probable that this awareness 
information will be perceived and interpreted accurately, and that it results in 
significantly more knowledge awareness compared to a condition in which this 
awareness information is not provided (Engelmann et al., 2010b). 
 
2.5.3.2 Psychological Effects of Knowledge or Expertise Awareness 
Information 
The selected results in Tables 4 and 5 are grouped according to different 
psychological areas, for example, whether an effect was cognitive, social, or 
behavioral, whether the study revealed that individual differences interacted with 
knowledge or expertise awareness (e.g. social comparison orientation; Ray et al., 
2013) and whether a context factor such as ‘anonymity’ was combined with 
knowledge or expertise awareness (e.g., Hsi & Hoadley, 1997). Further, this 
overview of studies also highlights which subcategories of knowledge or expertise 
awareness were researched more intensively than others. For example, every 
second study implemented context-based knowledge or expertise awareness (e.g. 
Nückles & Stürz, 2006). In most studies (i.e. n = 15 studies), static knowledge or 
expertise awareness was provided in combination with an explicit level of expertise 
(e.g. Molinari, Sangin, Nüssli, & Dillenbourg, 2008). Maybe this configuration 
(context-based, static, & explicit level of expertise) constitutes an especially 
efficient way of supporting knowledge or expertise awareness without overloading 
the users. 
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The collected CSCL studies consistently show that providing knowledge 
awareness information is an effective and efficient method for supporting both 
individual and collaborative computer-supported learning and problem solving (for 
an overview, see also Janssen & Bodemer, 2013). However, there are important 
moderating factors which need to be considered, for example, anonymity (Hsi & 
Hoadley, 1997), and individual differences (e.g. Ray et al., 2013). Similarly, 
providing expertise awareness information constitutes an important building block 
of knowledge management in CSCW. Still, it is difficult to find studies 
systematically testing the psychological effects of the presented applications. 
Important factors which need to be considered in this area are privacy, trust, an 
accurate representation of expertise, and social-motivational aspects of expertise 
profiling (Reichling & Wulf, 2009). 
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Table 4 
Knowledge Awareness: Study Examples and Selected Study Results 
 
Note. The studies are ordered alphabetically according to the name of the first author. KA: Knowledge Awareness. Double-lines indicate the boundaries 
between the different dimensions of knowledge or expertise awareness; dotted lines divide the subcategories within the dimensions of knowledge or 
expertise awareness. 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Knowledge Awareness: Study Examples and Selected Study Results 
 
Note. The studies are ordered alphabetically according to the name of the first author. KA: Knowledge Awareness. Double-lines indicate the boundaries 
between the different dimensions of knowledge or expertise awareness; dotted lines divide the subcategories within the dimensions of knowledge or 
expertise awareness. 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Knowledge Awareness: Study Examples and Selected Study Results 
 
Note. The studies are ordered alphabetically according to the name of the first author. KA: Knowledge Awareness. Double-lines indicate the boundaries 
between the different dimensions of knowledge or expertise awareness; dotted lines divide the subcategories within the dimensions of knowledge or 
expertise awareness. 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Knowledge Awareness: Study Examples and Selected Study Results 
 
Note. The studies are ordered alphabetically according to the name of the first author. KA: Knowledge Awareness. Double-lines indicate the boundaries 
between the different dimensions of knowledge or expertise awareness; dotted lines divide the subcategories within the dimensions of knowledge or 
expertise awareness. 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Knowledge Awareness: Study Examples and Selected Study Results 
 
Note. The studies are ordered alphabetically according to the name of the first author. KA: Knowledge Awareness. Double-lines indicate the boundaries 
between the different dimensions of knowledge or expertise awareness; dotted lines divide the subcategories within the dimensions of knowledge or 
expertise awareness. 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Knowledge Awareness: Study Examples and Selected Study Results 
 
Note. The studies are ordered alphabetically according to the name of the first author. KA: Knowledge Awareness. Double-lines indicate the boundaries 
between the different dimensions of knowledge or expertise awareness; dotted lines divide the subcategories within the dimensions of knowledge or 
expertise awareness. 
aStudy by Molinari et al. (2008): From the initial sample (N = 58 persons), 14 dyads had to be excluded from further analyses due to technical problems 
(Molinari et al., 2008, p. 95). 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Knowledge Awareness: Study Examples and Selected Study Results 
 
Note. The studies are ordered alphabetically according to the name of the first author. KA: Knowledge Awareness. Double-lines indicate the boundaries 
between the different dimensions of knowledge or expertise awareness; dotted lines divide the subcategories within the dimensions of knowledge or 
expertise awareness. 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Knowledge Awareness: Study Examples and Selected Study Results 
 
Note. The studies are ordered alphabetically according to the name of the first author. KA: Knowledge Awareness. Double-lines indicate the boundaries 
between the different dimensions of knowledge or expertise awareness; dotted lines divide the subcategories within the dimensions of knowledge or 
expertise awareness. 
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Table 5 
Expertise Awareness: Study Examples and Selected Study Results 
 
Note. The studies are ordered alphabetically according to the name of the first author. EA: Expertise Awareness. Double-lines indicate the boundaries 
between the different dimensions of knowledge or expertise awareness; dotted lines divide the subcategories within the dimensions of knowledge or 
expertise awareness. 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Expertise Awareness: Study Examples and Selected Study Results 
 
Note. The studies are ordered alphabetically according to the name of the first author. EA: Expertise Awareness. Double-lines indicate the boundaries 
between the different dimensions of knowledge or expertise awareness; dotted lines divide the subcategories within the dimensions of knowledge or 
expertise awareness. 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Expertise Awareness: Study Examples and Selected Study Results 
 
Note. The studies are ordered alphabetically according to the name of the first author. EA: Expertise Awareness. Double-lines indicate the boundaries 
between the different dimensions of knowledge or expertise awareness; dotted lines divide the subcategories within the dimensions of knowledge or 
expertise awareness. 
bStudy by Reichling and Wulf (2009): Field study for evaluating an expert recommender system in a large European industrial association (Reichling & Wulf, 
2009; see Reichling et al., 2007, and Reichling & Veith, 2005, for further results of this longitudinal field study). 
2   Knowledge and Expertise Awareness in CSCL and CSCW:  
Theories, Applications, and Their Psychological Implications 
79 
2.5.4 Psychological Implications of Knowledge or Expertise 
Awareness for CSCL and CSCW 
Different features of knowledge or expertise awareness serve different 
psychological functions. However, the aim of the extended classification is not to 
predict the effects of the configurations of knowledge or expertise awareness. 
Rather, the specific functions should be traced back to the described subcategories 
of knowledge or expertise awareness as applied in these previous studies in order 
to illustrate what researchers and practitioners can plausibly expect when 
implementing one or the other type of knowledge or expertise awareness. Since 
the database consists of only 22 studies, “patterns” across studies applying the 
same subcategory of knowledge or expertise awareness have to be interpreted 
carefully and tentatively until further studies, systematically varying the 
subcategories, show whether the specific functions can be corroborated reliably.  
 
Function of content-based knowledge or expertise awareness. This 
type of awareness information is well suited for supporting intersubjective 
knowledge construction in small groups while solving problems that require 
integrating different sources of knowledge and information and that include multiple 
solution steps (e.g., Engelmann, Baumeister, Dingel, & Hesse, 2010a; Engelmann 
et al., 2010b; Engelmann & Hesse, 2011; Schreiber & Engelmann, 2010); that is, 
with these kinds of problems, each individual group member possesses only part of 
the total knowledge and information base which is necessary to find the optimal 
solution. In the form of digital concept maps, for example, this awareness 
information supported detecting a hidden profile (e.g., Schreiber & Engelmann, 
2010). Further, groups provided with this type of awareness information reached 
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decisions based upon shared knowledge more effectively (i.e. more correct 
solutions) and more efficiently (i.e. more quickly) compared to groups not provided 
with content-based knowledge awareness information (e.g., Engelmann et al., 
2010b).  
 
Function of context-based knowledge or expertise awareness. Since 
this type of awareness information is provided only as an enrichment 
accompanying the core task, it depends on the intensity of using this awareness 
information whether this information is helpful or not. Those studies which applied 
context-based knowledge or expertise awareness information and did track its 
usage (i.e., Leinonen & Järvelä, 2006; Ogata & Yano, 1998) showed that (1) this 
information is actually not always used intensively enough for supporting 
knowledge exchange (Leinonen & Järvelä, 2006) and that (2) a more intense 
usage is related to better learning outcomes (Ogata & Yano, 1998). 
 
Function of hybrid knowledge or expertise awareness. This type of 
awareness information supports individual conceptual learning if, for example, 
learners compare their own task solution with a learning partner’s task solution 
which helps them to improve the correctness of their task solutions (Baumeister et 
al., subm. a, b; Bodemer, 2011). Further, hybrid knowledge or expertise awareness 
can be used to activate socio-cognitive conflicts (Mugny et al., 1995) by confronting 
learners with a partner who reaches a different task solution than they themselves 
reach.  
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Function of activity-based knowledge or expertise awareness. 
Information about users’ activities constitute the basis of knowledge management 
systems and are used in order to support expertise awareness (e.g. eXacT; Dörner 
et al., 2007). The field study by Ogata and Yano (1998) corroborates the 
usefulness of activity-based information for CSCL by showing that informing 
learners about which other learner has visited or has worked on the pieces of 
information they are interested in helps them to find a suitable learning partner. 
This principle is called social navigation (Dourish & Chalmers, 1994; Höök, 
Benyon, & Munro, 2003), and it is implemented by means of so called 
recommender systems (Konstan & Riedl, 2003). However, the studies by Schwind 
and colleagues (Schwind & Buder, 2012; Schwind, Buder, Cress, & Hesse, 2012) 
have shown that it is not enough for cognitive elaboration to be informed about 
information which is similar to that which one already knows: learners also need to 
be confronted with preference-inconsistent information.  
 
Function of subjective knowledge or expertise awareness. Actively 
creating for others information about one’s own knowledge is a metacognitive 
activity which supports self-reflection and individual learning (Mayer, 1998; Schraw, 
1998), for example, in the context of ePortfolio work (Hand et al., 2012). With 
regard to knowledge management in CSCW, subjective assessments are needed 
in combination with automatic expertise profiling in order to correct the profiles (e.g. 
delete trivial keywords) and increase user acceptance (Reichling & Wulf, 2009) 
over purely self-generated or automatically generated profiling. However, errors in 
self-profiling one’s expertise can result in becoming overburdened by the incoming 
requests (Vivacqua, 1999). 
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Function of objective knowledge or expertise awareness. The strength 
of objective knowledge or expertise awareness is that it should be “unbiased” due 
to the external knowledge assessment. However, in authentic situations of 
distributed collaboration and lifelong learning, the partners’ knowledge or expertise 
is, for the most part, not provided in pre-formatted ways.  
 
Function of an explicit level of expertise. An explicitly provided level of 
expertise supports virtual teams in establishing a transactive memory system 
(Schreiber & Engelmann, 2010) because group members are informed about who 
is responsible for storing and retrieving certain information (Wegner, 1995). 
However, explicitly informing persons about others’ level of expertise also is 
a strong anchor of social influence. Learning from a more competent partner is only 
possible if this learning partner is not threatening our self-esteem (e.g., by talking to 
us in a condescending way; cf. Darnon, Doll, & Butera, 2007). Examples of the 
negative effects of a competence threat are a mere imitation of the partner’s 
decisions without elaboration (Butera et al., 2005), reduced information sharing 
due to seeking self-enhancement by holding back important information (Ray et al., 
2013, Study 2), and, in the end, reduced learning (Darnon et al., 2007). Therefore, 
explicitly disclosing the level of expertise of learners should only be applied in a 
well-considered way. For example, learning to solve a knowledge-rich task from an 
expert reduces doubts in the correctness of the expert’s task solution compared to 
learning the same task from a peer layperson (Baumeister et al, subm. a). 
However, an explicit level of expertise should be avoided if this information is not 
necessary in order to solve the task collaboratively and if it would distract learners’ 
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attention from the core task (Darnon et al., 2007; Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001) 
because learners may socially compare their competences and experience a 
competence threat (Ray et al., 2013, Study 2). 
 
Function of an implicit level of expertise. Not providing learners with 
explicit information about their learning partners’ expertise does not mean that 
learners will not search for competence-related information themselves (Leinonen 
& Järvelä, 2006). If information about others that would be helpful for efficient 
collaboration is missing, learners have to engage more in searching for this 
information by means of dialogic discourse and knowledge exchange. 
 
Function of static knowledge or expertise awareness. In many situations 
of distributed collaboration, it will be sufficient to provide collaborators just once 
with information about their partners’ knowledge instead of continuously displaying 
changes. If groups collaborate for a short period of time, it is important to avoid 
overloading them with information not necessarily needed for completing the task 
(Eppler & Mengis, 2004; Sparrow, 1999).  
 
Function of dynamic knowledge or expertise awareness. Providing up-
to-date information about users’ knowledge or expertise is a standard requirement 
of knowledge management systems for CSCW. For example, the “Expertise 
Awareness Monitor” notifies users about changes to others’ expertise (Dörner et 
al., 2007). However, there are only a few CSCL studies using an external 
representation which informed the learners continuously about changes to others’ 
knowledge (Baumeister et al., subm. b; Bodemer, 2011; Ogata & Yano, 1998). This 
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type of knowledge awareness information combined with peer talk can help to 
resolve socio-cognitive conflicts (Baumeister et al., subm. b; Bodemer, 2011). 
Further, observing in real-time how another learner is modifying his or her task 
solution could provide an affordance (Suthers, 2006) for considering further 
changes and optimization of one’s own solution (Baumeister et al., subm. b). 
Especially long-term studies are needed which investigate the usefulness of 
dynamic knowledge or expertise awareness for supporting socio-cognitive 
processes. 
 
 
2.5.5 Issues of Anonymity 
Anonymity is a crucial moderating factor of users’ behavior in CSCL and CSCW 
settings. It was not included in the combined classification of knowledge or 
expertise awareness because anonymity is conceptualized as a context factor, 
namely as an aspect of social group awareness (Janssen & Bodemer, 2013), 
which can be combined with all described subcategories of knowledge or expertise 
awareness. For example, in the application “Xpertfinder” (Sihn & Heeren, 2001), 
users have access to a graph visualizing company-wide anonymous experts, and 
can choose to which company their query will be forwarded. Thus, aspects of the 
area and level of expertise are provided explicitly without disclosing the experts’ 
personal data. There is a broad consensus in the knowledge management 
literature that employees would reject expert finding systems if their personal 
information was not protected sufficiently (Kautz, Selman, & Milewski, 1996; 
Papacharissi, 2009; Reichling & Wulf, 2009; Sihn & Heeren, 2001). 
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A further positive psychological effect of anonymity was identified in CSCL 
research: Hsi and Hoadley (1997) have shown that girls at a coeducational middle 
school contributed more to discussions about scientific phenomena if their 
contributions remained anonymous. This finding and further effects of anonymity 
can be explained by means of the SIDE model (Social Identity model of 
DEindividuation Effects; e.g., Lea, Spears, & de Groot, 2001; Reicher, Spears, & 
Postmes, 1995) which differentiates whether people are visually anonymous or 
whether their behavior is not identifiable. The visual anonymity of virtual 
environments can support a salient social identity over the personal identity (Lea et 
al., 2001). This kind of social presence results in more cohesive groups whose 
members cooperate more productively compared to a non-anonymous condition 
(Lea et al., 2001). Cress (2005) extended these findings by showing that member 
portraits can have ambivalent effects on participation in virtual groups, depending 
on the members’ social value orientation (Van Lange & Semin-Goossens, 1998): 
Being provided with portraits, persons with a prosocial orientation (aim: maximize 
group’s benefit) lowered their contribution rate because the portraits made their 
personal identity more salient than their group identity, whereas persons with an 
individualistic orientation (aim: maximize own benefit) slightly, however non-
significantly, increased their contribution rate because they became more aware of 
being a group member. By using homogeneous visualizations of group members 
(i.e., the same photo six times for all 6 group members), information sharing of 
proselfs (aim: maximize own gain) can be increased without compromising 
information sharing of prosocials (Wodzicki, Schwämmlein, Cress, & Kimmerle, 
2011).  
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In addition, Cress and Kimmerle (2008) showed that if the contribution 
behavior was identifiable, people contributed more to a shared database in 
comparison to a condition in which they did not receive a feedback about each 
member’s number of contributions. A further relevant personality trait in the context 
of information exchange via a shared database is protective self-presentation (aim: 
avoiding social rejection; Wolfe, Lennox, & Cutler, 1986): Especially people with a 
high need for protective self-presentation cooperated more if a group awareness 
tool made their individual behavior identifiable compared to a condition in which the 
group awareness tool only mirrored the group’s average contribution, and 
compared to without such group awareness information (Kimmerle & Cress, 2008). 
 
 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
In our information and knowledge society (van Weert, 2006; Webster, 2006), it is 
increasingly taken for granted that people can get informed about others’ 
knowledge and expertise no matter how spatially distributed the others are. As 
research on knowledge and expertise awareness proceeds, different dimensions 
and their psychological functions are explored. The present chapter has provided 
an overview of psychological theories related to these concepts, an overview of 
computer-based applications for supporting knowledge and expertise awareness, 
results of previous studies revealing the various psychological effects, and a 
classification combining relevant features identified in the context of CSCL and 
CSCW research and development. Specifically, it was suggested to differentiate (1) 
between an explicit versus implicit level of expertise and (2) between static versus 
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dynamic knowledge or expertise awareness information because (1) these are core 
aspects of knowledge management systems, and (2) an explicit level of expertise 
may be suitable for different situations than an implicit level of expertise, as well as 
static knowledge or expertise awareness may serve different goals than dynamic 
knowledge or expertise awareness. 
Since the overview of applications and studies of knowledge and expertise 
awareness is not exhaustive, published examples easily available on the Internet 
dominate over unpublished or only internally reported ones (cf. “publication bias”, 
Renkewitz, Fuchs, & Fiedler, 2011). Although a lot of different applications for 
supporting knowledge or expertise awareness have been developed in the past, it 
seems that studies are missing which evaluate the psychological effects of the 
features of these applications systematically (Reichling & Wulf, 2009).  
The overview of studies shows that there are some moderating factors 
which need to be considered such as individual differences (e.g. need for socially 
comparing competences), and context factors (e.g. anonymity & communication). 
To sum up, is seems that research and development in the context of knowledge 
and expertise awareness could cross-fertilize each other more if they were more 
strongly connected. 
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Overview – Part I 
 
After introducing the combined classification of knowledge and expertise 
awareness in CSCL and CSCW developed in the context of the present 
dissertation, the first experimental study will be presented which applied a specific 
configuration of knowledge awareness briefly outlined in Table 2 of Chapter 1. 
In this study, it was investigated whether knowledge awareness can be 
acquired if the externalized task solution of another person (e.g., a peer learner) or 
a more abstract source (e.g., a textbook of the subject-matter domain) is presented 
to the learner. Thus, by viewing both the other person’s or source’s task solution 
and by being informed about the source (e.g., “peer”, “textbook”, etc.), a learner 
should be made aware of the knowledge of the other person or source. Since 
knowledge awareness was regarded as a prerequisite for the further assumptions 
of this study, the acquisition of knowledge awareness was tested more in the 
context of the manipulation check than in the context of a hypothesis. In addition, 
previous studies have already shown that knowledge awareness can be acquired 
by means of computer-based external representation which differ from the one 
used in this study (e.g. Engelmann & Hesse, 2010; Engelmann et al., 2010b). 
Therefore, beside testing and extending assumptions of conflict elaboration theory 
(Mugny et al., 1995), this study also tests the reproducibility of previous results 
regarding the acquisition of knowledge awareness using a different external 
representation and experimental task. 
 
Overview – Part I 
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3 Study 1: Impact of Knowledge Awareness Regarding 
a Higher Competence Source of a Cognitive Conflict 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Baumeister, A. E. E., Engelmann, T., & Hesse, F. W. (subm. a). One task, 
divergent solutions: Source labels and social comparison guide adaptation 
in a cognitive conflict task. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Socio-cognitive conflict is an effective instructional strategy for supporting learning 
and problem solving (e.g., Limón, 2001). The rationale of this constructivist 
approach, for example, of conflict elaboration theory (Pérez & Mugny, 1992; 
Mugny, Butera, Sanchez-Mazas, & Pérez, 1995
Although certain previous studies identified under which conditions peer 
learning in the context of a cognitive conflict is advantageous (e.g., Buchs & 
Butera, 2009; Quiamzade, Mugny, & Darnon, 2009), they did not identify all of the 
conditions under which learning from a high competent source is more effective 
than learning from a low competent source. This study contributes to answering 
this question by arguing that the studies advocating peer learning by cognitive 
), is to confront learners with task 
solutions of relevant sources which deviate from their own solution. The first study 
of the present dissertation aims at showing that knowledge awareness can support 
the experience of a cognitive conflict.  
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conflict applied rather well-defined problems (e.g., anagram tasks; Quiamzade et 
al., 2009) whose solution strategies could be acquired during the course of short 
experiments. It will be shown that social influence dynamics change for more 
complex, knowledge-rich tasks. Also, assumptions of conflict elaboration theory 
regarding the impact of cognitive conflict have not been completely empirically 
validated. Therefore, this first study of the dissertation conceptualizes perceived 
cognitive conflict as a mediator of the problem solvers’ behavior. Further, this study 
is the first one to show that social comparison orientation as a personality trait (cf. 
Festinger, 1954; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) is a moderator of the problem solvers’ 
adaptation behavior in a cognitive conflict task.  
 
 
 
3.2 Being Confronted with a Deviating Task Solution: 
Assumptions of Conflict Elaboration Theory 
Conflict elaboration theory (Mugny et al., 1995) as a Neo-Piagetian constructivist 
approach to learning predicts that confrontation with a task solution that deviates 
from one’s own solution can spark a cognitive conflict encouraging problem solvers 
to improve their own task solution (Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001). Several studies, 
also conducted outside the context of this theory, have shown that comparing 
one’s own task solution to the deviating solution of a peer learner (Bodemer, 2011) 
or of other group members (Constantino-Gonzáles & Suthers, 2001) helps problem 
solvers to improve their solution. Further, this comparison process should be 
activated by the computer-based external representation for supporting knowledge 
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awareness (cf. Buder et al., 2009). Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
postulated: 
Hypothesis 1: Comparing one’s own solution to the deviating 
solution of another source helps problem solvers to improve the 
correctness of their task solution compared to a baseline condition 
without this possibility to compare solutions.  
 
 
 
3.3 Impact of High Competence Sources in Knowledge-Rich 
Tasks 
Further, the conflict elaboration theory predicts that learners and problem solvers 
who are confronted with a deviating task solution and who are uncertain about the 
correct solution will focus especially on the competence of the source of the 
deviating solution. Thereby, both a confrontation with a high competent source 
(e.g., a textbook on the subject-matter domain) and a low competent source (e.g., 
a peer layperson) can promote seeking the best solution. In some experiments 
testing these assumptions, focusing on the competence of the source of a 
deviating solution was fostered by labeling the source of the deviating solution 
(e.g., bogus feedback of a competence score or academic labels such as “student”, 
“professor”; Mugny, Tafani, Butera, & Pigière, 1998), and in most studies by 
excluding interaction between the target person and the source of the deviating 
solution (e.g., Quiamzade, 2007). 
Further, developers of conflict elaboration theory argued that being 
confronted with the deviating task solution of a peer should particularly encourage 
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problem solvers to find the best task solution because, in this constellation of a 
“conflict of incompetencies” (Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001), problem solvers can 
neither maintain their initial solution easily nor simply imitate the peer’s deviating 
solution.  
For example, Quiamzade and colleagues (2009) showed in two studies that 
low competent sources can influence problem solvers’ behavior more than high 
competent sources. The target persons first solved verbal game tasks individually. 
After this, they were informed about the task solutions of either a higher- or an 
equally low competent source and could infer the source’s strategy. The problem 
solving tasks involved ticking as quickly as possible words containing the letter “F” 
and solving anagram tasks. In other experiments, a hypothesis testing task was 
used (e.g., Quiamzade, 2007). These tasks have in common that they can be 
classified as well-defined problems having a single correct solution although 
solution strategies can differ (cf. Schraw, Dunkle, & Bendixen, 1995). Moreover, 
these tasks do not require an extensive knowledge base in contrast to knowledge-
rich tasks. Examples of knowledge-rich tasks are playing chess, making medical 
diagnoses, or solving law cases (cf. Nievelstein, van Gog, Boshuizen, & Prins, 
2010; Sweller, van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998). Strategies for solving well-defined 
problems can be acquired more quickly, even in the course of participating in one 
experiment (e.g., reading a string of letters backwards in an anagram task; 
Quiamzade et al., 2009) than strategies for solving knowledge-rich, complex 
problems which require schema construction and automation (cf. Sweller et al., 
1998; VanLehn, 1999). However, there is a lack of studies testing assumptions of 
conflict elaboration theory for complex, less well-defined problems requiring a large 
knowledge base. It is known that social influence dynamics vary across different 
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types of tasks (cf. Mugny et al., 1995), and therefore, it is probable that they also 
vary across different levels of task complexity.  
Especially if problem solvers are laypersons in a specific kind of knowledge-
rich task, it will be difficult for them to identify strategies just from being informed 
about another source’s task solution without having the possibility to ask the other 
source for further explanations. In such a situation, problem solvers most probably 
will imitate especially a more competent source’s solution (cf. Bandura, 2006; 
Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001). Consequently, in the present study, it is assumed that 
for such knowledge-rich problems without interaction between source and target 
person, a peer’s social influence on conflict elaboration will be much weaker than 
usually postulated by studies on conflict elaboration theory applying less 
knowledge-rich problems (e.g., anagram tasks; Quiamzade et al., 2009). According 
to conflict elaboration theory, a high competent source’s deviating solution will 
generally be imitated more often than a low competent source’s solution 
(Quiamzade et al., 2009; Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001). However, it remains to be 
investigated which kind of imitation of the high competent source will occur since 
two types of imitation are discussed by conflict elaboration theory (Quiamzade & 
Mugny, 2001): 
a) In the positive form of imitation, the high competent source is 
regarded as an epistemic authority because this source provides 
helpful knowledge and information without questioning the target 
person’s competence. Imitation results because learners focus on the 
task and want to improve their ability; 
b) In the negative form of imitation, the high competent source threatens 
self-esteem by questioning the target person’s competence (cf. 
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Darnon et al., 2007). In this constellation, “Imitation is an easy and 
rapid solution to reestablish lost self-esteem … no further elaboration 
of the task is necessary”, however, this also means that “There is no 
learning or improvement …” (Quiamzade & Mugny 2001, p. 315). 
How can the positive versus negative form of imitation be differentiated 
empirically? In the present dissertation, it is suggested to present an only partly 
correct solution of the low and high competent source. This offers the possibility to 
differentiate whether a problem solver uncritically imitates the wrong part of the 
presented solution or whether he or she is able to identify it. In this first study of the 
present dissertation, it is argued that if the target person focuses more on the task 
than on the other source’s competence, then the target person will ponder which 
aspect of the other source’s solution seems to be plausible and which not. In this 
case, the target person will not imitate the presented solution completely 
uncritically, especially not if parts of the other source’s solution are wrong. On the 
other hand, if the target person is misled by the other source’s high competence, 
then the target person will not question the correctness of the other source’s 
solution. Instead, the target person will adopt more parts of the presented solution 
also including false aspects. This leads us to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: In case of a positive form of imitation, problem 
solvers will selectively adopt correct parts of the deviating solution of 
a high competent source (i.e., a “textbook on the subject-matter 
domain”) more often than of a low competent source (i.e., a “peer 
layperson”).  
Hypothesis 2b: In contrast, in case of a negative form of imitation, 
problem solvers will adopt false parts of a high competent source’s 
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solution more often than false parts of a low competent source’s 
solution.  
In this first study of the dissertation, a supposed textbook of the subject-
matter domain was used as a high competent source. That is, this study 
investigated whether a textbook can also result in knowledge awareness which is a 
new aspect not researched by previous studies on knowledge awareness before. 
Therefore, the term “textbook knowledge” is defined in brief. Textbook knowledge 
is information contained in a textbook of a specific domain. The term textbook 
knowledge is commonly used as the following examples demonstrate: Cohen 
(1990), for example, stated that “(…) textbook knowledge is imperfect (…)” (p. 
743), and Neale (1988) criticized the “unjustified faith in textbook knowledge and 
what experts say they do” (p. 135). Further, the term textbook knowledge can be 
found in the leading journals of interdisciplinary scientific research (e.g., in Science: 
Gaskell, Bauer, Durant, & Allum, 1999). In addition, since textbooks are generally 
written by one expert or a group of experts, it seems appropriate to speak not only 
of the contents of a textbook but also of the knowledge of the author(s), or put 
shortly, of the textbook knowledge. Thus, this study investigated among others 
whether being informed about textbook knowledge can be regarded as an instance 
of knowledge awareness. 
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3.4 Cognitive Conflict as a Mediator of Problem Solvers’ 
Adaptation Behavior 
According to Lee and colleagues (2003), “Cognitive conflict is a perceptual state in 
which one notices the discrepancy between one’s cognitive structure and the 
environment (external information) …” (p. 585). In most studies on conflict 
elaboration theory, however, being confronted with a deviating task solution was 
simply equated to cognitive conflict without assessing directly whether learners had 
actually experienced a cognitive conflict (e.g., Quiamzade, 2007). In contrast, in 
our study perceived cognitive conflict is measured by means of subjective rating 
scales (e.g., Darnon et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2003).  
Conflict elaboration theory argues that problem solvers confronted with a 
low competent source’s deviating task solution will have greater doubts regarding 
the correctness of the low competent source’s solution compared to problem 
solvers confronted with a high competent source’s deviating task solution 
(Quiamzade et al., 2009). Therefore, problem solvers confronted with a low 
competent source will start to search more intensively for the correct solution. In 
contrast, problem solvers confronted with a high competent source will have no or 
fewer doubts that the high competent source’s solution is correct. Therefore, 
problem solvers confronted with a high competent source will be much more likely 
to imitate the high competent source’s solution. Since “having doubts about other’s 
or one’s own solution” is one aspect of the experience of a cognitive conflict (cf. 
Lee et al., 2003), the developers of conflict elaboration theory at least implicitly 
state that problem solvers confronted with a low competent source of a deviating 
solution would experience a more intense cognitive conflict than problem solvers 
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confronted with a high competent source of a deviating solution. Thus, the 
hypothesis according to conflict elaboration theory is: 
Hypothesis 3a: Problem solvers confronted with a low competent 
source’s deviating task solution experience more cognitive conflict 
than problem solvers confronted with a high competent source’s 
deviating solution.  
However, to our knowledge, no study exists which has empirically validated 
this assumption by measuring perceived cognitive conflict and the resulting 
adaptation behavior to a low or high competent source’s solution. Therefore, in the 
present study, we examined whether the opposite could also be possible: Targets 
confronted with a low competent source may consider their own solution to be 
more plausible. Consequently, they do not experience a high degree of a cognitive 
conflict, and they do not adopt parts of the other source’s solution. Similarly, it 
could also be possible that targets confronted with a high competent source 
consider their own solution to be less plausible. Consequently, they do experience 
a high degree of a cognitive conflict and ultimately imitate the presented solution. 
Therefore, the following assumption, contrary to that of conflict elaboration theory, 
was also investigated in the present study: 
Hypothesis 3b: Problem solvers confronted with a high competent 
source’s deviating task solution experience more cognitive conflict 
than problem solvers confronted with a low competent source’s 
deviating solution.  
Neo-Piagetian approaches regard cognitive conflict as the driving force of 
cognitive and behavioral changes in the sense of learning (cf. Mugny et al., 1995; 
Limón, 2001). Therefore, in the present study, it is argued that cognitive conflict 
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can be conceptualized as a mediator of problem solvers’ adaptation behavior in the 
context of this knowledge-rich task: 
Hypothesis 3c: Cognitive conflict mediates problem solvers’ 
adaptation behavior: The more cognitive conflict is experienced, the 
more adaptation to the presented deviating task solution will be 
shown.  
In the following, we will extend assumptions of conflict elaboration theory 
further by considering a personality trait as a potential moderator of problem 
solvers’ behavior, namely, a person’s need for social comparison of his or her 
abilities. 
 
 
 
3.5 Adapting to Others: Why Social Comparison Orientation 
Matters 
Recent studies on conflict elaboration theory have started to take the impact 
of relevant personality traits on conflict regulation into account, for example, 
mastery vs. performance goals (e.g., Darnon & Butera, 2007). The present study 
integrates a further trait directly associated with social influence, namely, social 
comparison orientation (cf. Festinger, 1954), that is, the need to evaluate one’s 
abilities (and opinions) by means of social comparison processes.  
Reviewing previous studies on social comparison, Buunk and Gibbons 
(2007) conclude that high comparers are more uncertain about the self and are 
interested in reducing this self-uncertainty. For example, persons with a high need 
for social comparison are more interested in information about other participants’ 
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test performance than those with a low need for social comparison (Gibbons & 
Buunk, 1999). Moreover, persons with a high need for social comparison search for 
information about others in order to validate their position no matter whether the 
others are more or less similar to themselves (Michinov & Michinov, 2001).  
While there are a lot of studies which have investigated affective and 
behavioral aspects of people high in social comparison orientation (cf. Buunk & 
Gibbons, 2007), less is known about people who indicate that they do not often 
compare themselves with others. One reason for a low social comparison 
orientation could be that “… social comparison … [is] viewed by many as socially 
undesirable…” (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007, p. 13). Further, people low in social 
comparison orientation may lack awareness or recall of such comparisons (Wood, 
1996). It is plausible, however, that people low in social comparison orientation still 
use others as models for their own performance – at least, no evidence exists that 
a low need for social comparison would be associated with performance avoidance 
or depressive symptoms, for example. Instead, classic studies have shown that 
“individuals generally prefer to compare with others who are thought to be slightly 
better off …” (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007, p. 4) confirming Festinger’s concept of 
“upward drive”. Especially in situations in which individuals strive to improve their 
performance, they are interested in the performance of others who do better on the 
same task and thus serve as models (Smith & Sachs, 1997). This could also be 
true for persons low in social comparison of abilities. Therefore, in this study, it is 
postulated that social comparison regarding performance or ability is a moderator 
of problem solvers’ adaptation behavior: 
Hypothesis 4a: Persons high in social comparison of ability will adapt 
their task solution more often to the presented deviating one, 
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regardless of whether the source label of the deviating task solution 
indicates a low or a high competent source (Michinov & Michinov, 
2001). They do so because they are uncertain about the self, thus, 
having more doubts about the correctness of their own solution than 
about others’ solutions. 
Hypothesis 4b: Persons low in social comparison of ability adapt 
their task solution more often to the presented deviating solution of a 
high competent source than to a low competent source because 
they strive to improve their performance (Smith & Sachs, 1997).  
In addition, we examined whether the postulated interaction of knowledge 
awareness and social comparison orientation of ability is mediated in its relation to 
adaptation behavior by cognitive conflict. That is, a mediated moderation model 
was postulated (see Figure 1):  
Hypothesis 5: If persons low in social comparison orientation 
of ability are confronted with a high competent source’s deviating 
solution, they will experience more cognitive conflict than similar 
persons who are confronted with a low competent source’s deviating 
solution because they have no or fewer doubts regarding the 
correctness of a high competent source’s solution than regarding the 
correctness of a low competent source’s solution. Consequently, 
persons low in social comparison orientation of ability confronted 
with a high competent source’s solution will adapt their own task 
solution more extensively to the presented solution because they 
strive to improve their performance. 
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Figure 1. Hypothesized Mediated Moderation Model Whereby Knowledge 
Awareness, Social Comparison Orientation of Ability, and Cognitive 
Conflict Predict Adaptation of One’s Own Task Solution to the Presented 
Deviating Task Solution of the Other Source. 
 
 
 
3.6 Experimental Study 
In this first study of the present dissertation, the impact of knowledge awareness in 
the sense of source labels of varying expertise level (i.e., low vs. high competence) 
combined with the presentation of a task solution which deviates from the target 
person’s solution on problem solving was investigated. Specifically, it was 
examined how source labels influence problem solvers with respect to 
experiencing cognitive conflict. It was tested whether cognitive conflict can be 
conceptualized as a mediator and social comparison orientation of ability as a 
moderator of problem solvers’ adaptation behavior regarding the presented 
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deviating task solution. Finally, it was examined whether the interplay of these 
variables can be explained by a mediated moderation model. 
 
 
3.6.1 Method 
 
3.6.1.1 Participants and Design 
Fifty-nine university students (41 female, 18 male; M = 24.46 years, SD = 3.20) of 
different fields of study at a university in southern Germany volunteered to 
participate in the study for either payment or course credit. The participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions of a between-subjects design. In the 
following two conditions, the participants were provided with a computer-based 
external representation for supporting knowledge awareness: (1) In the “peer 
condition” (np = 20), participants compared their task solution with the deviating 
solution of a low competent source, namely, a former participant of the pilot study. 
(2) In the “textbook condition” (nt = 20), participants compared their task solution 
with the deviating task solution of a supposed high competent source, namely, a 
textbook on the subject-matter domain of this study (criminal law). In fact, 
participants in the textbook condition received the same task solution as 
participants in the peer condition, produced by the same former participant of the 
pilot study. This task solution contained one correct aspect and three false aspects. 
In the baseline condition (nb = 19), participants did not receive a deviating task 
solution of another source. 
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3.6.1.2 Procedure 
The participants were tested individually. They were told that the study was about 
solving criminal law cases by means of a computer-supported environment and 
that they would get to know different problem solving strategies. Figure 2 provides 
an overview of the phases of the experiment.  
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Figure 2. Overview of the Phases of Experiment 1 and Their Duration in Minutes.  
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First, the participants filled in a web form assessing demographic data, 
domain-specific prior knowledge, and social comparison orientation regarding 
abilities. Then the participants practiced using the software tool of this study 
(CmapTools, see 3.6.1.3, “cognitive conflict task”). Following this, they were given 
six solved cases to read in paper from the domain of criminal law in 10 minutes (cf. 
Appendix A). The participants returned the solved cases to the experimenter and 
received four unsolved cases from the same domain. They had 6 minutes to read 
these cases. Subsequently, the solved cases were handed out again, and the 
participants were asked to build pairs of the four unsolved cases and the six solved 
cases by means of a computer-based external representation (CmapTools; see 
Figure 3, left side and in the middle). The participants were given 10 minutes to 
arrange each unsolved case next to the solved case whose solution could be 
transferred best to this unsolved case. For this purpose, they dragged colored text 
boxes (i.e., unsolved cases) next to grey text boxes (i.e., solved cases) on the 
screen. After this, the participants were randomly assigned to one of the following 
three conditions: In the peer condition, the task solution (case pairs) of the 
participants was juxtaposed to the solution that had been created by a former 
participant of a pilot study. The participants were informed that the solution 
presented had been created by “a former, randomly chosen participant of a pilot 
study” (Figure 3, right side). In the textbook condition, the solution of the 
participants was juxtaposed to the same solution as in the peer condition; however, 
a textbook on criminal law was indicated to be the source. In both conditions, 
participants had 5 minutes to compare their own with the provided task solution. In 
the baseline condition, the participants were not provided with an additional 
solution. Keeping time-on-task constant among the three conditions, participants of 
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the baseline condition had 5 minutes to review their self-created solution. In the 
next phase, the participants of all three conditions were given 5 minutes to create a 
second version of case pairs by modifying their first version if they wished to do so. 
During this phase, the solution of the other source was still present in the peer 
condition and in the textbook condition. The online test on knowledge awareness 
followed in the peer condition and in the textbook condition (see 3.6.1.3, 
“knowledge awareness in the textbook condition and in the peer condition”). 
Subsequently, participants of the peer condition and of the textbook condition 
answered the cognitive conflict item. An experimental session lasted 60 minutes. At 
the end of the experiment, the participants were thanked, rewarded, and debriefed. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Computer-based external representation for supporting knowledge 
awareness: Self-created case pairs in the middle and in juxtaposition 
with presented deviating case pairs and source label on the right side. 
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3.6.1.3 Materials and Measures 
 
Demographic data and prior knowledge. Demographic data (e.g., gender, 
age) and prior knowledge of German case law were assessed by means of a web 
form. The maximum attainable score on the prior knowledge test was ten points.  
 
Cognitive conflict task. An inductive reasoning task was developed so as 
to maximize variety of task solutions: The problem solvers had to pair each of four 
unsolved criminal law cases with one of six solved criminal law cases, thus leaving 
two solved cases unpaired (cf. Appendix A). The aim was to build pairs with a high 
structural similarity, that is, pairs that required a similar solution so that the solution 
of the solved case could be transferred to the unsolved case. Previous studies 
have shown that legal reasoning (among others, by analogy) is a highly complex 
cognitive skill requiring a large knowledge base (Nievelstein et al., 2010). 
The software tool used for sorting the law cases in order to build structurally 
similar pairs was CmapTools (cf. Novak & Cañas, 2006; see, http://ftp.ihmc.us/). It 
allows for moving text boxes easily which represented the solved and unsolved 
cases. Further, the computer-based external representation of the sorting task also 
allowed for comparing self-arranged case pairs with case pairs presented 
additionally in the peer condition and in the textbook condition. This external 
representation initially contained six grey text boxes labeled with the titles of the six 
solved cases, and four colored text boxes representing the unsolved cases (Figure 
3, left side and in the middle). Each unsolved case could be arranged in a pair with 
a solved case by dragging the colored text boxes next to the grey text boxes on the 
screen.  
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We assessed the correctness of the first version of self-created pairs of 
solved and unsolved cases. Only two pairs were counted as correct solutions 
because structural similarities between the solved and unsolved cases existed, 
while for the other two unsolved cases, no structurally similar solved case existed. 
Thus, two points were attainable as maximum correctness score. This correct 
solution was identified in a pilot study with advanced law students (n = 8). The 
participants of the present study were not informed about the solution structure 
beforehand.  
The match between the first version of the self-created task solution (case 
pairs) and the solution presented in the peer condition and in the textbook condition 
was assessed to test whether the self-created solution (Figure 3, in the middle) 
naturally deviated from the presented one (Figure 3, right side). The score could 
range between “0” and “4” matching case pairs.  
Further, we assessed the adaptation to the task solution presented in the 
peer condition and textbook condition by counting how many case pairs had been 
adapted to the presented ones in the second version of the task solution. The 
maximum score was four points if the participant had adapted all four case pairs to 
the presented ones. In addition, it was assessed how often the participants of the 
peer condition and textbook condition had adopted the one correct and the three 
false case pairs of the presented solution. Consequently, the correctness of the 
second version of self-created case pairs was also assessed. It was measured 
analogously to the correctness of the first version, that is, again two points were 
attainable as maximum score.  
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Knowledge awareness in the textbook condition and in the peer 
condition. An online test was performed in the peer condition and in the textbook 
condition consisting of two parts: In the first part, a multiple-choice item assessed 
whether the participants could remember the source of the presented deviating 
task solution correctly. The multiple-choice item included six alternatives: “Several 
former participants of a pilot study whose task solutions were averaged”, “a 
textbook on criminal law”, “a random generator”, “an expert in criminal law”, “a 
former, randomly chosen participant of a pilot study”, and “a group of experts in 
criminal law”. The participants received either one point for choosing the indicated 
source correctly according to the previous instructions or zero points for choosing a 
wrong alternative. In the second part, the case pairs of the other source had to be 
reproduced from memory. The maximum score for correctly remembering the case 
pairs was four points because four case pairs had been presented to them. 
The assessment of knowledge awareness in this study is similar to the 
assessment in the context of certain previous studies (e.g., Engelmann, 
Baumeister, Dingel, & Hesse, 2010a; Engelmann, Dehler, Bodemer, & Buder, 
2009; Engelmann & Hesse, 2010). In these previous studies on knowledge 
awareness, it was also assessed whether learners or problem solvers had 
perceived that another source of knowledge, task solutions, and information 
existed. Further, in some studies on knowledge awareness, it was also assessed 
whether learners or problem solvers had perceived content elements (e.g., the task 
solution) of the other source’s knowledge (Engelmann et al., 2010a; Engelmann et 
al., 2009; Engelmann & Hesse, 
 
2010). 
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Cognitive conflict in the peer condition and in the textbook condition. 
The following item assessed in retrospect whether a cognitive conflict was 
experienced after being confronted with the task solution of another source which 
deviated from one’s own solution: “I had doubts about one or more of my case 
pairs when I saw the other case pairs that were provided”. The participants 
indicated their (dis)agreement on a 5-point rating scale (from 1 for “low agreement” 
to 5 for “high agreement”). This item assesses one aspect of the component 
“recognition of contradiction” of the Cognitive Conflict Levels Test by Lee and 
colleagues (2003).  
 
Social comparison orientation regarding abilities. A German translation 
of the items of the factor “Social Comparison Orientation Regarding Abilities” (6 
items, Cronbach’s α = .87) of the Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation 
Measure (INCOM, Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) was administered in the peer condition 
and in the textbook condition. The participants indicated on 5-point rating scales 
(from 1 for “I disagree strongly” to 5 for “I agree strongly”) how often they compare 
themselves to others with respect to, for example, what they have accomplished in 
life. 
 
 
3.6.2 Results 
For testing the hypotheses, mainly multiple linear regression analyses were 
conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 19. The alpha level was set at .05. Cohen’s d 
is reported as effect size measure, adjusted for interactions. By convention, d effect 
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sizes of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 are interpreted as small, medium, and large, respectively 
(Cohen, 1988). 
First, the results of the control measures and of the manipulation check will 
be presented. After this, the results of the hypotheses tests will be reported. 
 
3.6.2.1 Results of the Control Measures and of the Manipulation Check 
No statistically significant differences were found between the three conditions 
regarding the two demographic data “gender” (Pearson-χ² (2, N = 59) = 0.35,  
p > .10) and “age” (F < 1) and domain-specific prior knowledge (F < 1). Average 
domain-specific prior knowledge was medium, Moverall = 5.17; SD = 1.93 (cf. Table 
6).  
As expected, the three conditions did not differ regarding how many case 
pairs of the first self-created version matched the presented pairs in the peer 
condition and textbook condition, F < 1 (cf. Table 6). All participants created a first 
version of case pairs which deviated from the ones presented later. For 68% of the 
participants (n = 40), none or only one of the self-created case pairs of the first 
version matched the presented ones, for 22% (n = 13), two of the four case pairs 
matched the presented ones, and for 10% (n = 6), three of the four case pairs 
matched the presented ones. Thus, divergence between self-created and the 
solution presented additionally naturally occurred in this study due to the numerous 
possibilities of combining solved and unsolved cases. 
In addition, as expected, the three conditions did not differ regarding the 
correctness of the first version of case pairs, F < 1 (cf. Table 6).  
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Table 6 
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Control Measures and Correctness of the 2nd
 
 
Version of Task Solutions 
Peer  
condition 
(np = 20) 
M 
(SD) 
Textbook  
condition  
(nt = 20) 
M 
(SD) 
Baseline 
condition 
(nb = 19) 
M 
(SD) 
Domain-specific prior 
knowledge 
5.60 
(1.98) 
5.15 
(2.25) 
4.74 
(1.45) 
Match between 1st 1.15 
(0.93) 
 
version of self-created 
vs. presented task 
solutions (peer 
condition & textbook 
condition) 
1.15 
(0.88) 
1.21 
(1.03) 
Correctness of 1st 1.10 
(0.64) 
 
version of task solutions 
0.95 
(0.83) 
1.05 
(0.40) 
Correctness of 2nd 1.05 
(0.60) 
 
version of task solutions 
1.20 
(0.41) 
1.00 
(0.47) 
 
As one part of the manipulation check, the test on knowledge awareness 
showed that the participants of the peer condition and textbook condition 
remembered the indicated source of the presented case pairs correctly according 
to the instructions (i.e., as “peer” in the peer condition and as “textbook” in the 
textbook condition), Pearson- χ² (2, N = 40) = 40.00, p < .01. Further, the 
participants of the peer condition (Mp = 2.60; SD = 1.46) and of the textbook 
condition (Mt = 2.73; SD = 1.19) did not differ significantly in reproducing the case 
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pairs of the other source correctly, F < 1. Thus, it can be concluded that both 
participants of the peer condition and of the textbook condition had acquired an 
equally high amount of knowledge awareness regarding content elements of the 
other source’s knowledge, that is, case pairs. 
 
3.6.2.2 Impact of Comparing Task Solutions 
It was tested whether problem solvers who could compare their task solution to the 
deviating solution of another source produced more correct task solutions 
compared to problem solvers who did not have the possibility to compare task 
solutions (Hypothesis 1). In line with Hypothesis 1, the textbook condition achieved 
a more correct task solution compared to the baseline condition, β = .27, p = .05,  
R2adj = .34, F(1, 37) = 10.57, p < .001, d = 0.45 (cf. Table 6). However, contrary to 
Hypothesis 1, the peer condition did not achieve a more correct task solution 
compared to the baseline condition, β = .01, p = .92, R2adj
 
 = .66, F(1, 37) = 37.18,  
p < .001, d = 0.09. Inspection of the descriptive statistics revealed that 
performance did decline slightly both in the peer condition and in the baseline 
condition. Thus, Hypothesis 1 could only partly be confirmed, namely, for the 
textbook condition but not for the peer condition. 
3.6.2.3 Impact of Source Label: Textbook versus Peer 
In the next step, we analyzed whether the source label (i.e., peer vs. textbook) of 
the deviating solution that was presented has an influence on whether and how 
problem solvers adapt their case pairs to the presented ones and improve the 
correctness of their task solution (Hypotheses 2a & 2b). For this purpose, we 
contrasted the peer condition (coded by -1) with the textbook condition (coded by 
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+1) regarding the extent of adaptation to false and correct aspects of the deviating 
solution. While creating the second version of case pairs, participants in the 
textbook condition adapted significantly more case pairs to the presented ones 
than participants of the peer condition, β = .45, p < .01, R2adj = .18, F(1, 38) = 9.77,  
p < .01, d = 0.89 (cf. Table 7). However, participants in the textbook condition and 
in the peer condition did not differ in how often they adopted the false aspect of the 
presented task solution, β = .13, p = .43, F < 1, d = 0.26. Instead, participants of 
the textbook condition selectively adopted the correct aspect of the presented task 
solution more often compared to participants in the peer condition, β = .42, p < .01, 
R2adj
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Cognitive Conflict  
 = .15, F(1, 38) = 8.10, p < .01, d = 0.83. Consequently, the textbook condition 
tended to arrive at a more correct task solution than the peer condition, β = .21,  
p = .11, d = 0.29. Thus, Hypothesis 2a was confirmed which predicted a positive 
form of imitation of a high competent source’s solution, and Hypothesis 2b was 
rejected which predicted a negative form of imitation. 
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Table 7 
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Cognitive Conflict, Adaptation of Task 
Solutions, and Social Comparison Orientation of Abilities in the Peer Condition and 
in the Textbook Condition 
 Peer  
condition 
(np = 20) 
M 
(SD) 
Textbook  
condition  
(nt = 20) 
M 
(SD) 
Cognitive conflict 3.05 
(1.23) 
4.15 
(0.93) 
Extent of adaptation to presented 
task solution 
0.45 
(0.76) 
1.35 
(1.04) 
Extent of adaptation to presented 
correct aspect of task solution 
0.05 
(0.22) 
0.40 
(0.50) 
Extent of adaptation to presented 
false aspect of task solution 
0.40 
(0.68) 
0.60 
(0.88) 
Social comparison orientation 
regarding abilities (z-Scores) 
0.09 
(1.11) 
-0.09 
(0.89) 
 
 
3.6.2.4 Impact of Cognitive Conflict 
In order to test whether participants of the textbook condition experienced more 
(Hypothesis 3b) or less (Hypothesis 3a) cognitive conflict than participants of the 
peer condition and whether cognitive conflict mediates the participants’ adaptation 
behavior (Hypothesis 3c), a mediation analysis was carried out. For this purpose, 
the IBM SPSS Statistics macro SOBEL (v3.6, written by Andrew F. Hayes, 2011, 
see http://www.afhayes.com/spss-sas-and-mplus-macros-and-code.html) and 
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procedures introduced by Preacher and Hayes (2004) were used providing 
unstandardized mediation coefficients and Sobel test statistics. The 
unstandardized coefficients were converted into standardized coefficients in order 
to make the results comparable across all analyses of this study. SOBEL estimates 
the size of an indirect effect of X on Y through a single mediator M
In line with Hypothesis 3b and, thus, rejecting Hypothesis 3a, participants of 
the textbook condition experienced more cognitive conflict than participants of the 
peer condition, β
, and computes 
both normal theory (Sobel’s test; Sobel, 1982) and bootstrap approaches for 
inference. The analysis was based on 5.000 bootstrap resamples and a bias-
corrected 95% confidence interval (CI). 
MX = .46, p < .01 (cf. Table 8). Moreover, experiencing more 
cognitive conflict in both experimental conditions with knowledge awareness 
resulted in adapting one’s own case pairs more often to the presented ones,  
βYM,X = .57, p < .001 (Table 8). Further, as already mentioned, participants of the 
textbook condition adapted their case pairs more often to the presented ones,  
βYX = .45, p < .01. Cognitive conflict fully mediated the relationship between the 
experimental conditions with knowledge awareness and adaptation behavior,  
βYX,M = .23, p = .17. The indirect effect of knowledge awareness on adaptation 
behavior mediated by cognitive conflict was significant, both as Sobel’s statistic  
(ZSobel = 2.49, SE = 0.10, p = .01) and as bootstrap result (ZBoot
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 = 0.26, SE = 0.08, 
CI α = .05 [.10; .43]). Thus, Hypothesis 3b was confirmed: The more cognitive 
conflict was experienced, the more adaptation to the presented deviating solution 
was shown. 
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Table 8 
Regression Results of the Mediation Analysis 
Regression β SE t 
Adaptation on experimental 
condition  
.45 0.14 3.13
Cognitive conflict on 
experimental condition 
** 
.46 0.17 3.18
Adaptation on cognitive 
conflict controlling for 
experimental condition 
** 
.57 0.11 4.20
Adaptation on experimental 
condition controlling for 
cognitive conflict 
*** 
.23 0.14 1.41 
 
Note: Experimental condition: Textbook = +1, Peer = -1. Coefficients are standardized β-
coefficients. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***
 
p ≤ .001. 
 
3.6.2.5 Impact of Social Comparison of Abilities on Adaptation 
In addition, we tested whether the problem solvers’ social comparison orientation of 
abilities is a moderator of the impact of knowledge awareness regarding the 
presented deviating task solution on the adaptation of one’s task solution to the 
presented one (Hypotheses 4a & 4b). That is, persons with a high need for 
engaging in social comparison of abilities should generally adapt more of their case 
pairs to the ones presented additionally compared to persons with a low need to 
engage in social comparison of abilities (Hypothesis 4a). The source label of the 
presented task solution, however, should have a larger impact on adaptation 
behavior in cases of a low need to engage in social comparison of abilities 
(Hypothesis 4b). 
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Participants of the peer condition did not differ significantly from participants 
of the textbook condition regarding social comparison orientation of abilities,  
β = .09, p = .58, F < 1 (cf. Table 7). For testing the hypotheses, multiple regression 
analyses were performed. As predictors, the z-standardized factor “Ability” of the 
Iowa-Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure, the peer (coded by “-1”) 
versus textbook (coded by “+1”) condition, and the interaction term of both were 
inserted, and the adaptation of case pairs served as criterion variable. The three 
predictors explained about 23% of the participants’ extent of adaptation,  
R2adj.
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 = .23, F(3, 35) = 4.76, p < .01, d = 0.21. Not surprisingly, the main effect of 
knowledge awareness on the extent of adaptation was confirmed once again. That 
is, the participants of the textbook condition adapted significantly more case pairs 
to the presented ones than participants of the peer condition, β = .42, p < .01. No 
significant main effect of the factor “Ability” was found, β = .17, p > .10. A 
significant interaction, however, emerged between the factor “Ability” and the peer 
versus textbook condition, β = -.31, p = .05 (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Interaction Between Need for Social Comparison of Abilities and 
Knowledge Awareness Regarding the Source of Presented Deviating 
Case Pairs on Extent of Adaptation to the Presented Case Pairs  
(N = 39). 
 
Simple slope analyses (cf. Aiken & West, 1991) indicated that knowledge 
awareness only had an impact on the adaptation of case pairs for persons with low 
values on the factor “Ability” but not for persons with high values on this factor. 
That is, in case of a high need to engage in social comparison of ability, the pattern 
of results points in the direction of participants generally adapting more case pairs 
independently of the source of the presented task solution; however, this pattern of 
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results was too weak to reach statistical significance, β = .11, p = .60. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4a was rejected. In case of a low need for engaging in social 
comparison of ability, the participants of the textbook condition adapted 
significantly more case pairs to the presented ones than the participants of the peer 
condition, β = .73, p < .01, which confirms our Hypothesis 4b.  
 
3.6.2.6 Mediated Moderation Analysis 
Since in this study cognitive conflict was a mediator and social comparison 
orientation of ability a moderator of the participants’ adaptation behavior, we 
conducted a mediated moderation analysis (Hypothesis 5). For this purpose, the 
IBM SPSS Statistics macro PROCESS (Beta release 040612, written by Andrew F. 
Hayes, 2012, see http://www.afhayes.com/introduction-to-mediation-moderation-
and-conditional-process-analysis.html) was used. The experimental conditions with 
knowledge awareness (peer vs. textbook) served as independent variable (X), 
cognitive conflict as mediator (M), social comparison orientation of ability as 
moderator (W), and adaptation of one’s own case pairs to presented ones as 
dependent variable (Y). The unstandardized coefficients again were converted into 
standardized coefficients. The analysis was based on 5.000 bootstrap resamples. 
The 95% confidence interval (CI) obtained for the indirect effects of knowledge 
awareness × social comparison of ability interaction on adaptation behavior 
through the mediator of cognitive conflict did contain zero, ZBoot = -0.10, SE = 0.09, 
CI α = .05 [-.30; .05] (see Figure 5 for a graphical depiction of the mediated 
moderation model results). Therefore, Hypothesis 5 was rejected because it could 
not be concluded that a more intense adaptation behavior of persons with low 
values regarding their social comparison orientation of ability in the textbook 
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condition was mediated by cognitive conflict. Instead, it seems that cognitive 
conflict as a mediator and social comparison of ability as a moderator exerted 
unique and independent effects on adaptation behavior in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Results of the Mediated Moderation Model. All Path Coefficients are 
Standardized β-Coefficients. Total Adjusted R2 for the Model:  
R2adj = .49, F(4, 34) = 8.08, p < .001. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***
 
p ≤ .001. 
 
 
3.7 Summary and Discussion 
This first study of the present dissertation provides a synthesis of the following 
three research areas: (1) research on knowledge awareness, (2) research on 
conflict elaboration theory, and (3) research on personality differences regarding 
social comparison of abilities. Specifically, the study aimed at testing and extending 
assumptions of conflict elaboration theory (Mugny et al., 1995) by using a 
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knowledge-rich, complex problem solving task. In order to induce a cognitive 
conflict in the context of this problem solving task, problem solvers were provided 
with knowledge awareness regarding the source of a task solution that deviated 
from their own solution. By means of this cognitive conflict task, the impact of 
knowledge awareness regarding sources of varying levels of expertise (i.e., high 
vs. equally low competence) and the impact of individual differences regarding 
social comparison orientation on adaptation behavior was investigated. For this 
purpose, problem solvers compared their task solution in two experimental 
knowledge awareness conditions either with the deviating solution of a peer 
layperson or with the deviating solution of a supposed textbook on the subject-
matter domain. Participants of the baseline condition only reviewed their self-
created task solution. This study showed that for a knowledge-rich problem solving 
task without interaction between the source of the cognitive conflict and the target 
person, the impact of low competent sources is much weaker than postulated in 
the context of previous studies on conflict elaboration theory using more well-
defined problems (e.g., anagram tasks; Quiamzade et al., 2009). That is, only 
knowledge awareness as the possibility to compare one’s task solution with the 
deviating solution of a high competent source encouraged problem solvers to 
improve the correctness of their task solution but not knowledge awareness as the 
comparison with the deviating solution of an equally low competent source. One 
reason for this finding could be that knowledge-rich tasks are too complex in order 
to learn solution strategies quickly just from being provided with a deviating solution 
without receiving further explanations from the source of this deviating solution. In 
such a situation, problem solvers are not only especially uncertain about their own 
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solution, but also about a peer’s solution. Therefore, they are much more likely to 
trust a high competent source’s solution than a low competent source’s solution.  
Despite the present findings, peer learning can be helpful in the context of 
knowledge-rich cognitive conflict tasks if certain conditions are met. Previous 
studies have shown that for learning to solve such tasks, it is crucial that peer 
interaction takes place (cf. Bodemer, 2011) because explaining one’s solution to a 
peer can help both to resolve cognitive conflicts and to improve task solutions 
(Baumeister, Engelmann, & Hesse, subm. b). Therefore, peer talk became the 
starting point of the second study of this dissertation because it was assumed that 
peer talk could strengthen the positive impact of knowledge awareness regarding 
an equally low competent source on problem solving in the context of this cognitive 
conflict task. This study will be presented in the following Chapter 4. 
Moreover, the cognitive conflict task applied in the first study resulted in the 
positive form of a selective imitation (cf. Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001) because 
problem solvers selectively adopted the correct aspect of the high competent 
source’s solution whereas they did not adopt the false aspects more often than 
problem solvers confronted with a low competent source’s solution. This positive 
form of imitation resulted in slightly more correct task solutions of problem solvers 
confronted with a high competent source’s solution compared to problem solvers 
confronted with a low competent source’s solution. What caused this positive form 
of selective imitation? In this study, it was shown that cognitive conflict was the 
driving force of problem solver’s adaptation behavior. This corroborates previous 
assumptions and findings on the positive impact of cognitive conflict on learning as 
an educational strategy (cf. Limón, 2001). However, it was also shown that in 
contrast to previous assumptions of conflict elaboration theory (Mugny et al., 1995; 
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Quiamzade et al., 2009) and of other peer learning approaches (e.g., Chan, Burtis, 
& Bereiter, 1997), peer learning does not necessarily result in more intense 
cognitive conflicts than learning from an expert. In this first study of the present 
dissertation, problem solvers confronted with a high competent source’s deviating 
solution experienced substantially more cognitive conflict than problem solvers 
confronted with a low competent source’s deviating solution. Moreover, perceived 
cognitive conflict fully mediated problem solver’s adaptation behavior regarding the 
presented deviating task solution. That is, the more cognitive conflict problem 
solvers perceived, the more extensively they adapted their solution to the 
presented one, no matter whether their knowledge awareness referred to a high or 
a low competent source. This pattern of results can be interpreted in reference to 
the specific problem solving situation created in this study which differed from the 
learning settings investigated by previous studies on conflict elaboration theory: In 
contrast to previous studies using more well-defined problems whose solution 
strategies could be acquired in the course of the experiments (cf. Quiamzade et al., 
2009), in this study, a knowledge-rich problem solving task was applied. The 
solution strategies of such tasks take more time to learn because they require a 
large knowledge base (cf. Sweller et al., 1998; VanLehn, 1999) which was not 
available to the participants of the study who were laypersons in the subject-matter 
domain of criminal law. Further studies are needed applying longitudinal designs in 
order to investigate whether and how such social influence dynamics change in the 
course of learning how to solve knowledge-rich problem solving tasks. 
Further, in this study, social comparison orientation regarding ability 
moderated the relationship between knowledge awareness and adaptation 
behavior. That is, persons with a low need for social comparison of abilities 
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adapted their task solutions especially to those of a high competent source. Thus, 
this first study of the present dissertation contributes to understanding how persons 
low in social comparison orientation of ability react to social influence in a cognitive 
conflict task. The pattern of results illustrates that basic human needs such as the 
“upward drive” (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007; Festinger, 1954; Smith & Sachs, 1997), 
that is, comparing oneself with others who presumably do better on the same task 
in order to improve one’s performance, even apply to persons who characterize 
themselves as not preferring to compare themselves with others. Perhaps an 
especially valid assessment of personality traits such as social comparison 
orientation requires both self-assessments and assessments by others (e.g., close 
friends or relatives). 
For persons with a high need to compare their abilities, it was postulated 
that they would generally adapt their task solution more often to the presented 
deviating solution regardless of whether the source label indicated a low or a high 
competent source (Michinov & Michinov, 2001). The pattern of results, however, 
was too weak to confirm this assumption. Perhaps in the sample of this study, 
there was a lack of persons with a very high need for social comparison of abilities. 
Further, a mediated moderation analysis was conducted in order to clarify 
the interplay and relative strength of the influence of knowledge awareness, social 
comparison orientation regarding ability, and cognitive conflict on the adaptation of 
one’s task solution to the presented solution (cf. Figure 5). In this model, cognitive 
conflict turned out to be the only direct and a very strong predictor of problem 
solvers’ adaptation behavior. Knowledge awareness regarding sources of different 
levels of expertise had an indirect impact on adaptation behavior through cognitive 
conflict. That is, problem solvers confronted with a high competent source’s 
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deviating solution experienced more cognitive conflict than problem solvers 
confronted with a low competent source’s solution, and more perceived cognitive 
conflict resulted in more adaptation of task solutions to the presented one. 
However, knowledge awareness and social comparison orientation regarding 
ability did not interactively affect the mediator cognitive conflict. Thus, in this study, 
cognitive conflict as a mediator and social comparison of ability as a moderator 
interacted independently with knowledge awareness with respect to their impact on 
adaptation behavior. More studies with larger samples are needed to back up this 
new finding. 
The question of how learners react if they are confronted with other’s 
competence or knowledge is highly relevant for educational research and 
application. Being aware of others’ knowledge can change a learner’s or problem 
solver’s behavior in many ways. For example, previous studies have shown that 
being informed about others’ knowledge and information both supports individual 
learning by improving peer explanations (e.g., Dehler-Zufferey, Bodemer, Buder, & 
Hesse, 2011) and collaborative problem solving (Engelmann et al., 2009; 
Engelmann, & Hesse, 2010). However, individual differences substantially interact 
with contextual factors of learning and problem solving. Therefore, studies are 
needed to identify the prevalent individual differences and needs and their effects 
on different kinds of learning situations, respectively. For example, Ray, 
Neugebauer, Sassenberg, Buder, and Hesse (2013) showed in two studies that 
being confronted with others’ knowledge activates social comparison processes 
which, beside more effective explanation-giving, do not necessarily result in optimal 
learning behavior. Instead, persons high in social comparison orientation reduced 
information sharing with a peer due to seeking self-enhancement, and, in contrast, 
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persons low in social comparison orientation did not change the amount of shared 
information in this setting.  
 
 
3.8 Conclusions 
This first study of the present dissertation further contributes to understanding the 
effects of individual differences in social comparison orientation on learner’s and 
problem solver’s performance. This study showed that in the context of a 
knowledge-rich cognitive conflict task, assumptions of conflict elaboration theory 
regarding the impact of different source labels, that is, knowledge awareness 
regarding different levels of expertise, applied especially to persons with a low 
need for social comparison of abilities or performance since these persons 
selectively adopted the correct aspect of a high competent source’s solution more 
often than the same solution aspect of an equally low competent source. Thus, 
being low in social comparison orientation does not mean that someone is not 
interested in improving one’s performance by learning from presumably more 
competent models. 
Moreover, this study illustrated that perceived cognitive conflict is a strong 
driving force of learners’ behavior. Future studies are needed to investigate the 
interplay of individual differences in social comparison orientation and cognitive 
conflict in more naturalistic settings applying, for example, real, longer-term 
interaction between the source and the target of a cognitive conflict. This study 
provides evidence regarding factors and measures which contribute to understand 
individual differences and mediating processes in learners’ or problem solvers’ 
behavior.  
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Overview – Part II 
 
The first study of the present dissertation had shown that in the context of a 
knowledge-rich cognitive conflict task (i.e. identifying structural similarities between 
law cases; Nievelstein et al., 2010) without interaction between the source of the 
cognitive conflict and the target person, the impact of equally low competent 
sources will probably be lower than the impact of more highly competent sources 
which is in contrast to previous assumptions of the conflict elaboration theory 
(Mugny et al., 1995) applying more well-defined problems (e.g., anagram tasks; 
Quiamzade et al., 2009). Therefore, in the next step, it is interesting to explore how 
the positive impact of peer learning could be strengthened using the same task: 
one possibility being peer talk. Peer talk in the context of this dissertation is defined 
as the transmission of audio messages between two spatially distributed learning 
partners with an equivalent level of expertise, that is, two laypersons in the subject-
matter domain. Previous studies have shown that peer talk can support learning. 
For example, by directing explanations to a learning partner, learners improve their 
own understanding (Webb, 1985, 1991), and they adapt their explanations to their 
learning partner’s current level of understanding (Clark & Murphy, 1982; Dehler et 
al., 2009).  
The second study of the present dissertation investigates the impact of peer 
talk on (1.) cognitive (i.e., conflict resolution, knowledge convergence) and (2.) 
performance-related aspects (i.e., adaptation to the partner’s solution and 
correctness of task solutions) while completing the same knowledge-rich cognitive 
conflict task as in Study 1. 
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Further, static knowledge awareness information was provided in Study 1, 
whereas dynamic knowledge awareness information will be presented in Study 2 in 
order to compare across both studies whether these two subcategories of 
knowledge awareness may have different psychological effects (cf. technology 
affordances & representational guidance; Suthers, 2006), according to the 
combined classification proposed in Chapter 2.  
 
4   Study 2: Impact of Knowledge Awareness Regarding an Equally Low Competent 
Source Combined With Peer Talk in a Computer-Supported Cognitive Conflict Task 
130 
4 Study 2: Impact of Knowledge Awareness Regarding 
an Equally Low Competent Source Combined With Peer 
Talk in a Computer-Supported Cognitive Conflict Task 
 
This chapter is based on: 
Baumeister, A. E. E., Engelmann, T., & Hesse, F. W. (subm. b). Impact of peer talk 
in a computer-supported cognitive conflict task. Manuscript submitted for 
publication. 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Neo-Piagetian learning theories argue that socio-cognitive conflicts, for example, 
being confronted with others’ task solutions which deviate from one’s own solution 
offer a great potential for learning (cf. Marchand, 2012; Mugny, Butera, Sanchez-
Mazas, & Pérez, 1995; Limón, 2001). Studies on conflict elaboration theory (Pérez 
& Mugny, 1992; Mugny et al., 1995) investigate how confrontation with a divergent 
task solution affects a learner’s own performance if he or she does not know for 
sure which solution is correct. Consequently, these studies typically involve 
participants with low prior knowledge in the subject-matter domain, in order to 
induce high uncertainty regarding the correct solution and in order to maximize the 
probability of a cognitive conflict. One aim of conflict elaboration theory is to clarify 
social influence dynamics of learning through socio-cognitive conflict. Studies on 
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conflict elaboration theory have shown, for example, that being confronted with a 
peer’s deviating solution improves learning if the peer is not threatening one’s own 
self-esteem (Buchs & Butera, 2009; Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001). That is, learning 
occurs if peers compare and try to coordinate their solution strategies which results 
in more elaborated solutions (Quiamzade, Mugny, & Darnon, 2009) whereas 
learning is impaired if learning partners compete with each other and focus more 
on a social comparisons of their competence instead of focusing on solving the 
task (Darnon, Doll, & Butera, 2007). 
Further, being informed about another learner’s task solution that deviates 
from one’s own solution is an instance of knowledge awareness (Engelmann, 
Dehler, Bodemer, & Buder, 2009) which is defined as “an individual’s state of being 
informed and having perceived information about others’ knowledge”, that is, 
especially others’ externalized task-relevant knowledge (Engelmann et al., 2009, p. 
950). Knowledge awareness is a strand of research on group awareness (Gross, 
Stary, & Totter, 2005; Gutwin & Greenberg, 1995; Janssen & Bodemer, 2013). 
Research on group awareness aims at investigating and supporting 
“consciousness and information of various aspects of the group and its members” 
(Gross et al., 2005, p. 327). For example, group members should know what the 
others are doing or have contributed (social group awareness), and which 
knowledge or expertise, opinions and information they have (cognitive group 
awareness; Janssen & Bodemer, 2013). Group awareness has to be established in 
virtual teams by means of groupware because group members who are spatially 
separated do not receive the social cues casually transmitted face-to-face which 
facilitate knowledge exchange (e.g. seeing a group member nodding his or her 
head) and coordination of task completion (Gutwin & Greenberg, 1995). 
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For example, computer-based external representations which inform 
learners about others’ task solutions help learners to acquire knowledge 
awareness. That is, the task solutions learners produce deliberately and not just by 
mere guessing can be regarded as externalizations of their knowledge (“sediments 
of cognitive activity”; Rindermann, 2013, p. 190). Thus, different solutions regarding 
the same task indicate different knowledge. The following study example illustrates 
the close relationship between learners’ different knowledge and task solutions and 
the role which shared external representations of knowledge and task solutions 
can play: Bodemer (2011) provided dyads of spatially distributed learners with a 
shared visualization showing their individual task solutions that could differ on the 
same task. Dyads provided with such a shared visualization discussed conflicting 
task solutions more often than dyads without the shared visualization. According to 
Engelmann and colleagues’ (2009) classification of knowledge awareness, this 
form of knowledge awareness is called hybrid knowledge awareness because 
learners are provided with an external representation that both informs them about 
the others’ task solutions (i.e., content) and allows them to draw conclusions about 
others’ knowledge (i.e., the context of the content), whereas other forms of external 
representations mainly inform them about their own and the others’ knowledge 
without providing task solutions (cf. Engelmann et al., 2009). 
Several studies have shown that approaches for fostering knowledge 
awareness both improve individual learning and collaborative problem solving 
(Engelmann et al., 2009; Engelmann & Hesse, 2010; Engelmann, Tergan, & 
Hesse, 2010; Janssen & Bodemer, 2013). Computer-based external 
representations of others’ knowledge and information help to acquire knowledge 
awareness even if no further communication takes place (Engelmann, Baumeister, 
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Dingel, & Hesse,
Nevertheless, in this dissertation’s first experimental study (Baumeister, 
Engelmann, & Hesse, subm. a), using the same computer-supported cognitive 
conflict task of the present study, knowledge awareness about the partly correct 
task solution of a peer learner did not help learners to improve the correctness of 
their own task solutions compared to a baseline without knowledge awareness. In 
this previous study, learners either could compare their task solution to the 
deviating solution of a peer by means of a static external representation of the 
peer’s solution or they were not provided with such a comparison possibility. In 
contrast, the present study aimed at investigating whether the impact of peer 
learners as producers of solutions which deviate from one’s own solution, that is, 
sources of socio-cognitive conflicts, can be strengthened by (1.) enabling spatially 
distributed peer learners to talk to each other by means of computer-based audio 
communication and (2.) by enabling learners to observe in real-time how the peer 
is changing his or her solution (cf. Bodemer, 2011).  
 2010a). However, dialogic discourse combined with external 
representations for fostering knowledge awareness is helpful for solving problems 
because mistakes are identified mutually and discussed resulting in more correct 
task solutions compared to without dialogic discourse (Engelmann et al., 2010a).  
In the following sections of this chapter, it will be explained why and how 
computer-based peer talk could support learners in improving their task solutions 
after being confronted with a solution that deviates from their own. Specifically, this 
study aimed at elucidating the impact of peer talk on (1.) cognitive (i.e., conflict 
resolution, knowledge convergence) and (2.) performance-related aspects (i.e., 
mutual adaptation and correctness of task solutions) while completing a computer-
supported cognitive conflict task. 
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The next section starts with arguing that the impact of authentic peer talk 
has indeed not yet been investigated in studies on conflict elaboration theory 
(Mugny et al., 1995). After this, a short review of studies on the impact of 
computer-mediated communication (CMC) on learning and conflict resolution is 
provided. Further, it will be explained under which conditions computer-based peer 
talk can be helpful in order to solve cognitive conflict tasks. Specifically, it will be 
argued that peer talk can help to resolve cognitive conflicts and can support 
knowledge convergence (cf. Fischer & Mandl, 2005; Jeong & Chi, 2007). 
Regarding performance-related aspects, it is argued that peer talk will result in a 
more intensive mutual adaptation of task solutions and in more correct solutions. 
Finally, methods and results of the experimental study are presented and 
discussed comparing dyads with computer-based peer talk to dyads without peer 
talk regarding cognitive and performance-related aspects while solving a cognitive 
conflict task. 
 
 
 
4.2 Impact of Peer Talk 
As Mercer (1995) argues, studies on the concept of socio-cognitive conflict did not 
focus on “the actual talk involved in such conflicts of ideas – perhaps because 
language still occupies a relatively marginal role in their theory. The main aim in 
most of their research has also been to determine whether interaction improved 
later individual performance (rather than being interested in the joint construction of 
knowledge).” (Mercer, 1996, p. 360). Thus, studies in the context of conflict 
elaboration theory (e.g., Mugny et al., 1995; Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001) did 
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neither clarify the impact of peer talk in face-to-face (FTF) learning situations nor by 
means of computer-mediated communication (CMC). Some studies have included 
“peer interaction”, but in these cases, a confederate of the researchers presented 
his or her predetermined solution to university students (e.g., Buchs & Butera, 
2009; Darnon et al., 2007), and mostly no dialogic discourse with this bogus 
partner took place (e.g., Butera, Caverni, & Rossi, 2005; Quiamzade, 2007). One 
study included cooperative learning but with another focus (i.e. resource 
interdependence among dyads of university students; Buchs, Butera, & Mugny, 
2004a). Therefore, it remains to be clarified whether computer-based peer talk 
among university students increases or helps to resolve cognitive conflict 
compared to no discourse which is the aim of the present study. 
Lou, Abrami, and d’Apollonia (2001) conducted a meta-analysis (122 
studies) comparing dyadic or small group (i.e. 3- to 5-persons) learning versus 
individual learning, both using computer technology (CT). They found a small 
positive effect of peer talk in dyads or groups (i.e. either face-to-face or computer-
mediated communication) compared to individual learning on individual 
achievement in immediate or delayed post-tests (based on n = 100 studies, 
corrected for sample size differences: d = 0.16). Process measures revealed that 
peer talk in dyads and small groups resulted in using learning strategies more 
frequently and effectively (n = 5 studies, d = 0.50), and in being more perseverant 
on the tasks (n = 2 studies, d = 0.48) compared to individual learning. 
As Hobman, Bordia, Irmer, and Chang (2002) note, only few studies have 
investigated the impact of computer-mediated communication in text-based (i.e. 
written) form on different types of conflicts pertaining to task, process, and 
relationships. In additon, the results are inconsistent. For example, Straus (1997) 
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compared task-oriented conflict in CMC versus FTF groups and found more 
conflicts in CMC groups due to time pressure. Further, Hobman and colleagues 
(2002) found a similar amount of task-oriented conflict and more relationship and 
process conflict among CMC groups compared to FTF groups but only at the 
beginning of their cooperation, not in later stages. 
However, Harmon (1998) showed that a relatively rich medium, such as 
dialogic discourse by means of audio conferencing, is especially suited for 
resolving socio-cognitive conflicts. Harmon (1998) concluded that most audio 
conferencing research in dyadic settings “has provided some indication of positive 
audio effects on conflict management, as evidenced by a more constructive, issue-
focused conflict process and/or greater opinion change and agreement” (p. 140). 
However, it remains to be clarified which impact a short computer-mediated peer 
talk phase will have on completing a cognitive conflict task compared to no 
discourse. 
 
 
 
4.3 Hypotheses 
According to Harmon (1998), computer-mediated dyadic (audio) communication as 
a relatively rich medium should be helpful to solve a cognitive conflict compared to 
no communication: 
Hypothesis 1: Peer talk helps to resolve cognitive conflicts.  
Moreover, if communication partners exchange their knowledge and explain 
their positions, this should result not only in conflict resolution but also in a shared 
understanding called “knowledge convergence” (Dehler, Bodemer, & Buder, 2008; 
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Fischer & Mandl, 2005; Jeong & Chi, 2007) or “convergence of meaning” 
(Roschelle, 1992). 
With regard to the concept of socio-cognitive conflict, it is important to 
explain how and why conflict resolution was achieved. Knowledge convergence as 
co-construction of knowledge and ideas and as perspective-taking could be a good 
reason for resolving an initially experienced socio-cognitive conflict. Knowledge 
convergence, however, does not mean that no divergence between learners exists 
any more but knowledge convergence could explain why initial socio-cognitive 
conflicts are reduced. To put it differently, if no knowledge convergence occurs this 
could mean that learners could not learn from each other and, thus, the 
educational cognitive conflict strategy has missed the target. 
In previous studies with university students, knowledge convergence was 
mainly assessed by measuring shared knowledge (Dehler et al., 2008; Fischer & 
Mandl, 2005; Jeong & Chi, 2007), but also by measuring the similarity in resource 
use within groups of learners (Fischer & Mandl, 2005), and by measuring shared 
mental models (Jeong & Chi, 2007). Thus, objective measures were used. It 
remains to be investigated whether knowledge convergence can also be captured 
by means of subjective measures. Therefore, the present study aimed at 
examining: (1.) whether, in contrast to objective measures, knowledge 
convergence can also be measured by self-ratings of the learners, asking them to 
judge both their own task-relevant competence as well as their peer learner’s task-
relevant competence, and (2.) whether peer talk, while completing a cognitive 
conflict task, results in more knowledge convergence (subjectively rated by the 
learners). 
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Hypothesis 2: Communicating peers judge their own task-relevant 
competence and their peer learner’s task-relevant competence to be 
more similar as a result of mutually explaining their task solutions to 
each other compared to non-communicating peers. 
Regarding performance-related aspects, the present study aimed at 
examining whether peer talk has an impact on mutually adapting task solutions and 
on the correctness of task solutions. Since socio-cognitive conflict tasks usually 
involve much uncertainty regarding the correct solution on the learners’ part, the 
question needs to be answered whether peer talk will result in more mutual 
adaptation of initially diverging task solutions. If the previously mentioned 
assumption (Hypothesis 2) holds true that peer talk results in knowledge 
convergence in the sense of perceiving a similar competence level of partner and 
self, then it can be concluded that peer talk will also more often result in adopting 
the peer’s task solution compared to no peer talk. Thus, the following hypothesis 
was tested: 
Hypothesis 3: After peer talk, learners will mutually adapt their task 
solutions more often compared to learners who did not talk to each 
other.  
However, adapting task solutions can either have a positive or a negative 
effect on the correctness of task solutions depending on whether correct or false 
aspects of the learning partner’s solution are adopted (cf. Chapter 3; Baumeister, 
Engelmann, & Hesse, subm. a). According to conflict elaboration theory, it can be 
expected that learners will elaborate on a peer’s deviating solution if the peer is not 
threatening their self-esteem (Butera et al., 2005; Mugny et al., 1995; Quiamzade & 
Mugny, 2001). This should result in deliberate mutual adaptation which improves 
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the correctness of task solutions because, in this case, learners mainly adopt the 
correct aspects of their partner’s task solution. 
Which impact does peer talk have on the correctness of task solutions in a 
cognitive conflict task? This study aims at clarifying this question. Several studies 
found that the quality of the content of dialogic discourse was a crucial factor for 
learners’ improved comprehension of the subject-matter and improved 
performance (Teasley, 1997; Webb, Troper, & Fall, 1995). High quality dialogic 
discourse can be called exploratory talk which Mercer (1995) defines as follows: 
“partners engage critically but constructively with each other’s ideas. (…) 
Statements and suggestions are offered for joint consideration. These may be 
challenged and counter-challenged, but challenges are justified and alternative 
hypotheses are offered.” That is, “knowledge is made more publicly accountable 
and reasoning is more visible in the talk.” (Mercer, 1995, p. 104). In a study, for 
example, teachers taught primary age children the ground rules of exploratory talk 
which improved their reasoning (e.g. Fernández, Wegerif, Mercer, & Rojas-
Drummond, 2002; Mercer, Dawes, Wegerif, & Sams, 2004). 
This dissertation’s second study aimed at clarifying the question whether 
peer talk per se helps to improve task solutions by improving task-relevant 
cognitive processes (cf. Teasley, 1995) or whether the quality of dialogic discourse 
content matters (Mercer, 1995; Teasley, 1995): 
Hypothesis 4 a): The correctness of the task solution improves as a 
result of peer talk compared to no communication (cf. Teasley, 1995).  
Hypothesis 4 b): Only high-quality dialogic discourse will result in a 
more correct task solution compared to no communication. High 
quality means that learners talk about their interpretation of core 
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elements of the task and that learners use exploratory talk (Mercer, 
1995, 1996, 2000; Teasley, 1995). 
In order to identify high-quality discourse, that is, exploratory talk, Mercer 
(2000) suggests to focus discourse analysis, for example, on key words (e.g., 
‘reasoning words’: ‘I think’, ‘because’, ‘if’, ‘how’, ‘why’ etc., Wegerif & Mercer, 1997; 
Wegerif, Mercer, & Dawes, 1999; Soter et al., 2008).  
 
 
 
4.4 Experimental Study 
In the second study of the present dissertation, the following two sets of research 
questions were investigated in the context of completing a complex, knowledge-
rich cognitive conflict task: First, the impact of peer talk on cognitive aspects was 
examined. Second, the impact of peer talk on performance-related aspects was 
focused on. 
Regarding cognitive aspects, it was examined whether peer talk helps to 
resolve cognitive conflicts. Further, it was investigated whether peers judge their 
own task-relevant competence and their peer learner’s task-relevant competence 
to be more similar as a result of mutually explaining their task solutions to one 
another. 
Regarding performance-related aspects, it was investigated whether peer 
learners who communicate with each other mutually adapt their task solutions 
more often compared to learners who did not communicate with each other. In 
addition, it was examined whether the correctness of the task solution improves as 
a result of peer talk (cf. Engelmann, Baumeister, Dingel, & Hesse, 2010a) or 
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whether the quality of discourse content matters. The peer talk was analyzed in 
more detail in order to reveal associations between discourse content, cognitive 
conflict, competence judgments, and improved or declined correctness of task 
solutions. 
 
 
4.4.1 Method 
 
4.4.1.1 Participants and Design 
The 58 university students who participated in this study (43 female, 15 male;  
M = 23.95 years, SD = 2.70) were drawn from a larger sample of 80 students of 
different fields of study who volunteered to participate for either payment or course 
credit. Eleven dyads were excluded from the final sample because their first 
version of the task solutions matched each other to a great extent. Thus, for them, 
this was not a cognitive conflict task. Except for the control measure “match of the 
first version of task solutions”, the excluded participants did not differ from the final 
sample regarding any of the further control measures applied. 
Law students were not invited to participate in order to keep prior knowledge 
low in the later domain of problem solving which was criminal law. In a between-
subjects design, the participants were randomly assigned to either the peer talk (pt) 
or the no peer talk (npt) condition. The final sample consisted of 13 dyads in the 
peer talk condition and 16 dyads in the no peer talk condition. In the peer talk 
condition, the participants compared their task solution with the solution of a peer 
learner that largely deviated from their own solution, and after this, both learners 
mutually explained their task solutions to each other. In the no peer talk condition, 
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the participants also compared their task solution with the largely deviating solution 
of a peer learner, but both learners had no possibility to communicate with each 
other. 
 
 
4.4.1.2 Materials and Measures 
 
Control measures. All control measures, demographic data (e.g., gender, 
age) and domain-specific prior knowledge were assessed online by means of web 
forms. Domain-specific prior knowledge was assessed by a multiple-choice 
questionnaire of basic concepts of German case law (5 items; e.g., what are the 
basic fields of law?). The maximum attainable score was ten points.  
As a control measure, a test on knowledge awareness was performed in 
both conditions (cf. Baumeister et al., subm. a). That is, it was tested whether the 
participants were informed about the peer learner’s task solution and could 
reproduce it from memory. The maximum score for correctly remembering the 
peer’s solution was five points. 
As a further control measure, the match between the first version of the task 
solutions within each dyad was assessed to test whether the task solutions 
deviated sufficiently, which is a prerequisite for a cognitive conflict task. The 
criterion for being included in the final sample was to have between zero and a 
maximum of two matches within each dyad. Since the task involved arranging five 
pairs of solved and unsolved criminal law cases, the score ranged from “0” to “5” 
matching case pairs within each dyad of peer learners. 
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Computer-supported cognitive conflict task. An inductive reasoning task 
was applied which in this dissertation’s first experimental study had proven to 
maximize the variety of task solutions and, thus, the experience of a cognitive 
conflict (cf. Chapter 3; Baumeister et al., subm. a): The learners had to pair each of 
five unsolved criminal law cases with one of five solved criminal law cases (cf. 
Appendix B). The aim was to build pairs with a high structural similarity, that is, 
pairs that required a similar solution so that the solution of the solved case could 
be transferred to the unsolved case. Five solved criminal law cases each consisting 
of three to four sentences along with their solution were printed on single sheets of 
paper, respectively. Further, five unsolved criminal law cases were presented on 
five cards. The software tool used for sorting the law cases in order to build 
structurally similar pairs was CmapTools (cf. Novak & Cañas, 2006; see, 
http://ftp.ihmc.us/) which allows for moving the text boxes easily that represented 
the solved and unsolved cases. Moreover, using CmapTools, the computer-based 
external representation of the sorting task also allowed for comparing self-arranged 
case pairs with the peer learner’s case pairs presented additionally both in the peer 
talk condition and in the no peer talk condition (see Figure 6). This external 
representation initially contained five grey text boxes labeled with the titles of the 
five solved cases and five colored text boxes representing the unsolved cases. 
Each unsolved case could be arranged in a pair with a solved case by dragging the 
colored text boxes next to the grey text boxes on the screen. 
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Figure 6. Computer-Based External Representation for Supporting Knowledge 
Awareness: Self-Created Case Pairs in the Middle and Additionally 
Presented Deviating Case Pairs of a Peer Learner on the Right Side. 
 
Cognitive conflict. It was assessed whether the participants experienced a 
cognitive conflict while they were confronted with the case pairs of a peer learner 
which deviated from their self-created pairs. The participants indicated on three 5-
point rating scales (from 1 for “low agreement” to 5 for “high agreement”; 
Cronbach’s α = 0.82) whether they “had doubts regarding the correctness of the 
presented deviating task solution” of a peer and regarding the “peer’s task-related 
competence”, and whether the deviating task solution “did not convince” them. This 
4   Study 2: Impact of Knowledge Awareness Regarding an Equally Low Competent 
Source Combined With Peer Talk in a Computer-Supported Cognitive Conflict Task 
145 
test was administered before and after the experimental variation (i.e., presence / 
absence of a peer talk phase). 
 
Competence rating: Self vs. peer. In order to assess knowledge 
convergence, the participants were asked to rate both their own competence and 
their peer learner’s competence regarding building correct case pairs. The 
competence ratings were given on two separate 11-point rating scales, one scale 
for the participant’s competence and one scale for the peer’s competence (from 0% 
for “not competent at all” to 100% for “highly competent”). In order to assess 
whether the participants rated their own competence lower or higher than the 
peer’s competence, a competence difference variable was calculated by 
subtracting the values of the rating of peer competence from the values of the 
rating of one’s own competence. Positive values on this competence difference 
variable indicated that the participant had rated his or her own competence higher 
than the peer’s competence, whereas negative values indicated that the participant 
had rated the peer’s competence higher than his or her own competence. The 
nearer the difference value was to zero, the more similar the rating of own and the 
peer’s competence was. Both competence rating scales were administered before 
and after the experimental variation (i.e., presence / absence of a peer talk phase). 
 
Adaptation of task solution. It was assessed how many case pairs in the 
second version of the own task solution had been adapted to the presented 
solution of the peer learner. The maximum score was five points if the participant 
had adapted all five case pairs to the case pairs of the peer learner. Note that 
adaptation can only be assessed if divergence between task solutions existed 
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initially. This is a further reason (beside the aim to create a cognitive conflict 
situation) why dyads had to be excluded from the final sample if their initial task 
solutions were highly matched. Further, it was assessed whether learners adopted 
correct (i.e. structurally similar) or false case pairs of their peer. 
 
Correctness of task solution. The participants’ correctness of the first and 
second version of the task solution was assessed regarding pairing solved and 
unsolved cases. Only two pairs were counted as the correct solution because 
structural similarities between the solved and unsolved case existed. For the other 
three unsolved cases, no structurally similar solved case existed. Thus, they 
served as distractors. Two points were attainable as the maximum score for the 
correctness of building structurally similar case pairs. The correct solution had 
been previously identified in a pilot study with advanced law students (n = 8).  
 
Content analysis of discourse. In the peer talk condition, the verbal 
activity was recorded via Camtasia Studio screen recorder software (see, 
http://www.techsmith.com/camtasia/). Transcripts of the audio files were generated. 
One dyad had to be excluded from the analysis because the audio data were too 
noisy. For the remaining 12 communicating dyads, both learning partners were 
identified and labeled in the transcripts. Verbal statements were segmented into 
utterances based on content and pauses. In a first step, all utterances were coded 
into categories. For this purpose, no apriori coding system was used, but 
categories emergent from the data were used. One utterance could be coded into 
several categories. In a second step, the frequencies of the categories were 
calculated, and the most representative categories were identified. This procedure 
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yielded seven categories and a total of 203 verbal statements which were 
representative for the special discourse situation of this experimental setting. 
These 203 verbal statements were completely and independently coded by two 
coders who resolved disagreements through discussion. 173 statements (85.2%) 
were coded into one category, 29 statements were coded into two categories 
(14.3%), and one statement was coded into three categories (0.5%). As a measure 
of inter-rater agreement, Spearman’s rho was calculated because the categories 
were rank-ordered. The inter-rater agreement was high, Spearman’s ρ(232) = .79, 
p < .001. After this, the transcripts were reanalyzed in order to investigate whether 
aspects of exploratory talk (cf. Mercer, 1995, 1996, 2000) were identifiable. Based 
on the description of concordance analysis offered by Mercer (2000), a computer-
based search for indicator words of explanatory talk was conducted. That is, the 
occurrence of the words ‘I think’, ‘because’, ‘why’ and ‘if’ as well as of synonyms 
(e.g. ‘I believe / I guess / I consider’, ‘whether’, ‘in case’) for each word was tracked 
(cf. Mercer, 2000, p. 154). Two indicators of exploratory talk occurred especially 
frequently, namely ‘I think’ and ‘because’, whereas other indicators were almost 
non-existent (e.g. ‘why’, ‘if’). Therefore, only the two indicators ‘I think’ and 
‘because’ were used for analyzing associations between these aspects of 
exploratory talk and cognitive and performance-related aspects. The analyzed 
categories, their frequencies, as well as sample statements, can be seen in Table 
9. 
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Table 9 
Coding Categories of Verbal Activity in the Peer Talk Condition (npt 
 
= 12), 
Frequencies and Example Statements 
Coding category, description and example statement M 
(SD) 
Sum 
(Range) 
Identification of similar cases: Learner states that a specific 
solved case fits better or especially well with a specific unsolved 
case, e.g., “Blue is better with four.” 
2.75 
(2.14) 
33 
(0-6) 
Expression of understanding: Learner states that he or she did 
understand: (a) task, (b) cases or case features, (c) one’s own 
case pairs, (d) case pairs of peer, (e) explanation or 
argumentation of peer, e.g., “Sounds good, I think.” 
5.00 
(2.89) 
60 
(1-10) 
Request for peer-explanation: Learner asks peer to explain and 
give reasons why he or she formed specific case pairs, e.g., 
“How did you hit on the blue one?” 
2.42 
(2.02) 
29 
(0-6) 
Expression of lack of understanding: Learner states that he or 
she did not understand: (a) task, (b) cases or case features, (c) 
one’s own case pairs, (d) case pairs of peer, (e) explanation or 
argumentation of peer, e.g., “I did not figure out at all which 
criminal action happened in this unsolved case.” 
1.58 
(1.51) 
19 
(0-5) 
Task coordination: Learner asks or suggests how to proceed, 
e.g., “Where do we start? With the first one?” 
4.58 
(2.75) 
55 
(0-11) 
Identification of dissimilar cases: Learner states that a specific 
solved case does not fit well with a specific unsolved case, e.g., 
“Lilac does not fit at all with three, I think.” 
2.00 
(1.28) 
24 
(1-5) 
Competence self-rating and peer-rating: Learner expresses how 
he or she judges his or her own task-relevant competence vs. 
the peer’s competence, e.g., “How incompetent have we been?” 
1.17 
(2.08) 
14 
(0-6) 
Exploratory talk I (‘I think’, cf. Mercer, 2000): Reasoning is visible 
in the talk; knowledge is made publicly accountable, e.g., “I think 
that maybe I was misled too fast by these two aspects – I don’t 
know why, but I lumped them together immediately.” 
20.08 
(7.49) 
241 
(9-37) 
Exploratory talk II (‘because’, cf. Mercer, 1995, 1996, 2000): 
Learners account for their opinions; statements and suggestions 
are offered for joint consideration, e.g., “Basically, it was 
deliberate intention because, in this case, the woman 
deliberately did not tell him that the injured person was still alive.” 
11.67 
(6.30) 
140 
(4-26) 
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4.4.1.3 Procedure 
The participants were welcomed in dyads so that both participants of a dyad were 
informed about the presence of a “real” peer learner, but they did not know each 
other beforehand. They were told that the study was about solving criminal law 
cases by means of a computer-supported environment, and that they would get to 
know different problem solving strategies. After this, the participants of the dyads 
were guided to separate rooms. At the beginning of the study, all participants 
worked individually. Figure 7 provides an overview of the phases of the experiment. 
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Figure 7. Overview of the Phases of Experiment 2 and Their Duration in Minutes.  
 
4   Study 2: Impact of Knowledge Awareness Regarding an Equally Low Competent 
Source Combined With Peer Talk in a Computer-Supported Cognitive Conflict Task 
151 
First, the participants filled in a web form (6 minutes) assessing control 
measures, such as demographic data and domain-specific prior knowledge 
(German case law). Then the participants practiced using CmapTools (6 minutes). 
Following this, they were asked to read through five solved cases from the domain 
of criminal law (9 minutes). The participants returned the solved cases to the 
experimenter, received five unsolved cases from the same domain, and again were 
asked to read them through (7 minutes). Subsequently, the five solved cases were 
handed out again, and the participants were asked to build pairs of the unsolved 
cases and the solved cases (8 minutes) by means of a computer-based external 
representation of all cases (CmapTools). For each unsolved case, the solved case 
that was supposed to be identified was the one whose solution could be 
transferred best to this unsolved case. To this end, the participants dragged the 
colored text boxes (i.e., unsolved cases) next to the grey text boxes (i.e., solved 
cases) on the screen. After this, the computer-based external representation was 
extended on the right side to display the case pairs of the peer (see Figure 6). The 
participants were informed that the presented case pairs had been created by the 
peer learner whom they had met at the beginning of the experiment. The 
participants were asked to compare their self-created case pairs with those of the 
peer learner. Additionally, all participants received the three cognitive conflict items 
and the two competence rating scales. They had three minutes for comparing the 
case pairs and for giving cognitive conflict and competence ratings. Subsequently, 
the participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: In the peer talk 
condition, they were asked to explain mutually to each other why they had 
arranged the case pairs in this way. They communicated by using “SkypeTM”, a 
free internet phone software (see, http://www.skype.com). The participants were 
4   Study 2: Impact of Knowledge Awareness Regarding an Equally Low Competent 
Source Combined With Peer Talk in a Computer-Supported Cognitive Conflict Task 
152 
informed that their talk would be recorded. Moreover, they had the possibility to 
modify their self-created case pairs, if they wished to. They were told that the aim 
of this phase was to identify the correct task solution and that this did not require 
coming to an agreement with the peer. The participants of the peer talk condition 
had six minutes for communicating and for modifying their case pairs. To keep 
time-on-task constant between both conditions, the participants of the no peer talk 
condition also had six minutes for modifying their case pairs. They were also told 
that the aim was to identify the correct solution which did not require bringing one’s 
own case pairs into agreement with the peer’s case pairs. In both the peer talk and 
no peer talk condition, the participants could view which changes the peer learner 
made to his or her case pairs in real-time (i.e., the colored text boxes on the right 
side of the external representation started moving when the peer dragged them to 
a new position). Subsequently, all participants again received the three cognitive 
conflict items and the two competence rating scales for providing their second 
ratings (3 minutes). During this phase, the computer-based external representation 
with the self-created and the additionally presented case pairs of the peer was still 
present. The online test on knowledge awareness followed in both conditions (5 
minutes). Overall, the experimental session lasted about 60 minutes. At the end of 
the experiment, the participants were thanked, rewarded, and debriefed. 
 
 
4.4.2 Results 
All analyses were performed on the dyadic mean values of the individuals because 
peer talk and its effects can only be interpreted meaningfully on the dyadic level. 
For testing the hypotheses, mainly multiple linear regression analyses were 
4   Study 2: Impact of Knowledge Awareness Regarding an Equally Low Competent 
Source Combined With Peer Talk in a Computer-Supported Cognitive Conflict Task 
153 
conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 20. The alpha level was set at .05. Cohen’s d 
is reported as effect size measure, adjusted for multiple predictors and interactions. 
By convention, d effect sizes of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 are interpreted as small, medium, 
and large, respectively (Cohen, 1988). First, we will present the results of the 
control measures, then the results regarding the impact of peer talk on cognitive 
and performance-related aspects, followed by the results of the content analysis of 
discourse. 
 
4.4.2.1 Results of the Control Measures 
With regard to the demographic data “gender distribution across dyads”  
(Pearson-χ² (2, N = 29) = 2.05, p > .10) and “age” (F < 1), no statistically significant 
differences were found between the peer talk (coded by 1) and no peer talk 
condition (coded by 2). Further, the two conditions did not differ in their average 
domain-specific prior knowledge which was low (Mpt = 0.08; SD = 2.47;  
Mnpt = 0.44; SD = 2.28), F < 1. 
It was also tested whether both conditions had acquired knowledge 
awareness, that is, whether the learners were informed about their peer’s task 
solution. An ANOVA showed no differences between both conditions on the test on 
knowledge awareness, F < 1. That is, participants of both conditions reproduced 
the case pairs of the peer learner equally well (Mpt = 3.38; SD = 1.16; Mnpt = 3.28; 
SD = 1.11). Thus, the dyads of both conditions had acquired an equally high 
amount of knowledge awareness regarding the peer’s case pairs. 
In addition, match of the first version of case pairs as the selection criterion 
of the final sample was checked statistically. As intended, both conditions did not 
differ regarding how many case pairs of the first self-created version matched 
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within the dyads of peer learners (Mpt = 1.69; SD = 0.63; Mnpt = 1.38; SD = 0.62), 
F(1,27) = 1.85; MSE = 0.39; p > .10. All selected participants created a first version 
of case pairs which deviated from their peer learner’s case pairs. In 41% of all 
selected dyads (n = 12), none or only one of the case pairs of the first version 
matched, whereas in the remaining 59% of all selected dyads (n = 17), two of the 
five case pairs matched. Thus, divergence between self-created task solution and 
additionally presented peer solution was sufficiently high as a prerequisite for the 
experience of a cognitive conflict and for investigating adaptation behavior. Since 
match vs. divergence of task solutions was regarded as the crucial source of 
experiencing a cognitive conflict and of guiding behavior (e.g., adaptation) and peer 
talk, the variable “match” was included as a further predictor in the following 
analyses. 
 
4.4.2.2 Results on the Impact of Peer Talk on Cognitive Aspects 
It was tested whether peer talk helps to resolve cognitive conflicts and 
whether peer talk results in more similar ratings for both one’s own task 
competence and for the peer learner’s task competence.  
As expected, the two conditions did not differ regarding the experience of a 
cognitive conflict at the first assessment, β = -.12, p = .54, R2adj = .00,  
F(2, 28) = 1.03, p = .37, d = 0.07 (match of the first case pair version: β = .21,  
p = .28; see Table 10). However, as expected (Hypothesis 1), after communicating 
with each other, participants experienced less cognitive conflict at the second 
assessment compared to participants who did not communicate with each other,  
β = .42, p = .01, R2adj = .35, F(3, 25) = 6.03, p < .01 , d = -0.28 (match of the first 
case pair version: β = .35, p = .04; cognitive conflict at the first assessment,  
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β = .43, p = .01; see Table 10). Thus, the first hypothesis was confirmed that peer 
talk helps to reduce cognitive conflicts in this setting. 
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Table 10 
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Cognitive and Performance-Related Aspects 
at the First and Second Assessment 
 
Variable 
category 
Variable and measurement 
time 
Condition with  
peer talk  
(npt = 13) 
M 
(SD) 
Condition without  
peer talk 
(nnpt = 16) 
M 
(SD) 
Cognitive 
aspects 
Cognitive conflict (z-score),  
1st
0.34 
(0.93)  assessment 
0.09 
(0.54) 
Cognitive conflict (z-score), 
2nd
-0.54 
(1.32)  assessment 
0.07 
(1.02) 
Difference of competence 
ratings, 1st
-15.00 
(26.30)  assessment 
-6.25 
(16.07) 
Difference of competence 
ratings, 2nd
-9.23 
(14.56)  assessment 
5.63 
(11.81) 
Performance-
related 
aspects 
Adaptation (overall) of own 
case pairs to peer’s case 
pairs 
1.27 
(0.97) 
1.03 
(0.92) 
Adaptation of own case 
pairs to peer’s correct case 
pairs 
0.19 
(0.25) 
0.31 
(0.36) 
Adaptation of own case 
pairs to peer’s false case 
pairs 
0.12 
(0.30) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Correctness of 1st 1.38 
(0.46) 
 version  
of case pairs 
1.34 
(0.35) 
Correctness of 2nd 1.50 
(0.61) 
 version  
of case pairs 
1.59 
(0.38) 
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Further, already before communicating with each other, participants of the 
peer talk condition rated the peer’s competence higher than their own competence, 
compared to participants of the no peer talk condition, β = .35, p = .05, R2adj = .27, 
F(2, 26) = 6.12, p < .01, d = -0.01 (match of the first case pair version: β = .54,  
p < .01; see Table 10). This was in contrast to our expectations. Therefore, this first 
assessment was used as a second covariate (beside match of the first version of 
case pairs), when analyzing the competence difference at the second assessment 
point of time. In line with Hypothesis 2, at the second assessment, participants of 
the peer talk condition still rated the peer’s competence higher but more similar to 
their own competence, whereas participants of the no peer talk condition rated their 
own competence higher than the peer’s competence, β = .33, p < 01 ., R2adj
To sum up, the reported results confirm the set of hypotheses concerning 
the impact of peer talk on cognitive aspects. In line with the hypothesis, peer talk 
helped to resolve cognitive conflict since learners were more convinced about the 
peer’s solution and had less doubts about his or her task-relevant competence and 
the correctness of his or her solution compared to learners who did not 
communicate with each other. Moreover, the hypothesis was confirmed that 
learners judge their task-relevant competence more similarly to their peer’s 
competence after communicating with him or her.  
 = .78,  
F(3, 25) = 33.06, p < .001 , d = -0.02 (match of the first case pair version: β = -.04, 
p < .72; competence difference rating at the first assessment: β = .78, p < .001). 
This finding supports the second hypothesis. 
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4.4.2.3 Results on the Impact of Peer Talk on Performance-Related Aspects 
The present study also examined whether peer learners mutually adapt their task 
solutions more often after communicating with each other. In addition, it was tested 
whether the correctness of the task solution improves as a result of peer talk.  
Contrary to the assumptions (Hypothesis 3), participants of both conditions 
did not differ in their overall adaptation behavior, β = -.27, p = .12, R2adj = .25,  
F(2, 26) = 5.70, p < .01 , d = 0.05 (match of the first case pair version: β = -.56,  
p < .01). Thus, participants of both conditions did neither differ in adopting correct 
case pairs of their learning partner (β = .07, p = .71, R2adj = .21, F(2, 26) = 4.72,  
p = .02 , d = -0.01; match of the first case pair version: β = -.50, p < .01), nor in 
adopting false case pairs (β = -.25, p = .20, R2adj
Further, the two conditions did not differ in the correctness of task solutions 
at the first assessment, β = .06, p = .74, R
 = .03, F(2, 26) = 1.42, p = .26 ,  
d = 0.49; match of the first case pair version: β = .14, p = .49). Consequently, the 
third hypothesis regarding the impact of peer talk on adaptation of task solutions 
must be rejected in this setting. 
2
adj = .13, F(2, 26) = , p = .06 , d = -0.21 
(match of the first case pair version: β = .45, p = .02). At the second assessment, 
participants of both conditions achieved a significantly higher correctness 
compared to the first assessment, β = .76, p < .001, R2adj = .42, F(3, 25) = 7.79,  
p = .001 , d = -0.47 (match of the first case pair version: β = -.29, p = .09). In 
contrast to the expectations (Hypothesis 4a), however, no differences were found 
between both conditions (β = .06, p = .67, d = -0.27). Further, a time-by-condition 
interaction emerged, β = -.31, p < .04, R2adj = .50, F(4, 24) = 8.01, p < .001 ,  
d = -0.47 (match of the first case pair version: β = -.32, p = .05; see Table 10). 
Thus, rejecting Hypothesis 4a), peer talk did not result in larger improvements of 
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the correctness of task solutions compared to no peer talk (β = -.15, p = .48). 
Instead, the learners without peer talk tended to improve the correctness of their 
solutions more than the learners with peer talk (β = .41, p = .06). 
In summary, the set of hypotheses regarding the impact of peer talk on 
performance-related aspects could not be confirmed because peer talk resulted 
neither in learners mutually adapting their task solutions more often nor in a higher 
correctness of task solutions compared to no peer talk. 
 
4.4.2.4 Content Analysis of Discourse 
In order to find out why peer talk had a positive effect on cognitive conflict and 
competence ratings, but not on performance-related aspects, the associations 
between discourse content and cognitive aspects as well as correctness of the 
second version of case pairs as a performance-related aspect were analyzed. The 
focus was on the second assessment of the repeated measures, that is, after peer 
talk took place. Due to the small sample size of twelve communicating dyads, 
Kendall’s Tau-c coefficient as a non-parametric test of the association between 
variables was used.  
First, associations of the discourse content with the two cognitive measures 
“cognitive conflict” and “difference of competence ratings” (self-rating of one’s own 
vs. peer’s competence) are reported, controlling for match of the first version of 
case pairs (cf. Table 11).  
Dyads tended to rate the peer’s solution to be more convincing, and they 
tended to have less doubts about the correctness of the peer’s solution and the 
peer’s competence, the more often they talked about similarities between cases 
(Kendall’s Tau-c (9) = -.40, p = .07), and the less they understood the task, the 
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cases, or case features (Kendall’s Tau-c (9) = -.62, p < .01). It seems that, in the 
first case, the dyads talked about good task solutions, while in the second case, 
the dyads developed explanations which were helpful to understand the task. 
Thus, both kinds of discourse content were associated with a decrease in 
perceived cognitive conflict.  
 
Table 11 
Associations (Kendall’s Tau-c, n = 9) Between Discourse Content and Cognitive 
Measures After Discourse 
 
 Cognitive conflict, 
2nd
Difference of 
competence ratings,  
2
 assessment 
nd
Identification of similar cases 
 assessment 
-.40 -.17 t 
Expression of understanding .35 .20 t 
Request for peer-explanation .59 -.53* 
Expression of lack of understanding 
** 
-.62 -.63** 
Task coordination 
*** 
.18 -.07 
Identification of dissimilar cases .10 .07 
Competence self-rating and peer-
rating 
-.10 -.20 
Exploratory talk I (‘I think’) .03 .10 
Exploratory talk II (‘because’) .03 -.13 
 
Note: ***p ≤ .001, **p ≤ .01, *p ≤ .05, t
 
p ≤ .10. 
On the other hand, the more often dyads had to ask for explanations of why 
the partner had built specific case pairs, the less convincing they rated the peer’s 
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solution to be and the more doubts they had about the correctness of the peer’s 
solution and about the peer’s competence after the peer talk phase, Kendall’s  
Tau-c (9) = .59, p = .02. Similarly, the more often a partner expressed that he or 
she did understand aspects of the task, the less convincing they tended to rate the 
peer’s deviating solution to be and the more doubts they tended to have about the 
correctness of the peer’s deviating solution and about the peer’s competence after 
the peer talk phase, Kendall’s Tau-c (9) = .35, p = .08. Thus, both requesting peer 
explanations and expressing that one had understood the task was associated with 
an increase in perceived cognitive conflict. 
Further, the more often dyads had to ask for explanations of why the partner 
had built specific case pairs, the lower they rated their own competence in relation 
to the peer’s competence after the peer talk phase, Kendall’s Tau-c (9) = -.53,  
p = .01. 
Similarly, the more often dyads expressed that they did not understand the 
task, the cases, or case features, the lower they rated their own competence and 
the higher they rated the peer’s competence after the peer talk phase, Kendall’s 
Tau-c (9) = -.63, p < .001. 
Second, associations between discourse content and the performance-
related measure “correctness of the second version of case pairs” are reported, 
again controlling for match of the first version of case pairs (cf. Table 12).  
The more often dyads talked about similarities between cases, the more 
correct was the second version of their case pairs, Kendall’s Tau-c (9) = .61,  
p < .001. This association corresponds with Hypothesis 4b) stating that high-quality 
peer talk about the core elements of the task should improve the correctness of 
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task solutions. Thus, identifying similarities was both associated with a trend 
towards conflict resolution and with more correct task solutions. 
 
Table 12 
Associations (Kendall’s Tau-c, n = 9) Between Discourse Content and 
Performance-Related Aspects After Discourse 
 
 Correctness of 2nd Improvement (+1) 
vs. deterioration (-1) 
of correctness of  
2
 
version  
of case pairs 
nd
Identification of similar cases 
 version  
of case pairs 
.61 .15 *** 
Expression of understanding -.09 .54
Request for peer-explanation 
** 
-.42 -.19 t 
Expression of lack of understanding .15 .04 
Task coordination -.56 -.15 * 
Identification of dissimilar cases .33 .70
Competence self-rating and peer-
rating 
*** 
-.17 -.48
Exploratory talk I (‘I think’) 
* 
.46 .67t 
Exploratory talk II (‘because’) 
* 
-.51 -.33 t 
 
Note: ***p ≤ .001, **p ≤ .01, *p ≤ .05, t
 
p ≤ .10. 
On the other hand, the more often dyads tended to ask for explanations of 
why the partner had built specific case pairs (Kendall’s Tau-c (9) = -.42, p = .08) 
and the more often dyads talked about how to proceed with the task (i.e., task 
coordination), the less correct was the second version of case pairs, Kendall’s  
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Tau-c (9) = -.56, p = .03. Thus, coordination problems were associated with 
decreased correctness of task solutions. 
The more often dyads used the reasoning word ‘I think’ (exploratory talk, cf. 
Mercer, 1995, 2000), the more correct tended the second version of case pairs to 
be, Kendall’s Tau-c (9) = .46, p = .08. However, the occurrence of the word 
‘because’ as a further indicator of exploratory talk tended to be associated with a 
less correct second version of case pairs, Kendall’s Tau-c (9) = -.51, p = .08. This 
pattern of findings corresponds only partly with Hypothesis 4b) because, in this 
study, only some of the typical indicators of exploratory talk (i.e., the reasoning 
word ‘I think’) and not all indicators analyzed (e.g., the reasoning word ‘because’) 
were associated with an improved correctness of task solutions. 
Moreover, based on the initial level of correctness of task solutions, it was 
analyzed which discourse content was associated with improved or decreased 
correctness of task solutions.  
The more often dyads expressed that they had understood either the case 
features or the explanations exchanged for building specific case pairs, the more 
often did the correctness of case pairs improve, Kendall’s Tau-c (9) = .54, p = .01. 
In addition, the more often dyads talked about dissimilar cases, the more they 
enhanced the correctness of their solutions, Kendall’s Tau-c (9) = .70, p < .001. On 
the other hand, the more often dyads expressed doubts about either their own 
task-relevant competence or the peer’s competence, the more they impaired 
correctness of task solutions, Kendall’s Tau-c (9) = -.48, p = .03. Thus, it can be 
concluded that exchanging good explanations as well as talking about the core of 
the task was associated with improved performance (Hypothesis 4b), whereas 
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talking about competences was associated with decreased correctness of task 
solutions.  
Moreover, the reasoning word ‘I think’ as an indicator of exploratory talk (cf. 
Mercer, 1995, 2000) was associated with improved correctness of task solutions, 
Kendall’s Tau-c (9) = .67, p = .01.  
This confirms Hypothesis 4b) stating that only high-quality dialogic discourse 
helps to improve the correctness of task solutions. 
 
 
 
4.5 Summary and Discussion 
This second study of the present dissertation investigated the impact of peer talk 
on cognitive and performance-related aspects while completing a computer-
supported cognitive conflict task. In the peer talk condition (13 dyads), participants 
compared their task solution with a peer learner’s solution that deviated from their 
own solution; subsequently, both learners explained their task solutions to each 
other. In the no peer talk condition (16 dyads), the participants also compared their 
task solution with the deviating solution of a peer learner, but both learners had no 
possibility to communicate with each other. 
This study shows as expected that computer-mediated peer talk helps to 
resolve cognitive conflicts (cf. Harmon, 1998) because dyads after peer talk were 
more convinced about the peer’s solution and had less doubts about the peer’s 
task-relevant competence and the correctness of his or her solution compared to 
dyads without peer talk. Thus, even a very short computer-mediated discourse 
phase can be sufficient for conflict reduction which is a new finding. However, a 
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longer discourse phase could have different effects: For example, it could result in 
more co-construction of knowledge, that is, in learners discussing task solutions in 
more detail and in mutually identifying the optimal task solution. In addition, 
personality traits could unfold during a longer discourse phase. For example, more 
dominant learners could persuade their partners to adopt aspects of their own 
solution. However, only deliberate adaptation of solutions should result in higher 
correctness (cf. Chapter 3; Baumeister et al., subm. a). 
A further positive aspect of peer talk was that the learners rated the peer’s 
competence to be more similar to their own competence than the learners of the no 
peer talk condition who rated their own competence higher than the peer’s 
competence. Since participants of both conditions were laypersons in the subject-
matter domain, it seems that peer talk resulted not only in more similar, but also in 
more accurate competence ratings. The finding of converging competence ratings 
due to peer talk is consistent with results of previous studies (e.g., Jeong & Chi, 
2007), although, in the present study, a more subjective measure of knowledge 
convergence was used. It can be assumed that subjective measures of knowledge 
convergence are appropriate if learning partners work through completely identical 
information such as in the presented study.  
In spite of decreased doubts about the peer’s competence and the 
correctness of his or her task solution, peer talk did not result in more often 
adopting the peer’s task solution. However, mutual adaptation of task solutions is 
not necessarily the best decision for solving problems because it could also be 
harmful for one’s performance if the learner adopts false aspects of the peer’s task 
solution. In this regard, the present finding of a lack of adaptation is in line with 
assumptions of conflict elaboration theory stating that peer solutions, compared to 
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expert solutions that deviate from one’s own solution, are evaluated more critically 
and encourage learners more to find the correct solution (Mugny et al., 1995); in 
contrast, expert solutions are more often imitated uncritically (Quiamzade & Mugny, 
2001).  
Further, this dissertation’s second study tested whether the correctness of 
the task solution improves as a result of peer talk. This was not the case. Instead, 
the correctness of task solutions improved both in the peer talk condition and in the 
no peer talk condition when the learners created their second version of task 
solutions. It can be concluded that, in this type of task, learners who are confronted 
with a peer’s solution that deviates from their own solution gradually improve in 
identifying structurally similar cases even if they do not receive peer explanations 
concerning the peer’s deviating solution. Thus, the possibility to compare solutions 
may be helpful to improve one’s performance even without the possibility to receive 
a peer’s explanations (cf. Chapter 3; Baumeister et al., subm. a). However, in this 
dissertation’s first study (Baumeister et al., subm. a), using the same computer-
supported cognitive conflict task, no improvement of task solutions was found in 
the peer condition in which there was no talk. Beside this different pattern of 
findings, a further difference between the previous study and the present study was 
that in the first study, the computer-supported external representation (Study 1: 
Figure 3; Study 2: Figure 6) displaying the solution of the peer learner did not 
change whereas in the present study, the peers could observe in real-time how the 
learning partner changed his or her task solution. One explanation for this different 
pattern of findings across both studies could be that observing by means of a 
computer-based external representation how another learner is modifying his or 
her task solution provides an affordance for considering further changes of one’s 
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own task solution (Suthers, 2006) even if the learning partner does not try to 
convince the learner to modify the own task solution. However, the time dimension, 
that is, whether the computer-based external representation displays the partner’s 
task solution statically versus dynamically, should be varied within one study in 
order to substantiate this assumption. 
In addition, previous studies have shown that discourse is especially helpful 
for solving complex or information-rich tasks which often involve multiple steps, 
sometimes with increasing difficulty (Engelmann et al., 2010a; Hirokawa, 1999). 
Such tasks often result in cognitive overload of individual problem solvers, and 
therefore, discourse as ‘interthinking’ (Mercer, 2000) can help to distribute solution 
procedures among learners. Further, awareness tools have been proven to be 
helpful in order to support both collaborative problem solving and reasoning during 
dialogic discourse (e.g., Engelmann et al., 2009; Buder & Bodemer, 
The content analysis of discourse revealed that learners reacted quite 
differently to the deviating task solution of their peer. Some learners used the 
discourse phase to express that they were not at all confident about having 
understood the task; it seems that this increased or improved peer explanations 
because, afterwards, those learners were convinced about the peer’s solution. 
Some learners needed to ask the peer quite often to explain his or her solution; 
perhaps this was due to poor explanations (cf. Webb, 1989; Webb et al., 1995) or 
to strange task solutions of the peer because those learners were less convinced 
about the peer’s solution afterwards. Thus, it seems that peer talk resulted in two 
types of learners: those who had more doubts about the peer’s task-relevant 
competence and the correctness of the peer’s solution, and those who had less 
2008; De 
Groot et al., 2007; Janssen & Bodemer, 2013; Wegerif et al., 2010). 
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doubts and were more convinced about the peer’s solution than about their own 
solution. This mixed finding shows that effects of peer talk on socio-cognitive 
conflicts are not clear-cut per se. Peer talk can increase or decrease cognitive 
conflicts (or sometimes can have no effect). Further studies with larger samples 
and more process measures are needed for investigating, for example, under 
which conditions computer-mediated peer talk supports the resolution of socio-
cognitive conflicts reliably. 
In line with the assumptions of conflict elaboration theory (Quiamzade & 
Mugny, 2001), as well as with the results of a study by Darnon and colleagues 
(2007), in this second study of the present dissertation, talking about one’s own or 
the partner’s competence was associated with less correct solutions, perhaps 
because it distracted learners from the core task. Thus, by talking about 
competences, the learners were more engaged in a relational conflict (i.e., “who is 
more competent?”) than in an epistemic conflict using exploratory talk (i.e., “how 
can we find the correct solution?”; Mercer, 1995, 1996, 2000). 
Moreover, it was shown that aspects of exploratory talk had a differential 
impact on learners’ performance: On the one hand, the reasoning words ‘I think’ 
were associated with improved correctness of task solutions. On the other hand, 
the reasoning word ‘because’ tended to be associated with less correct task 
solutions. Although research has shown that such reasoning words (and their 
synonyms) are associated with high-quality discourse (Mercer, Wegerif, & Dawes, 
1999; Soter et al., 2008; Teasley, 1997), only ‘I think’ was associated with an 
improved performance in this study. Inspection of the transcripts revealed that the 
reasoning word ‘because’ indeed was not always used in a deliberate and 
appropriate way by adult learners. Instead, it was sometimes used as a filler word 
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in order to gain time for further consideration (e.g., “Well, because, hm, because, in 
the end, hm, yes, that is wrong.”), and sometimes only fragments of arguments 
were brought up (e.g., “Yes, because the doctor – no, that makes no sense.”; “This 
is very simple because it is bodily harm with fatal consequences, but -.”). Since 
learners did not interrupt each other frequently, it can be excluded that 
interruptions were the reason for fragmentary arguments. Instead, it could be 
possible that media effects on sentence length could be a reason for the 
heterogeneous findings regarding exploratory talk in this study. That is, ‘I think’ 
often was used in very short sentences, whereas ‘because’ usually requires a main 
clause and a subordinate clause. This longer sentence structure could have 
caused a higher working memory load of learners using synchronous audio 
communication resulting in incomplete statements if learners lost the thread 
(Baddeley, 2003). Perhaps text-based communication (e.g., chat) or asynchronous 
media (e.g. discussion forums) would have resulted in a more effective 
spontaneous use (i.e., without training) of exploratory talk, especially in more 
complete and more elaborated claims using ‘because’.  
Moreover, the content analysis of discourse revealed associations between 
discourse content and learners’ performance. Learners who focused on 
understanding the core of the task, namely, identifying structurally similar cases in 
order to arrange them in pairs were more successful. In contrast, learners who 
centred their peer talk on task coordination (e.g., which case pair to talk about next) 
were less successful. Similar results have been shown by several studies 
investigating text-based computer-mediated communication (chat, discussion 
forums, e-mail) of synchronous and asynchronous online learning groups (e.g., 
Paulus, 2009; Strømsø et al., 2007). These studies found that students using 
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computer-mediated communication often communicated “off-topic”, that is, not 
about the concepts to be learned but instead about procedures for completing the 
task, for example, technical issues. Paulus (2009) argues that off-topic 
communication seems to be an integral part of students’ grounding processes in 
distance learning environments (cf. Clark & Schaefer, 1989) and that distance 
learning groups need enough time both for on- and off-topic communication (cf. 
Orvis, Wisher, Bonk, & Olson, 2002).  
 
 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
To sum up, in this dissertation’s second experimental study, there is a mixed 
balance of findings regarding the impact of computer-mediated peer talk on 
completing a cognitive conflict task: Peer talk had a positive impact on some 
cognitive aspects; that is, peer talk helped to reduce cognitive conflict by increasing 
confidence in the peer learner’s competence and the correctness of his or her task 
solution. Moreover, peer talk resulted in more similar and thus more accurate 
ratings of one’s own and the partner’s competence compared to no peer talk. No 
effect of peer talk, however, was found regarding the performance-related 
measures “mutual adaptation of task solutions” and “correctness of solution”. 
However, the content analysis of discourse revealed that particular aspects of high-
quality reasoning and discourse were associated with improved performance (cf. 
Mercer, Dawes, Wegerif, & Sams, 2004; Teasley, 1997; Webb, Troper, & Fall, 
1995). In line with previous field studies (e.g. Paulus, 2009; Strømsø, Grøttum, & 
Lycke, 2007), the present laboratory study also suggests that it is important for 
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learners to focus on core elements of the task instead of talking about how to 
proceed or about competences. However, future studies with larger samples and a 
longer duration of the peer talk phase than in the present study are needed in order 
to substantiate the present findings and conclusions. Further, the impact of 
knowledge awareness as observing how other learners change their task solutions 
on improving one’s own solution should be clarified by future studies. 
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Overview – Part III 
 
The aim of this second experimental study was to strengthen peer influence, 
compared to the first study, in the context of this knowledge-rich cognitive conflict 
task. The results of Study 2 showed that especially high-quality peer talk was 
associated with more correct task solutions. Thus, it can be concluded that peer 
talk had a positive impact on task solutions if peers talked about their 
understanding of the task instead of talking about their task-relevant competence. 
Across both studies, time on task was virtually identical. However, a direct, 
statistical comparison of the correctness of task solutions in the peer condition of 
Study 1 and the peer talk condition of Study 2 is not possible due to other 
differences between these conditions. For example, in Study 1, static knowledge 
awareness was applied, whereas in Study 2, dynamic knowledge awareness was 
implemented. Therefore, comparing both studies only descriptively, the correctness 
of task solutions generally improved in Study 2 across both conditions, whereas it 
did not improve in the peer condition of Study 1. Further studies will have to prove 
whether this pattern of results was caused by static (Study 1) versus dynamic 
(Study 2) knowledge awareness. It could be possible that observing in real-time 
how another learner is modifying his or her task solution (i.e., dynamic knowledge 
awareness) additionally encourages learners to improve their own task solution (cf. 
technology affordances & representational guidance; Suthers, 2006) beyond being 
informed only once about another solution (cf. Study 1: static knowledge 
awareness). In the following chapter, the aims and results of this dissertation 
project will be summarized and discussed, and implications for future studies will 
be derived.  
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5 General Discussion 
 
One aim of the present dissertation was to contribute to research on knowledge 
awareness (Engelmann, Dehler, Bodemer, & Buder, 2009) by suggesting a 
classification which combines the previous ones of Engelmann and colleagues 
(2009: context-based, content-based, & hybrid knowledge awareness), Sangin, 
Molinari, Nüssli, and Dillenbourg (2011: subjective vs. objective knowledge 
awareness), and of Ogata and Yano (1998: activity-based knowledge awareness) 
with the awareness features described by Maybury, D’Amore, and House (2002: 
explicit vs. implicit awareness information, & static vs. dynamic awareness 
information) in the context of CSCW and expertise awareness. Knowledge 
awareness (Engelmann et al., 2009) is a type of cognitive group awareness 
(Janssen & Bodemer, 2013) defined as “an individual’s state of being informed and 
having perceived information about others’ knowledge”, that is, especially others’ 
externalized task-relevant knowledge (Engelmann et al., 2009, p. 950). Similarly, 
expertise awareness can be defined as being informed about various aspects of 
others’ expertise, for example, their “type and level of expertise” (Maybury et al., 
2002, p. 204), their activities in their area of expertise, and changes to their area of 
expertise (Dörner, Pipek & Won, 2007; Reichling & Wulf, 2009; Vivacqua, 1999). In 
this dissertation, CSCL studies in which the distributed participants interacted with 
and learned from partners who had an equal level of expertise regarding the 
subject-matter domain of the task conducted in the studies were categorized as 
researching knowledge awareness (e.g. Bodemer, 2011), including this 
dissertation’s both experimental studies. In contrast, CSCW studies which involved 
distributed professional cooperation with or help seeking between interaction 
General Discussion 
174 
partners who showed a larger asymmetry of the level of expertise regarding the 
subject-matter domain of the task conducted in the studies were categorized as 
researching expertise awareness (e.g. Nückles & Stürz, 2006; Reichling & Wulf, 
2009). By means of a literature review of 30 computer-based applications for 
supporting knowledge or expertise awareness and a review of 20 published studies 
which contributed to clarifying the psychological effects of knowledge or expertise 
awareness and which were conducted in the past 16 years, and including this 
dissertation’s two studies submitted for publication, it was shown that it is important 
to further differentiate the subcategories of knowledge awareness and expertise 
awareness. The combined classification (Baumeister, Engelmann, Cress, & Hesse, 
in prep.) helps to predict the psychological effects of knowledge awareness and 
expertise awareness more thoroughly and to derive implications concerning the 
question of when to use which subcategory of knowledge awareness and expertise 
awareness in order to optimize CSCL and CSCW settings. 
 
A further aim of this dissertation was to integrate research on knowledge 
awareness (Engelmann et al., 2009) and research on the conflict elaboration 
theory (Mugny, Butera, Sanchez-Mazas, & Pérez,
It was shown that providing learners with knowledge awareness information 
about a task solution that deviates from their own in combination with explicit 
information about the expertise of the producer of the deviating task solution (e.g., 
1995; Quiamzade & Mugny, 
2001). This theory aims at predicting under which conditions social influence in the 
context of cognitive conflict tasks can support or hinder learning. “Cognitive conflict 
is a perceptual state in which one notices the discrepancy between one’s cognitive 
structure and the environment (external information) …” (Lee et al., 2003, p. 585). 
General Discussion 
175 
a peer vs. a textbook of the subject-matter domain) by means of a computer-
supported external representation indeed results in knowledge awareness, and it is 
well suited for sparking a cognitive conflict (Lee et al., 2003) and for testing and 
extending assumptions of the conflict elaboration theory (Mugny et al., 1995; 
Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001).  
For this purpose, two experimental studies were conducted investigating the 
impact of knowledge awareness regarding a higher competence source (Study 1) 
and regarding an equally low competent source combined with peer talk (Study 2) 
in the context of completing a knowledge-rich cognitive conflict task (i.e. identifying 
structural similarities between law cases; Nievelstein, van Gog, Boshuizen, & Prins, 
2010). Thus, the first study focused on the relative impact of a high competent 
source of a cognitive conflict compared to a low competent source in a context 
without interaction between source and target person (cf. Butera, Caverni, & Rossi, 
2005). The second study aimed at fostering the low competent source’s influence 
by means of peer talk (Mercer, 1995; Teasley, 1995).  
 
 
 
5.1 Discussion of Main Findings 
The combined classification of knowledge awareness in CSCL and expertise 
awareness in CSCW introduced in Chapter 2 showed that it is important to 
differentiate whether the awareness information regarding the users’ level of 
expertise is explicitly provided, for example, by using labels such as “layperson”, 
“novice” or “expert” (e.g., Bromme, Jucks, & Rambow, 2004; Bromme, Rambow, & 
Nückles, 2001; Mugny, Tafani, Butera, & Pigière, 1998), or implicitly provided, for 
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example, by enabling audio or text communication in the computer-based 
interaction space. Further, it is important to differentiate whether the awareness 
information is provided only once which was called static knowledge awareness 
information or whether users can observe changes to others’ knowledge or 
expertise in real-time which was called dynamic knowledge awareness information 
(cf. Engelmann et al., 2009).  
Categorizing studies implementing knowledge or expertise awareness 
information in the past 16 years highlighted that these studies applied various 
configurations of the dimensions of knowledge awareness and expertise 
awareness. The configuration of knowledge awareness information implemented in 
the two studies of this dissertation is outlined in Table 2 (Chapter 1). Three of the 
four newly suggested subcategories of knowledge awareness information were 
implemented in the studies, namely, an explicit level of expertise (Study 1 & 2), 
static knowledge awareness information (Study 1), and dynamic knowledge 
awareness information (Study 2). Further studies are needed to investigate 
systematically the impact of each of the subcategories of knowledge awareness, 
for example, by keeping constant as many of the other subcategories as possible. 
In addition, the specific function of each subcategory of knowledge 
awareness in CSCL and expertise awareness in CSCW was described. For future 
CSCL studies, it could be interesting, for example, to identify which instructional 
method goes especially well with a subcategory of knowledge awareness. As 
tentative first suggestions that need to be examined, one could imagine combining, 
for example, reciprocal teaching (Palincsar & Brown, 1984) with subjective 
knowledge awareness information because both approaches foster peer 
explanations (Teasley, 1995, 1997; Webb, 1985, 1991). Further, content-based 
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knowledge awareness could be used in the context of anchored instruction 
(Bransford, Sherwood, Hasselbring, Kinzer, & Williams, 1990) because both 
approaches support the integration of multiple sources of information in order to 
solve problems including multiple solution steps (e.g. Engelmann et al., 2009; 
Engelmann & Hesse, 2010; Engelmann, Baumeister, Dingel, & Hesse, 2010a; 
Engelmann, Tergan, & Hesse, 2010b).  
 
In the following sections, the results of the two experimental studies will be 
discussed. In the first study, students in two conditions (N = 59) compared their 
self-created task solution with a partly correct solution presented additionally, 
deviating from their solution. The source label of the presented solution indicated 
either an equally low competent (“peer”) or a high competent source (“textbook”) 
whereas the presented solution was identical. A baseline condition lacked this 
possibility for comparison.  
After comparing task solutions, students of the textbook condition achieved 
a more correct second task solution than students of the baseline condition who 
did not compare task solutions. This effect was small to medium (d = 0.45). Since 
previous studies have already shown that comparing one’s task solution to a 
deviating solution helps problem solvers to improve their solution (Bodemer, 2011; 
Constantino-Gonzáles & Suthers, 2001), it can be concluded that this is a stable 
effect, across different types of problems (for the positive effect of such comparison 
processes on learning, see meta-analytic review by Alfieri, Nokes-Malach, & 
Schunn, 2013). However, in contrast to assumptions of the conflict elaboration 
theory (e.g. Quiamzade, Mugny, & Darnon, 2009), students of the peer condition 
were not superior to students of the baseline condition regarding correctness of the 
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second version of task solutions. This result corroborates the first study’s argument 
that task complexity matters (cf. Alfieri et al., 2013): That is, in the context of 
knowledge-rich problems, a mere comparison of task solutions may not be enough 
in order to improve one’s own solution if problem solvers have larger doubts 
regarding the presented deviating solution than about their own solution, which 
was the case in the peer condition. From previous studies conducted in the context 
of conflict elaboration theory (e.g. Butera et al., 2005; Quiamzade et al., 2009) as 
well as from this dissertation’s studies, it can be concluded that well-defined 
problems (e.g. hypothesis testing, anagram tasks) are more suited for peer 
learning if peers can combine their individual solution strategies in order to co-
construct the best solution (Quiamzade et al., 2009). In contrast, it seems that 
learning to solve knowledge-rich, complex problems requires more modeling, 
learning by imitation, interaction and feedback (cf. Bandura, 2006) than co-
construction. Thus, learning to solve knowledge-rich problems is more suited for 
learning from a higher competence source. Further studies are needed in order to 
examine the generalizability of this conclusion and the impact of different forms of 
interaction between the source of the cognitive conflict and the target person. 
Also in contrast to assumptions of the conflict elaboration theory (e.g. 
Quiamzade et al., 2009), students of the textbook condition experienced more 
cognitive conflict than students of the peer condition, whereas this theory would 
predict that low competent sources elicit stronger cognitive conflicts than high 
competent sources (Quiamzade et al., 2009). Cognitive conflict was a mediator of 
problem solver’s adaptation behavior: That is, the more cognitive conflict was 
experienced, the more the problem solvers adapted their task solution to the 
presented one. This result is traced back to the knowledge-rich task applied. Since 
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such tasks require more time in order to identify solution strategies than the 
participants had, learners may have considered their own solution to be more 
plausible than the peer’s solution. Therefore, they did not experience a high degree 
of a cognitive conflict in the peer condition. In contrast, learners confronted with the 
solution of a supposed textbook indeed had larger doubts about their own solution 
which resulted in adopting the presented solution more often in the textbook 
condition than in the peer condition. To date, there are only few studies that have 
measured perceived cognitive conflict (e.g., Darnon, Doll, & Butera, 2007; Heiß & 
Sander, 2010; Lee et al., 2003). These studies applied very different tasks and 
measured subjective cognitive conflict differently. Therefore, studies are needed 
that systematically compare cognitive conflict and its effects across different kinds 
of tasks, applying the same conflict measure. 
Moreover, the presented source labels had a differential impact on 
adaptation behavior: Students of the textbook condition adopted more case pairs of 
the presented solution than students of the peer condition. This is in line with 
previous findings of conflict elaboration theory showing that the solutions of high 
competent sources generally are more often imitated than the solutions of low 
competent sources (Quiamzade et al., 2009; Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001). 
However, participants of the textbook condition and of the peer condition did not 
differ in how often they adopted the false aspect of the presented task solution. 
Instead, participants of the textbook condition selectively adapted their solution 
more often to the correct aspect of the presented solution than participants of the 
peer condition. Thus, a positive form of imitation (cf. Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001) 
occurred in the textbook condition. It can be assumed that learners focused on 
improving their own solution and did not just imitate the presented solution 
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uncritically. Since no interaction between the learners and the low or high 
competent source of the cognitive conflict occurred, the learners in the textbook 
condition were free to decide for or against adopting aspects of the presented 
solution. Therefore, they probably did not experience a competence threat (Buchs 
& Butera, 2009; Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001) which, in this situation, would have 
caused them to imitate both the correct and the false aspects of the presented 
solution uncritically. 
Further, this first study of the dissertation showed that social comparison 
orientation (cf. Festinger, 1954) as an individual difference variable (e.g. Buunk & 
Gibbons, 2007; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) is a relevant moderator of a problem 
solver’s adaptation behavior in the context of this cognitive conflict task: Especially 
students with a low need for social comparison of ability adapted their solution 
more extensively in the textbook condition than in the peer condition. However, a 
mediated moderation analysis (Hayes, 2013) failed to show that the impact of the 
interaction between source labels and social comparison orientation on adaptation 
behavior is mediated by cognitive conflict. Instead, it seems that cognitive conflict 
as a mediator and social comparison of ability as a moderator exerted unique and 
independent effects on adaptation behavior in this first study. However, larger 
samples are needed in order to test whether this is a stable result. 
 
The second experimental study of this dissertation investigated the impact of 
peer talk (cf. Mercer, 1995, 1996, 2000; Teasley, 1995, 1997; Webb, 1985, 1991) 
while learners completed a cognitive conflict task, being confronted with a peer’s 
solution that deviated from their own solution. Fifty-eight participants were 
randomly assigned to either 13 dyads with peer talk or 16 dyads without peer talk. 
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All dyads compared their own task solution to their partner’s deviating task solution 
by means of a computer-supported representation. Peer talk resulted in reduced 
perceived cognitive conflict. Larger samples are needed in order to corroborate the 
reliability of this finding. Moreover, this result probably depends on the type of task 
and the quality of peer talk (Mercer, 1995, 1996, 2000; Teasley, 1995).  
After peer talk, peers rated their own task-relevant competence to be more 
similar to the task-relevant competence of their partner compared to those 
participants without peer talk. Thus, it is concluded that knowledge convergence 
(cf. Fischer & Mandl, 2005; Jeong & Chi, 2007) can be measured by means of 
subjective competence ratings of own versus peer’s competence and that 
knowledge convergence occurred in this setting. To put it more simply: Peer 
learners felt that they had learned together or from each other. Since competence 
ratings generally increased from the first to the second measurement time, learners 
became more confident regarding their task-relevant competence. This dissertation 
recommends that studies applying cognitive conflict tasks in the context of peer 
learning generally should check both whether peers objectively and subjectively 
were able to learn from each other as it was done in Study 2. If this is not the case, 
for example, if learners are more uncertain about the correct solution and about 
their task-relevant competence after talking with the peer than before peer talk, the 
educational method of cognitive conflict has missed its target. 
Peer talk did not result more often in adapting one’s task solution to that of 
the peer. Moreover, peer talk overall did not result in improving the correctness of 
one’s own solution. These findings further corroborate the pattern of results of the 
first study: In the context of a knowledge-rich, cognitive conflict task, peer learning 
might not be as effective as learning from a higher competence source – a finding 
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which is in contrast to previous assumptions of the conflict elaboration theory 
applying more well-defined problems (e.g. hypothesis testing, anagram tasks; 
Butera et al., 2005; Quiamzade et al., 2009). The reason for this may be because 
in such a complex task, peers doubt each other more and are less willing to adopt 
all parts of the peer’s deviating solution in contrast to more well-defined problems. 
These problems allow for quick learning solution strategies from the peer, even in 
the course of a short experiment (cf. Quiamzade et al., 2009). 
Further, the correctness of task solutions generally improved in Study 2 
across both conditions. As already mentioned, this could be an effect of dynamic 
knowledge awareness because observing in real-time how another learner was 
modifying his or her task solution could have encouraged learners both of the peer 
talk condition and of the condition without peer talk to improve their own task 
solution (cf. technology affordances & representational guidance; Suthers, 2006). 
More studies with larger samples, a longer duration of the dialogic discourse phase 
and systematically varying static versus dynamic knowledge awareness within one 
and the same study are needed in order to examine the relative impact of peer talk 
versus talk with a more competent partner than oneself is and dynamic knowledge 
awareness in the context of a knowledge-rich task. 
Further, the quality of the discourse content did matter in improving the 
correctness of task solutions: Exploratory talk (cf. Mercer, 2000) about one’s 
understanding of the task was associated with a more correct solution, whereas 
talking about coordinating task completion was associated with a less correct 
solution. These findings are in line with those of several previous studies on online 
or distance learning showing that epistemic talk results in superior learning 
5   General Discussion 
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outcomes than off-topic talk (e.g., Paulus, 2009; Strømsø, Grøttum, & Lycke, 
2007). 
In addition, talking about one’s own or the partner’s competence was 
harmful for task performance. This is in line with previous studies done in the 
context of conflict elaboration theory (cf. Darnon et al., 2007; Quiamzade & Mugny, 
2001). This pattern of results highlights the special challenge for collaborative 
learning through cognitive conflict which is to foster epistemic talk (i.e., “how can 
we find the correct solution?”) but not relational conflict (i.e., “who is more 
competent?”).  
 
 
5.1.1 Computer-Supported Cognitive Conflict Task 
In the context of this dissertation, a knowledge-rich, computer-supported cognitive 
conflict task was developed: The learners who were laypersons in the domain of 
law were asked to build pairs of structurally similar solved and unsolved criminal 
law cases (cf. Nievelstein et al., 2010). Numerous combinations of case pairs were 
possible. This increased the probability of achieving divergence between the 
participant’s task solution and the one presented and, thus, of sparking a cognitive 
conflict (Lee et al., 2003).  
Particularly noteworthy is that the cognitive conflict task applied differed in 
complexity from the tasks applied in the context of the conflict elaboration theory 
(Mugny et al., 1995; Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001) because the previous studies 
tested assumptions of this theory by means of well-defined problems, for example, 
anagram tasks or hypothesis testing (cf. Butera et al., 2005; Quiamzade et al., 
2009). Therefore, by means of this more knowledge-rich cognitive conflict task, the 
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aim was to extend assumptions of the conflict elaboration theory by proposing that 
previously proven social influence dynamics may change for more complex 
cognitive conflict tasks. In the next step, studies are needed varying task 
complexity within one and the same study thereby directly comparing conflict 
elaboration and social influence for well-defined versus more knowledge-rich, 
complex problems.  
With regard to computer-support, it can be concluded that dynamic 
knowledge awareness information (Study 2), that is, the possibility to observe 
changes to others’ knowledge and task solutions in real-time, is especially suited 
for investigating conflict elaboration processes because dynamic external 
representations both make divergence between learning partners visually salient 
which increases the probability of discussing such socio-cognitive conflicts (cf. 
Bodemer, 2011), and they mirror the resolution of these conflicts, for example, if 
the learning partners mutually adapt their task solutions. 
Future studies could examine whether there are gender differences in 
conflict elaboration, perhaps depending on context factors such as the subject-
matter domain of the cognitive conflict task and anonymity (cf. Chapter 2) of the 
conflicting contributions to a shared interaction space (cf. Hsi & Hoadley, 1997). 
 
 
5.1.2 Perceived Cognitive Conflict 
In the first study of the present dissertation, perceived cognitive conflict was 
measured in retrospect after the participants had been given the possibility to 
modify their case pairs. The item used for this assessment was: “I had doubts 
about one or more of my case pairs when I saw the other case pairs that were 
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provided” (to be answered on a 5-point rating scale). This item assesses one 
aspect of the component “recognition of contradiction” of the Cognitive Conflict 
Levels Test by Lee and colleagues (2003). 
In the second study, perceived cognitive conflict was measured “online”, that 
is, simultaneously when being confronted with the peer’s task solution which 
deviated from the participant’s own solution. Since in this study among other 
questions, the impact of peer talk on cognitive conflict was examined, perceived 
cognitive conflict was measured once again after the peer talk phase in both 
conditions with versus without peer talk. The participants indicated whether they 
“had doubts regarding the correctness of the presented deviating task solution” of a 
peer and regarding the “peer’s task-related competence”, and whether the 
deviating task solution “did not convince” them (to be answered on 5-point rating 
scales).  
In further studies on cognitive conflict, the use of such subjective rating 
scales can be recommended. In addition, it is possible to assess more aspects of a 
cognitive conflict, for example, emotional (e.g., “When I saw the result, I was 
surprised by it”, cf. Lee et al., 2003, Figure 2, p. 59) and motivational aspects (e.g., 
“I would like to ascertain further whether my idea is incorrect or not”, Lee et al., 
2003, Figure 2, p. 59). For example, Heiß and Sander (2010) used selected items 
of the “Differentielle Affekt Skala” (DAS; Merten & Krause, 1993) in order to assess 
emotional aspects of perceived cognitive conflict, conflict resolution, and learning 
success. Using more than one item for measuring cognitive conflict offers a more 
reliable assessment, but the sample has to be large enough in order to conduct a 
factor analysis. In addition, research in this area should try to separate cognitive 
conflict as a situational variable from related personality traits that could also be 
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activated in this situation (e.g., neuroticism, Costa & McCrae, 1992; need for 
cognition, Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).  
To conclude, both experimental studies revealed different aspects of the 
psychological course of a cognitive conflict: Study 1 showed that different sources 
of socio-cognitive conflict have a different impact on learners’ behavior (cf. Mugny 
et al., 1995), whereby a higher competent source encouraged them more to 
improve the correctness of their task solutions by working on them and making 
changes than an equally low competent source. Study 2 suggested that peer talk 
can help to resolve cognitive conflicts. However, conflict resolution per se does not 
mean that the correctness of task solutions improves (cf. Light & Glachan, 1985). 
As both studies have shown, it depends on the quality of the conflict resolution (cf., 
Study 1: two kinds of imitating high competent sources; Quiamzade & Mugny, 
2001) and on the quality of the content of peer talk (cf. Study 2: exploratory talk; 
Mercer, 1995, 1996, 2000). 
 
 
 
5.2 Implications of Knowledge Awareness for Computer-
Supported Collaborative Learning 
This dissertation provided an overview and analysis of the strengths of the concept 
of knowledge awareness for supporting individual and collaborative computer-
supported learning and its potential problems if unfavorable social influence 
dynamics are activated (cf. Chapter 2). 
One implication of the suggested extended classification of knowledge 
awareness is that instructors should consider which subcategories of knowledge 
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awareness could be helpful for specific learning goals and tasks of computer-
supported collaborative learning. For example, if a group of learners with 
heterogeneous levels of expertise (i.e., novices & intermediates; Bromme et al., 
2001, 2004) are supposed to collaborate, providing explicit information about the 
levels of expertise should be avoided because this could result in an unfavorable 
social comparison for the less competent learners and, thus, in a competence 
threat (Buchs & Butera, 2009; Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001). Instead, 
heterogeneous groups could be provided with subjective knowledge awareness 
information in a more task-focused sense such as, for example, “I did not 
understand this point” rather than in a competence-focused sense such as “I am a 
layperson”, since subjective knowledge awareness, in combination with further 
subcategories such as context-based knowledge awareness, has supported 
adaptation of communication to the learning partner’s understanding (Dehler-
Zufferey, Bodemer, Buder, & Hesse, 2011). However, the studies by Ray, 
Neugebauer, Sassenberg, Buder, and Hesse
The present dissertation’s first experimental study suggests that the 
configuration of hybrid and subjective knowledge awareness information in 
combination with providing explicit information about the higher competence of the 
source (i.e., a textbook of the subject-matter domain) of the presented task 
solution, which deviated from the learner’s solution, supported solving a 
 (2013) applying the same 
configuration of knowledge awareness as Dehler-Zufferey and colleagues (2011) 
have shown that (1) personality factors such as a high need for social comparison 
and (2) context factors such as a faked negative feedback about one’s own 
intelligence can counteract the positive impact of this configuration of knowledge 
awareness. 
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knowledge-rich task correctly. Further, comparing the peer condition of Study 1 
with the no peer talk condition of Study 2 indicates that dynamic knowledge 
awareness information (Study 2), that is, observing how the learning partner 
changes his or her task solution in real-time, more strongly encouraged learners to 
improve their own task solution (cf. technology affordances & representational 
guidance; Suthers, 2006) than static knowledge awareness information (Study 1). 
However, the time dimension of knowledge awareness (static / dynamic) should be 
varied within one and the same study in order to substantiate this assumption. 
Finally, since most studies on knowledge awareness have been conducted 
in the laboratory, future studies should more strongly focus on implementing and 
evaluating the impact of, for example, dynamic knowledge awareness information 
in longitudinal field studies. 
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Summary 
 
The present dissertation examined how learners react if they are confronted with a 
task solution that deviates from their own solution provided by a source of either 
equally low or high competence. This dissertation combined and extended two 
research areas in order to predict learners’ cognition and behavior in the context of 
a knowledge-rich, cognitive conflict task (Chapter 1): (1) research on the concept of 
knowledge awareness (Engelmann, Dehler, Bodemer, & Buder, 2009) and (2) 
research on the conflict elaboration theory (Mugny, Butera, Sanchez-Mazas, & 
Pérez, 1995). Knowledge awareness (Engelmann et al., 2009) is an approach 
developed in the field of computer-supported collaborative learning (CSCL), and it 
is defined as “an individual’s state of being informed and having perceived 
information about others’ knowledge”, that is, especially others’ externalized task-
relevant knowledge (Engelmann et al., 2009, p. 950). According to the conflict 
elaboration theory (Mugny et al., 1995) that is based on educational (e.g., Mugny & 
Doise, 1978) and social psychological theories and findings (e.g. majority vs. 
minority influence; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1986), 
confronting learners with a task solution that deviates from their own solution offers 
a great potential for learning if the producer of the deviating solution is an equally 
low competent learning partner (“peer”) because these learning partners may 
activate a stronger cognitive conflict (Quiamzade, Mugny & Darnon, 2009) that 
results in a more intensive search for the correct solution compared to high 
competent learning partners whose solution may be imitated more often uncritically 
(Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001).  
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In order to provide a distinction between the related concepts of knowledge 
awareness in CSCL and expertise awareness in computer-supported cooperative 
work (CSCW), in order to predict their psychological effects more comprehensively 
and in order to describe more precisely the configuration of knowledge awareness 
implemented in the context of this dissertation’s two experimental studies, a 
combined classification of knowledge awareness and expertise awareness in 
CSCL and CSCW was suggested in the conceptual part of the dissertation 
(Chapter 2). It was proposed to use the concept of “knowledge awareness” for 
CSCL settings which involve distributed persons with an equal level of expertise in 
a subject-matter domain (cf. Engelmann et al., 2009), whereas the concept of 
“expertise awareness” should be used for CSCW settings which involve a stronger 
asymmetry regarding the level of domain-specific expertise, in case of distributed 
professional cooperation with or help seeking from an expert, for example (cf. 
Maybury, D’Amore, & House, 2002; Nückles & Stürz, 2006; Reichling & Wulf, 
2009). The combined classification was based on a literature review of 30 
computer-based applications for supporting knowledge or expertise awareness and 
a review of 22 studies which contributed to clarifying the psychological effects of 
knowledge or expertise awareness and which were conducted in the past 16 years. 
Engelmann and colleagues (2009) introduced three categories of knowledge 
awareness in CSCL: context-based, content-based, and hybrid knowledge 
awareness. Sangin, Molinari, Nüssli, and Dillenbourg (2011) distinguished further 
between subjective, objective, and activity-based knowledge awareness (cf. Ogata 
& Yano, 1998), the last category being conceptually identical to the concept of 
action awareness (Carroll, Neale, Isenhour, Rosson, & McCrickard, 2003). This 
dissertation argues for the incorporation of two further dimensions which are 
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relevant both for knowledge awareness in CSCL and expertise awareness in 
CSCW (cf. Maybury et al., 2002), namely, (1) whether the information on the level 
of expertise is implicit versus explicit and (2) whether the information about others’ 
knowledge or expertise is provided only once (static knowledge awareness 
information) or whether dynamic changes to the knowledge or expertise are 
observable (dynamic knowledge awareness information). Based on the proposed 
combined classification of knowledge awareness, the studies of the present 
dissertation can be described as implementing hybrid, subjective, static (Study 1) 
and dynamic (Study 2) knowledge awareness information providing an explicit level 
of expertise of the learning partner. Further, possible functions of the subcategories 
of knowledge awareness and expertise awareness can be derived from the results 
of the studies that were categorized according to the combined classification. 
The first experimental study (Chapter 3) aimed at investigating the impact of 
knowledge awareness regarding a higher competence source of a cognitive 
conflict. In two conditions, students (N = 59) compared their self-created task 
solution with a partly correct solution presented additionally, deviating considerably 
from their solution. However, the students were not informed that the presented 
solution was only partly correct. The source label of the presented solution 
indicated either an equally low competent (“peer”) or a high competent source 
(“textbook”) whereas the presented solution was identical. In the baseline 
condition, this comparison possibility was missing. Students in the textbook 
condition experienced more cognitive conflict and adapted their solution more often 
to the correct aspect of the presented solution than students in the peer condition. 
That is, perceived cognitive conflict fully mediated the relationship between the 
experimental conditions with knowledge awareness and adaptation behavior. 
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Moreover, students’ need for social comparison of abilities (Gibbons & Buunk, 
1999) moderated their adaptation behavior in the two experimental conditions with 
knowledge awareness: Especially students with a low need for social comparison 
of ability adapted their solution more extensively in the textbook condition than in 
the peer condition. However, a mediated moderation model of these factors failed 
to reach significance. Therefore, it was concluded that the cognitive conflict as a 
mediator and social comparison of one’s own ability as a moderator exerted unique 
and independent effects on adaptation behavior in Study 1. 
This first study indicates that social influence dynamics postulated by the 
conflict elaboration theory in the context of well-defined problems (e.g., anagram 
tasks; Quiamzade et al., 2009), that is, a stronger cognitive conflict after being 
confronted with the deviating solution of an equally low competent producer (a 
peer) compared to a more competent producer (e.g., an expert), may not hold true 
for more knowledge-rich problems (e.g., identifying structural similarities between 
law cases; Nievelstein, van Gog, Boshuizen, & Prins, 2010) without interaction 
between the source of the cognitive conflict and the target person. Moreover, this 
study extended the empirical base of the conflict elaboration theory regarding 
relevant individual differences (i.e., need for social comparison; Gibbons & Buunk, 
1999). 
Since Study 1 showed that a more competent source of a cognitive conflict 
had more impact on target persons than an equally low competent source (peer), 
the second experimental study (Chapter 4) aimed at strengthening the impact of 
the equally low competent source by enabling peer talk (Mercer, 2000) in the form 
of computer-supported audio communication. Fifty-eight participants were 
randomly assigned to either 13 dyads with peer talk or 16 dyads without peer talk. 
Summary 
193 
All dyads compared their own task solution to their partner’s deviating task solution 
by means of a computer-supported external representation. Peer talk resulted in 
reduced perceived cognitive conflict (cf. Harmon, 1998). The correctness of task 
solutions was associated with the quality of the discourse content: Exploratory talk 
about one’s understanding of the task (cf. Mercer, 2000) was associated with a 
more correct solution whereas talking about coordinating task completion was 
associated with a less correct solution. This pattern of results is consistent with 
previous findings regarding computer-mediated communication of distance learning 
groups (e.g., Paulus, 2009).  
The descriptive comparison of the peer condition of Study 1 with the no peer 
talk condition of Study 2 showed that learners improved the correctness of their 
own task solution only in Study 2. In Study 1, the computer-based external 
representation supported static knowledge awareness, that is, information about 
the learning partner’s solution was provided only once, whereas in Study 2, 
dynamic knowledge awareness was enabled, that is, observing in real-time how 
the learning partner is changing his or her own solution. It is possible that dynamic 
knowledge awareness has encouraged the learners more to change their own 
solution thereby improving its correctness compared to static knowledge 
awareness (cf. technology affordances & representational guidance; Suthers, 
2006). Future studies could test this assumption by varying static versus 
knowledge awareness within one and the same study. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die vorliegende Dissertation widmete sich der Frage, wie Lernende reagieren, 
wenn sie mit einer Aufgabenlösung konfrontiert werden, die von ihrer eigenen 
Lösung abweicht, wobei die zusätzlich dargebotene Aufgabenlösung entweder von 
einem, im Vergleich zum Lernenden, gleich gering kompetenten oder von einem 
hochkompetenten Ersteller stammt. Diese Dissertation kombinierte und erweiterte 
zwei Forschungsbereiche, um Kognition und Verhalten von Lernenden bei einer 
voraussetzungsreichen kognitiven Konfliktaufgabe vorherzusagen (Kapitel 1): (1) 
den Forschungsbereich zum Konzept der Knowledge Awareness (Engelmann, 
Dehler, Bodemer & Buder, 2009) und (2) den Forschungsbereich zur Konflikt-
elaborationstheorie (Mugny, Butera, Sanchez-Mazas, & Pérez, 1995). Knowledge 
Awareness (Engelmann et al., 2009) ist ein Ansatz aus dem Bereich des 
computerunterstützten kollaborativen Lernens (CSCL) und wird definiert als „die 
Informiertheit einer Person über das Wissen anderer Personen“, wobei sich die 
Informierung insbesondere auf das externalisierte, aufgabenrelevante Wissen 
anderer Personen bezieht (Engelmann et al., 2009, S. 950). Gemäß der 
Konfliktelaborationstheorie (Mugny et al., 1995), die auf pädagogisch-
psychologischen (z.B. Mugny & Doise, 1978) und sozialpsychologischen Theorien 
und Befunden (z.B. zum Mehrheiten- vs. Minderheiteneinfluss; Deutsch & Gerard, 
1955; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1986) beruht, sei es besonders lernförderlich, wenn 
Lernende mit einer Aufgabenlösung konfrontiert würden, die von der eigenen 
Aufgabenlösung abweicht und von einem gleich gering kompetenten Lernpartner 
(„Peer“) erstellt wurde, weil diese Lernpartner einen stärkeren kognitiven Konflikt 
auslösen würden (Quiamzade, Mugny & Darnon, 2009), der zudem eher zu einer 
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Suche nach der richtigen Lösung führen würde als hochkompetente Lernpartner, 
deren Lösung häufiger unreflektiert imitiert würde (Quiamzade & Mugny, 2001).  
Um eine Unterscheidung zwischen den verwandten Konzepten der 
Knowledge Awareness im CSCL-Kontext sowie der Expertise Awareness im 
Kontext des computerunterstützten kooperativen Arbeitens (CSCW) zu treffen, um 
deren psychologischen Effekte umfassender vorhersagen zu können, und um die 
Form der Knowledge Awareness Information, die in den beiden experimentellen 
Studien dieser Dissertation eingesetzt wurde, genauer zu beschreiben, wurde im 
konzeptuellen Teil der Dissertation (Kapitel 2) eine kombinierte Klassifikation von 
Knowledge Awareness und Expertise Awareness für den CSCL- und den CSCW-
Bereich vorgeschlagen. Zudem wurde vorgeschlagen, den Begriff Knowledge 
Awareness im CSCL-Kontext bei räumlich verteilten Personen zu verwenden, die 
einen gleich hohen Kenntnisstand in einem Bereich aufweisen (cf. Engelmann et 
al., 2009), während der Begriff Expertise Awareness im CSCW-Kontext verwendet 
werden sollte, wenn eine stärkere Asymmetrie hinsichtlich des 
domänenspezifischen Kenntnisstandes vorliegt, zum Beispiel im Rahmen einer 
räumlich verteilten, professionellen Zusammenarbeit oder bei einem Hilfegesuch 
an einen Experten (vgl. Maybury, D’Amore, & House, 2002; Nückles & Stürz, 2006; 
Reichling & Wulf, 2009). Diese kombinierte Klassifikation basierte zudem auf 
einem Literaturüberblick über 30 computerunterstützte Anwendungen zur 
Förderung von Knowledge oder Expertise Awareness sowie auf einem 
Literaturüberblick über 22 Studien der vergangenen 16 Jahren, welche einen 
Beitrag zur Klärung der psychologischen Effekte von Knowledge oder Expertise 
Awareness geleistet hatten. Engelmann und Kollegen (2009) stellten die drei 
Kategorien Context-Based, Content-Based und Hybrid Knowledge Awareness vor. 
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Sangin, Molinari, Nüssli und Dillenbourg (2011) schlugen zudem vor, zwischen 
Subjective, Objective und Activity-Based Knowledge Awareness (vgl. Ogata & 
Yano, 1998) zu unterscheiden. Dabei ist die letzte Kategorie konzeptuell identisch 
mit dem Konzept der Action Awareness (Carroll, Neale, Isenhour, Rosson & 
McCrickard, 2003). Im Rahmen der vorliegenden Dissertation wurde 
vorgeschlagen, zwei weitere Dimensionen in die Klassifikation einzubeziehen, 
welche sowohl für das Konzept der Knowledge Awareness im CSCL-Kontext als 
auch für das Konzept der Expertise Awareness im CSCW-Kontext relevant sind (cf. 
Maybury et al., 2002), und zwar (1) ob die Information über den Kenntnisstand 
implizit versus explizit dargeboten wird und (2) ob die Informierung über das 
Wissen oder den Kenntnisstand anderer Personen lediglich einmal erfolgt (Static 
Knowledge Awareness Information) oder ob dynamische Veränderungen im 
Wissen oder Kenntnisstand beobachtbar sind (Dynamic Knowledge Awareness 
Information). Ausgehend von dieser kombinierten Klassifikation kann die Form der 
Knowledge Awareness Information, die in den Studien der vorliegenden 
Dissertation implementiert wurde, als Hybrid, Subjective, Static (Studie 1) bzw. 
Dynamic (Studie 2) Knowledge Awareness Information mit einer expliziten 
Informierung über den Kenntnisstand (Explicit Level of Expertise) des Lernpartners 
beschrieben werden. Zudem können aus den Ergebnissen der Studien, die nach 
der kombinierten Klassifikation kategorisiert wurden, mögliche Funktionen der 
Subkategorien von Knowledge Awareness und Expertise Awareness abgeleitet 
werden. 
Die erste experimentelle Studie (Kapitel 3) hatte das Ziel, den Einfluss von 
Knowledge Awareness bezüglich eines, im Vergleich zur Zielperson des 
Lernenden, höher kompetenten Auslösers eines kognitiven Konfliktes zu 
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untersuchen. Studierende (N = 59) verglichen in zwei experimentellen 
Bedingungen ihre selbst erstellte Aufgabenlösung mit einer zusätzlich 
dargebotenen, teilweise korrekten Aufgabenlösung, die von ihrer deutlich abwich. 
Die Teilnehmer wurden jedoch nicht darüber informiert, dass die dargebotene 
Lösung nur teilweise korrekt war. Als Ersteller bzw. Quelle der zusätzlich 
dargebotenen Aufgabenlösung wurde entweder ein gleich gering kompetenter 
Ersteller (ein „Peer“) oder eine hoch kompetente Quelle (ein „Lehrbuch“) 
angegeben, wobei die dargebotene Lösung jedoch immer identisch war. In der 
Baseline-Bedingung fehlte diese Vergleichsmöglichkeit in Form einer zusätzlich 
dargebotenen Aufgabenlösung. Die Teilnehmer der Lehrbuchbedingung erlebten 
einen stärker ausgeprägten kognitiven Konflikt und passten ihre Aufgabenlösung 
häufiger an den korrekten Teil der dargebotenen Lösung an als die Teilnehmer der 
Peer-Bedingung. Das heißt, der wahrgenommene kognitive Konflikt mediierte den 
Zusammenhang zwischen den experimentellen Bedingungen mit Knowledge 
Awareness und dem Anpassungsverhalten der Teilnehmer vollständig. Darüber 
hinaus moderierte die soziale Vergleichsorientierung der Teilnehmer hinsichtlich 
ihrer Fähigkeiten (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) ihr Anpassungsverhalten in den beiden 
experimentellen Bedingungen mit Knowledge Awareness: Insbesondere 
Studierende mit einer gering ausgeprägten sozialen Vergleichsorientierung 
hinsichtlich ihrer Fähigkeiten passten ihre Aufgabenlösung in der Lehrbuch-
bedingung stärker an die dargebotene Lösung an als in der Peer-Bedingung. 
Jedoch wurde das mediierte Moderationsmodell dieser Faktoren nicht signifikant. 
Deshalb wird geschlussfolgert, dass der Mediator kognitiver Konflikt und der 
Moderator soziale Vergleichsorientierung hinsichtlich der eigenen Fähigkeiten 
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jeweils einen unabhängigen Einfluss auf das Anpassungsverhalten in Studie 1 
ausübten. 
Diese erste Studie deutet darauf hin, dass soziale Einflussdynamiken, die 
von der Konfliktelaborationstheorie bei gut strukturierten Aufgaben (z.B. 
Anagramm-Aufgaben; Quiamzade et al., 2009) vorhergesagt wurden, d.h. ein 
stärkerer kognitiver Konflikt bei der Konfrontation mit der abweichenden Lösung 
eines gleich gering kompetenten Erstellers (Peer) im Gegensatz zu einem höher 
kompetenten Ersteller (z.B. Experte), möglicherweise nicht zutreffen bei stärker 
voraussetzungsreichen Aufgaben (z.B. strukturelle Gemeinsamkeiten von 
juristische Fällen erkennen; Nievelstein, van Gog, Boshuizen & Prins, 2010), bei 
denen keine Interaktion stattfindet zwischen dem Auslöser des kognitiven Konflikts 
und der Zielperson. Darüber hinaus erweiterte die Studie die empirische Wissens-
basis zur Konfliktelaborationstheorie im Hinblick auf relevante interpersonale 
Unterschiede (d.h. die soziale Vergleichsorientierung). 
Da die erste Studie zeigte, dass ein kompetenterer Auslöser eines 
kognitiven Konflikts einen größeren Einfluss auf die Zielpersonen ausübt als ein 
gleich gering kompetenter Konfliktauslöser (Peer), zielte die zweite experimentelle 
Studie (Kapitel 4) darauf ab, den sozialen Einfluss des gleich gering kompetenten 
Auslösers zu stärken, indem Peer Talk (Mercer, 2000) in Form von 
computergestützter Audio-Kommunikation zwischen dem Konfliktauslöser und der 
Zielperson ermöglicht wurde. Eine Stichprobe von 58 Teilnehmern wurde zufällig 
entweder zu 13 Dyaden mit Peer Talk oder zu 16 Dyaden ohne Peer Talk zugeteilt. 
Alle Dyaden verglichen ihre eigene Aufgabenlösung mit der abweichenden Lösung 
des Lernpartners mit Hilfe einer computergestützten externen Repräsentation der 
Lösungen. Peer Talk bewirkte eine Abnahme des wahrgenommenen kognitiven 
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Konflikts (vgl. Harmon, 1998). Die Korrektheit der eigenen Aufgabenlösung stand 
in Zusammenhang mit der Qualität der Gesprächsinhalte: Das Erklären des 
eigenen Aufgabenverständnisses (Exploratory Talk; vgl. Mercer, 2000) korrelierte 
mit einer korrekteren Aufgaben-lösung, während Gespräche über die 
Koordinierung der Aufgabenerledigung mit einer weniger korrekten Lösung 
korrelierten. Dieses Befundmuster stimmt mit früheren Studienergebnissen zur 
computergestützten Kommunikation virtueller Lerngruppen überein (z.B. Paulus, 
2009).  
Der deskriptive Vergleich der Peer-Bedingung aus Studie 1 mit der 
Bedingung ohne Peer Talk aus Studie 2 zeigt, dass sich die Korrektheit der 
eigenen Aufgabenlösung nur in der 2. Studie verbesserte. In Studie 1 förderte die 
computergestützte externe Repräsentation Static Knowledge Awareness, d.h. die 
einmalige Informierung über die Lösung des Lernpartners, während sie in Studie 2 
Dynamic Knowledge Awareness ermöglichte, d.h. das Beobachten in Echtzeit, wie 
der Lernpartner seine eigene Aufgabenlösung verändert. Möglicherweise hat 
Dynamic Knowledge Awareness die Lernenden stärker dazu ermuntert, ihre eigene 
Lösung zu verändern und sie dadurch zu verbessern (vgl. technology affordances 
& representational guidance; Suthers, 2006). Zukünftige Studien könnten diese 
Annahme überprüfen, indem Static versus Dynamic Knowledge Awareness 
innerhalb ein und derselben Studie variiert wird. 
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Appendix A 
Study 1: Solved and Unsolved Criminal Law Cases 
Solved Case Unsolved Case 
1.) 
Gelöster Fall Nummer 1: 
“Breach of domestic peace”: 
 
Hausfriedensbruch 
L ist stark angetrunken und schläft an der 
Bartheke ein. Der Wirt hat L bereits mehrfach 
dazu aufgefordert, die Kneipe zu verlassen 
und sieht sich nun gezwungen, die Polizei zu 
verständigen. 
 
- Täter: L 
Falllösung: 
- Verbrechensart: Unterlassungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Hausfriedensbruch 
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Vorsatz 
- Kein Rechtfertigungsgrund vorhanden 
- Schuldfähigkeit vermindert aufgrund 
Alkoholisiertheit 
 
Ungelöster Fall: „GRÜN“ 
“Green”:  
 
R (24 Jahre alt) steht am Ufer und sieht, dass 
sein Vater (65 Jahre alt) im See am Ertrinken 
ist. R und sein Vater sind allein. R wirft 
seinem Vater ein Seil zu, welches der Vater 
mit letzter Kraft erfasst. Plötzlich kommt R der 
Gedanke, dass dies doch eine gute 
Möglichkeit sei, um an das Erbe seines 
Vaters zu gelangen. R zieht das Seil ruckartig 
zurück. Durch den Ruck entgleitet dem Vater 
das Seil. Der Vater ertrinkt. 
 
 
Note. Correct case pairs are underlined. The cases are similar, yet not identical to example cases of 
educational materials applied in German law studies (e.g., Hemmer & Wüst, 2001, 2002; Schmidt & 
Seidel, 2000). The participants of both experimental studies were informed that the cases are based 
on German criminal law but with the restriction that the experimental studies did not claim to provide 
a complete representation of current German criminal law. Rather, the information about the cases 
was strongly simplified for the purposes of this dissertation’s both experimental studies. 
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Appendix A (Continued) 
Study 1: Solved and Unsolved Criminal Law Cases 
Solved Case Unsolved Case 
2.) 
Gelöster Fall Nummer 2: 
“Bodily injury”: 
 
Körperverletzung 
Frau P. lebt alleine in einer Reihenhaushälfte 
und hat im Winter die Streupflicht für den 
Gehweg vor ihrem Haus. Aufgrund einer 
akuten schweren Grippe mit hohem Fieber 
kann sie jedoch ihrer Streupflicht nicht 
nachkommen. Durch die Medikamente ist sie 
zudem sehr schläfrig und vergisst, bei den 
Nachbarn bezüglich einer Vertretung für ihren 
Streudienst anzufragen. Da geschieht es, 
dass eine ältere Dame auf dem vereisten 
Gehweg vor dem Haus von Frau P. 
ausrutscht und sich einen Beckenbruch 
zuzieht. Die ältere Dame verklagt Frau P. auf 
Schmerzensgeld. 
 
- Täter: Frau P. 
Falllösung: 
- Verbrechensart: Unterlassungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Körperverletzung 
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Fahrlässigkeit 
- Rechtfertigungsgrund: Konnte aufgrund 
eigener akuter Erkrankung ihrer 
Streupflicht nicht nachkommen 
- Schuldfähigkeit vermindert aufgrund 
Medikamenteneinnahme 
 
Ungelöster Fall: „GELB“ 
“Yellow”: 
 
Die Badeaufsicht eines öffentlichen 
Schwimmbades geht in die Mittagspause 
ohne einem Kollegen Bescheid zu geben, 
weil sie davon ausgeht, dass sie gleich 
wieder da ist und in dieser Zeit schon nichts 
passieren wird. Doch genau in diesem 
Zeitraum ertrinkt ein Junge beinahe im 
Schwimmbecken, als er einen Krampf im Fuß 
bekommt. Ein Badegast zieht den Jungen 
aus dem Wasser. Später verklagen die Eltern 
des Jungen die Betreiber des 
Schwimmbades. 
 
 
Note. Correct case pairs are underlined. The cases are similar, yet not identical to example cases of 
educational materials applied in German law studies (e.g., Hemmer & Wüst, 2001, 2002; Schmidt & 
Seidel, 2000). The participants of both experimental studies were informed that the cases are based 
on German criminal law but with the restriction that the experimental studies did not claim to provide 
a complete representation of current German criminal law. Rather, the information about the cases 
was strongly simplified for the purposes of this dissertation’s both experimental studies. 
Appendices 
233 
Appendix A (Continued) 
Study 1: Solved and Unsolved Criminal Law Cases 
Solved Case Unsolved Case 
3.) “Non-assistance of a person in danger”: 
Gelöster Fall Nummer 3: 
 
Unterlassene 
Hilfeleistung 
Die Wohnung der Familie F im 3. Stock eines 
Hochhauses steht in Flammen. Eine Flucht durch 
die Tür ist nicht möglich. Die Mutter scheut sich, ihr 
dreijähriges Kind aus dem Fenster zu werfen, 
obwohl hilfsbereite Passanten vor dem Fenster 
stehen, um das Kind aufzufangen. Da entreißt der 
Vater der Mutter das Kind und wirft es den 
Passanten in die Arme. Das Kind bleibt unversehrt, 
und auch die Eltern werden kurz darauf von der 
Feuerwehr gerettet. Trotzdem erwägen die 
Großeltern des Kindes, die Mutter wegen 
unterlassener Hilfeleistung anzuzeigen. 
 
- Täter: Mutter der Familie F:  
Falllösung: 
- Verbrechensart: Unterlassungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Unterlassene Hilfeleistung 
- Straftatbestand nicht vollendet 
- Fahrlässigkeit 
- Rechtfertigungsgrund: Angst um das Leben 
des Kindes & Schreck 
- Schuldfähigkeit entfällt aufgrund des Schocks 
in der Situation 
 
--- 
 
Note. Correct case pairs are underlined. The cases are similar, yet not identical to example cases of 
educational materials applied in German law studies (e.g., Hemmer & Wüst, 2001, 2002; Schmidt & 
Seidel, 2000). The participants of both experimental studies were informed that the cases are based 
on German criminal law but with the restriction that the experimental studies did not claim to provide 
a complete representation of current German criminal law. Rather, the information about the cases 
was strongly simplified for the purposes of this dissertation’s both experimental studies. 
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Appendix A (Continued) 
Study 1: Solved and Unsolved Criminal Law Cases 
Solved Case Unsolved Case 
4.) “Prevention of penalty & damage to 
property”: 
Gelöster Fall Nummer 4: Strafverhinderung 
 
Sachbeschädigung 
Ein äußerst nervöser Mann mit einer stark blutenden 
Schussverletzung kommt in die Arztpraxis von Dr. X, 
der eigentlich schon Feierabend hat und deshalb alleine 
in der Praxis ist. Der Doktor vermutet richtig, dass es 
sich bei dem Mann um einen Verbrecher auf der Flucht 
handelt. Er beschließt, zuerst die Wunde zu versorgen, 
danach aber sofort die Polizei zu verständigen. 
Nachdem der Doktor dem Mann einen Verband 
angelegt hat, lenkt der Mann den Arzt ab und schafft es, 
aus der Praxis zu fliehen. Als der Arzt die Polizei 
anrufen will, bemerkt er, dass sein Telefonkabel 
durchtrennt wurde. Als er es schließlich schafft, die 
Beamten zu verständigen, ist der Verbrecher auf der 
Flucht bereits erfolgreich untergetaucht. 
 
- Täter: Arzt Dr. X 
Falllösung: 
- Verbrechensart: Unterlassungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Strafverhinderung  
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Rechtfertigungsgrund vorhanden: Musste zuerst 
seiner ärztlichen Hilfspflicht nachkommen; somit 
entfallen Vorsatz- / Fahrlässigkeits- & 
Schuldfähigkeitsfrage 
 
- Täter: Mann auf der Flucht 
- Verbrechensart: Begehungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Sachbeschädigung (Telefonkabel) 
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Vorsatz 
- Kein Rechtfertigungsgrund vorhanden 
- Angeklagter voll schuldfähig 
 
--- 
 
Note. Correct case pairs are underlined. The cases are similar, yet not identical to example cases of 
educational materials applied in German law studies (e.g., Hemmer & Wüst, 2001, 2002; Schmidt & 
Seidel, 2000). The participants of both experimental studies were informed that the cases are based 
on German criminal law but with the restriction that the experimental studies did not claim to provide 
a complete representation of current German criminal law. Rather, the information about the cases 
was strongly simplified for the purposes of this dissertation’s both experimental studies. 
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Appendix A (Continued) 
Study 1: Solved and Unsolved Criminal Law Cases 
Solved Case Unsolved Case 
5.) “First degree arson, insurance fraud, & 
breach of domestic peace”: 
Gelöster Fall Nummer 5: Schwere Brandstiftung 
Versicherungsbetrug 
 
Hausfriedensbruch 
V (46 Jahre alt) zündet nachts seine Scheune an, um in 
den Genuss der Versicherungssumme zu gelangen. V 
weiß, dass der alkoholkranke Landstreicher L häufig in der 
Scheune übernachtet, was V stört. Auch an diesem Tag 
hat V den Landstreicher L auf der Wiese vor der Scheune 
sitzen sehen. V schaut trotzdem nicht vorher in der 
Scheune nach, sondern läuft sofort vom Tatort weg. So 
bemerkt er nicht, dass sich L tatsächlich in der brennenden 
Scheune befindet, weil er dort seinen Rausch ausschlafen 
will. L geht davon aus, dass der Besitzer der Scheune 
nichts dagegen hat, wenn er ab und zu in der Scheune 
übernachtet. Nun kann er sich nicht mehr befreien und 
verbrennt. Ein Zeuge hat V heimlich beobachtet und zeigt 
ihn bei der Polizei an. 
 
- Täter: V 
Falllösung: 
- Verbrechensart: Begehungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Schwere Brandstiftung 
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Vorsatz 
- Kein Rechtfertigungsgrund vorhanden 
- Volle Schuldfähigkeit 
 
- Täter: V 
- Verbrechensart: Begehungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Versicherungsbetrug 
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Vorsatz 
- Kein Rechtfertigungsgrund vorhanden 
- Volle Schuldfähigkeit 
 
- Täter: L 
- Verbrechensart: Begehungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Hausfriedensbruch 
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Fahrlässigkeit 
- Rechtfertigungsgrund: aus Not in Scheune 
übernachtet 
- Schuldfähigkeit vermindert aufgrund Alkoholisiertheit 
- Anklage entfällt, da L verstorben ist 
 
“Blue”: 
 
 
Ungelöster Fall: „BLAU“ 
 
Der Politiker X will nach 36-stündiger 
Recherchearbeit mit dem Auto nach 
Hause fahren. Beraterin B ist seine 
Beifahrerin. Aufgrund von 
Übermüdungserscheinungen 
übersieht X eine Frau, die auf einem 
Fußgängerweg die Straße überquert. 
Diese bleibt schwer verletzt auf der 
Fahrbahn liegen. Nachdem X 
angehalten hat, schaut B nach dem 
Zustand der Frau und erklärt dem im 
Wagen gebliebenen X 
wahrheitswidrig, dass die Frau tot 
sei, und dass es am besten wäre, 
den Unfallort zu verlassen, um der 
Strafverfolgung zu entgehen. So 
geschieht es. Als endlich jemand die 
schwerverletzte Frau entdeckt und 
den Notarzt ruft, kommt jede Hilfe für 
die Frau zu spät. 
 
 
Note. Correct case pairs are underlined. The cases are similar, yet not identical to example cases of 
educational materials applied in German law studies (e.g., Hemmer & Wüst, 2001, 2002; Schmidt & 
Seidel, 2000). The participants of both experimental studies were informed that the cases are based 
on German criminal law but with the restriction that the experimental studies did not claim to provide 
a complete representation of current German criminal law. Rather, the information about the cases 
was strongly simplified for the purposes of this dissertation’s both experimental studies. 
Appendices 
236 
Appendix A (Continued) 
Study 1: Solved and Unsolved Criminal Law Cases 
Solved Case Unsolved Case 
6.) “Aggravated battery & intimidation”: 
Gelöster Fall Nummer 6: Gefährliche 
Körperverletzung 
 
Bedrohung 
M hat B an diesem Abend in der Disco kennengelernt. 
Als M sich auf einem Feldweg nach Hause von B 
verabschieden möchte, wird M plötzlich von B mit 
einem Messer bedroht. M wehrt sich in Todesangst, 
verletzt B dabei ohne es zu merken mit dessen 
Messer und läuft davon. B bleibt aufgrund der 
Verletzung auf dem Feldweg liegen. Beim 
aufkommenden Gewitter wird B vom Blitz erschlagen.  
 
- Täter: M 
Falllösung: 
- Verbrechensart: Begehungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Gefährliche Körperverletzung 
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Rechtfertigungsgrund: Notwehr, d.h. Vorsatz-/ 
Fahrlässigkeitsfrage & Schuldfähigkeitsfrage 
entfallen 
 
- Täter: B 
- Verbrechensart: Begehungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Bedrohung 
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Vorsatz 
- Kein Rechtfertigungsgrund vorhanden 
- Volle Schuldfähigkeit 
- Anklage entfällt, da B verstorben ist 
 
- Täter: B 
- Verbrechensart: Begehungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Gefährliche Körperverletzung 
- Straftatbestand versucht 
- Vorsatz 
- Kein Rechtfertigungsgrund vorhanden 
- Volle Schuldfähigkeit 
- Anklage entfällt, da B verstorben ist 
 
“Red”: 
 
 
 
Ungelöster Fall: „ROT“ 
 
D filmt seine Arbeitskollegen 
unbemerkt dabei, wie diese planen, 
eine Bank auszurauben. D 
beschließt, den geplanten Bankraub 
nicht der Polizei zu melden, weil er 
seine Kollegen im Nachhinein 
erpressen möchte. Zwei Wochen 
später werden die Kollegen während 
des versuchten Bankraubs verhaftet. 
Als D in Verdacht gerät, vom 
Bankraub gewusst zu haben, 
durchsucht die Polizei seine 
Wohnung und entdeckt dort das 
Video mit dem geplanten Bankraub. 
 
 
Note. Correct case pairs are underlined. The cases are similar, yet not identical to example cases of 
educational materials applied in German law studies (e.g., Hemmer & Wüst, 2001, 2002; Schmidt & 
Seidel, 2000). The participants of both experimental studies were informed that the cases are based 
on German criminal law but with the restriction that the experimental studies did not claim to provide 
a complete representation of current German criminal law. Rather, the information about the cases 
was strongly simplified for the purposes of this dissertation’s both experimental studies. 
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Appendix B 
Study 2: Solved and Unsolved Criminal Law Cases 
Solved Case Unsolved Case 
1.) 
Gelöster Fall Nummer 1: 
“Bodily injury”: 
 
Körperverletzung 
Frau P. lebt alleine in einer Reihenhaushälfte 
und hat im Winter die Streupflicht für den 
Gehweg vor ihrem Haus. Aufgrund einer 
akuten schweren Grippe mit hohem Fieber 
kann sie jedoch ihrer Streupflicht nicht 
nachkommen. Durch die Medikamente ist sie 
zudem sehr schläfrig und vergisst, bei den 
Nachbarn bezüglich einer Vertretung für ihren 
Streudienst anzufragen. Da geschieht es, 
dass eine ältere Dame auf dem vereisten 
Gehweg vor dem Haus von Frau P. 
ausrutscht und sich einen Beckenbruch 
zuzieht. Die ältere Dame verklagt Frau P. auf 
Schmerzensgeld. 
 
- Täter: Frau P. 
Falllösung: 
- Verbrechensart: Unterlassungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Körperverletzung 
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Fahrlässigkeit 
- Rechtfertigungsgrund: Konnte aufgrund 
eigener akuter Erkrankung ihrer 
Streupflicht nicht nachkommen 
- Schuldfähigkeit vermindert aufgrund 
Medikamenteneinnahme 
 
Ungelöster Fall: „GRÜN“ 
“Green”:  
 
Die Badeaufsicht eines öffentlichen 
Schwimmbades geht in die Mittagspause 
ohne einem Kollegen Bescheid zu geben, 
weil sie davon ausgeht, dass sie gleich 
wieder da ist und in dieser Zeit schon nichts 
passieren wird. Doch genau in diesem 
Zeitraum ertrinkt ein Junge beinahe im 
Schwimmbecken, als er einen Krampf im Fuß 
bekommt. Ein Badegast zieht den Jungen 
aus dem Wasser. Später verklagen die Eltern 
des Jungen die Betreiber des 
Schwimmbades. 
 
 
Note. Correct case pairs are underlined. The cases are similar, yet not identical to example cases of 
educational materials applied in German law studies (e.g., Hemmer & Wüst, 2001, 2002; Schmidt & 
Seidel, 2000). The participants of both experimental studies were informed that the cases are based 
on German criminal law but with the restriction that the experimental studies did not claim to provide 
a complete representation of current German criminal law. Rather, the information about the cases 
was strongly simplified for the purposes of this dissertation’s both experimental studies. 
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Appendix B (Continued) 
Study 2: Solved and Unsolved Criminal Law Cases 
Solved Case Unsolved Case 
2.) 
Gelöster Fall Nummer 2: 
“Prevention of penalty, First 
degree arson & intimidation”: 
Strafverhinderung 
Schwere Brandstiftung 
 
Bedrohung 
H erfährt von seinem Kumpel N, dass N vor 
wenigen Monaten mit seiner Bande ein Feuer 
in einem Asylbewerberheim gelegt hat. Die 
Polizei konnte den Fall bisher nicht aufklären, 
weil die Spuren nur auf einen elektrischen 
Kurzschluss hindeuten. N macht H deutlich, 
dass er von H Stillschweigen bezüglich des 
Feuers im Asylbewerberheim erwartet. Da H 
die Brutalität seines Kumpels N kennt, hält 
sich H an die Abmachung. 
 
- Täter: H 
Falllösung: 
- Verbrechensart: Unterlassungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Strafverhinderung  
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Rechtfertigungsgrund vorhanden: von N 
bedroht 
- Vorsatz- / Fahrlässigkeitsfrage entfällt  
- Volle Schuldfähigkeit  
 
- Täter: N 
- Verbrechensart: Begehungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestände: Schwere Brandstiftung; 
Bedrohung 
- Straftatbestände vollendet 
- Vorsatz 
- Kein Rechtfertigungsgrund vorhanden 
- Volle Schuldfähigkeit 
 
 
“Yellow”: 
 
 
Ungelöster Fall: „GELB“ 
 
D filmt seine Arbeitskollegen unbemerkt 
dabei, wie diese planen, eine Bank 
auszurauben. D beschließt, den geplanten 
Bankraub nicht der Polizei zu melden, weil er 
seine Kollegen im Nachhinein erpressen 
möchte. Zwei Wochen später werden die 
Kollegen während des versuchten Bankraubs 
verhaftet. Als D in Verdacht gerät, vom 
Bankraub gewusst zu haben, durchsucht die 
Polizei seine Wohnung und entdeckt dort das 
Video mit dem geplanten Bankraub. 
 
 
Note. Correct case pairs are underlined. The cases are similar, yet not identical to example cases of 
educational materials applied in German law studies (e.g., Hemmer & Wüst, 2001, 2002; Schmidt & 
Seidel, 2000). The participants of both experimental studies were informed that the cases are based 
on German criminal law but with the restriction that the experimental studies did not claim to provide 
a complete representation of current German criminal law. Rather, the information about the cases 
was strongly simplified for the purposes of this dissertation’s both experimental studies. 
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Appendix B (Continued) 
Study 2: Solved and Unsolved Criminal Law Cases 
Solved Case Unsolved Case 
3.) “Prevention of penalty & damage to 
property”: 
Gelöster Fall Nummer 3: Strafverhinderung 
 
Sachbeschädigung 
Ein äußerst nervöser Mann mit einer stark 
blutenden Schussverletzung kommt in die 
Arztpraxis von Dr. X, der eigentlich schon 
Feierabend hat und deshalb alleine in der Praxis 
ist. Der Doktor vermutet richtig, dass es sich bei 
dem Mann um einen Verbrecher auf der Flucht 
handelt. Er beschließt, zuerst die Wunde zu 
versorgen, danach aber sofort die Polizei zu 
verständigen. Nachdem der Doktor dem Mann 
einen Verband angelegt hat, lenkt der Mann den 
Arzt ab und schafft es, aus der Praxis zu fliehen. 
Als der Arzt die Polizei anrufen will, bemerkt er, 
dass sein Telefonkabel durchtrennt wurde. Als er 
es schließlich schafft, die Beamten zu 
verständigen, ist der Verbrecher auf der Flucht 
bereits erfolgreich untergetaucht. 
 
- Täter: Arzt Dr. X 
Falllösung: 
- Verbrechensart: Unterlassungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Strafverhinderung  
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Rechtfertigungsgrund vorhanden: Musste 
zuerst seiner ärztlichen Hilfspflicht 
nachkommen; somit entfallen Vorsatz- / 
Fahrlässigkeits- & Schuldfähigkeitsfrage 
 
- Täter: Mann auf der Flucht 
- Verbrechensart: Begehungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Sachbeschädigung 
(Telefonkabel) 
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Vorsatz 
- Kein Rechtfertigungsgrund vorhanden 
- Volle Schuldfähigkeit 
 
“Blue”: 
 
 
 
Ungelöster Fall: „BLAU“ 
 
L ist stark angetrunken und schläft an der 
Bartheke ein. Der Wirt hat L bereits 
mehrfach dazu aufgefordert, die Kneipe 
zu verlassen und sieht sich nun 
gezwungen, die Polizei zu verständigen. 
 
 
Note. Correct case pairs are underlined. The cases are similar, yet not identical to example cases of 
educational materials applied in German law studies (e.g., Hemmer & Wüst, 2001, 2002; Schmidt & 
Seidel, 2000). The participants of both experimental studies were informed that the cases are based 
on German criminal law but with the restriction that the experimental studies did not claim to provide 
a complete representation of current German criminal law. Rather, the information about the cases 
was strongly simplified for the purposes of this dissertation’s both experimental studies. 
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Appendix B (Continued) 
Study 2: Solved and Unsolved Criminal Law Cases 
Solved Case Unsolved Case 
4.) “First degree arson, insurance fraud & 
breach of domestic peace”: 
Gelöster Fall Nummer 4: Schwere Brandstiftung 
Versicherungsbetrug 
 
Hausfriedensbruch 
V (46 Jahre alt) zündet nachts seine Scheune an, um in 
den Genuss der Versicherungssumme zu gelangen. V 
weiß, dass der alkoholkranke Landstreicher L häufig in 
der Scheune übernachtet, was V stört. Auch an diesem 
Tag hat V den Landstreicher L auf der Wiese vor der 
Scheune sitzen sehen. V schaut trotzdem nicht vorher 
in der Scheune nach, sondern läuft sofort vom Tatort 
weg. So bemerkt er nicht, dass sich L tatsächlich in der 
brennenden Scheune befindet, weil er dort seinen 
Rausch ausschlafen will. L geht davon aus, dass der 
Besitzer der Scheune nichts dagegen hat, wenn er ab 
und zu in der Scheune übernachtet. Nun kann er sich 
nicht mehr befreien und verbrennt. Ein Zeuge hat V 
heimlich beobachtet und zeigt ihn bei der Polizei an. 
 
- Täter: V 
Falllösung: 
- Verbrechensart: Begehungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestände: Schwere Brandstiftung; 
Versicherungsbetrug 
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Vorsatz 
- Kein Rechtfertigungsgrund vorhanden 
- Volle Schuldfähigkeit 
 
- Täter: L 
- Verbrechensart: Begehungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Hausfriedensbruch 
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Fahrlässigkeit 
- Rechtfertigungsgrund: aus Not in Scheune 
übernachtet 
- Schuldfähigkeit vermindert aufgrund 
Alkoholisiertheit 
- Anklage entfällt, da L verstorben ist 
 
“Lilac”: 
 
 
 
Ungelöster Fall: „LILA“ 
 
R (24 Jahre alt) steht am Ufer und 
sieht, dass sein Vater (65 Jahre alt) 
im See am Ertrinken ist. R und sein 
Vater sind allein. R wirft seinem 
Vater ein Seil zu, welches der 
Vater mit letzter Kraft erfasst. 
Plötzlich kommt R der Gedanke, 
dass dies doch eine gute 
Möglichkeit sei, um an das Erbe 
seines Vaters zu gelangen. R zieht 
das Seil ruckartig zurück. Durch 
den Ruck entgleitet dem Vater das 
Seil. Der Vater ertrinkt. 
 
 
Note. Correct case pairs are underlined. The cases are similar, yet not identical to example cases of 
educational materials applied in German law studies (e.g., Hemmer & Wüst, 2001, 2002; Schmidt & 
Seidel, 2000). The participants of both experimental studies were informed that the cases are based 
on German criminal law but with the restriction that the experimental studies did not claim to provide 
a complete representation of current German criminal law. Rather, the information about the cases 
was strongly simplified for the purposes of this dissertation’s both experimental studies. 
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Appendix B (Continued) 
Study 2: Solved and Unsolved Criminal Law Cases 
 
Solved Case Unsolved Case 
5.) “Aggravated battery & intimidation”: 
Gelöster Fall Nummer 5: Gefährliche 
Körperverletzung 
 
Bedrohung 
M hat B an diesem Abend in der Disco 
kennengelernt. Als M sich auf einem Feldweg nach 
Hause von B verabschieden möchte, wird M 
plötzlich von B mit einem Messer bedroht. M wehrt 
sich in Todesangst, verletzt B dabei ohne es zu 
merken mit dessen Messer und läuft davon. B 
bleibt aufgrund der Verletzung auf dem Feldweg 
liegen. Beim aufkommenden Gewitter wird B vom 
Blitz erschlagen.  
 
- Täter: M 
Falllösung: 
- Verbrechensart: Begehungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Gefährliche Körperverletzung 
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Rechtfertigungsgrund: Notwehr, d.h. Vorsatz-/ 
Fahrlässigkeitsfrage & Schuldfähigkeitsfrage 
entfallen 
 
- Täter: B 
- Verbrechensart: Begehungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Bedrohung 
- Straftatbestand vollendet 
- Vorsatz 
- Kein Rechtfertigungsgrund vorhanden 
- Volle Schuldfähigkeit 
- Anklage entfällt, da B verstorben ist 
 
- Täter: B 
- Verbrechensart: Begehungsstraftat 
- Straftatbestand: Gefährliche Körperverletzung 
- Straftatbestand versucht 
- Vorsatz 
- Kein Rechtfertigungsgrund vorhanden 
- Volle Schuldfähigkeit 
- Anklage entfällt, da B verstorben ist 
 
“Red”: 
 
Ungelöster Fall: „ROT“ 
 
Der Politiker X will nach 36-stündiger 
Recherchearbeit mit dem Auto nach 
Hause fahren. Beraterin B ist seine 
Beifahrerin. Aufgrund von 
Übermüdungserscheinungen übersieht 
X eine Frau, die auf einem 
Fußgängerweg die Straße überquert. 
Diese bleibt schwer verletzt auf der 
Fahrbahn liegen. Nachdem X 
angehalten hat, schaut B nach dem 
Zustand der Frau und erklärt dem im 
Wagen gebliebenen X wahrheitswidrig, 
dass die Frau tot sei, und dass es am 
besten wäre, den Unfallort zu verlassen, 
um der Strafverfolgung zu entgehen. So 
geschieht es. Als endlich jemand die 
schwerverletzte Frau entdeckt und den 
Notarzt ruft, kommt jede Hilfe für die 
Frau zu spät. 
 
 
Note. Correct case pairs are underlined. The cases are similar, yet not identical to example cases of 
educational materials applied in German law studies (e.g., Hemmer & Wüst, 2001, 2002; Schmidt & 
Seidel, 2000). The participants of both experimental studies were informed that the cases are based 
on German criminal law but with the restriction that the experimental studies did not claim to provide 
a complete representation of current German criminal law. Rather, the information about the cases 
was strongly simplified for the purposes of this dissertation’s both experimental studies. 
 
